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Reflections on the Quarter

Another Step Toward Unity in Europe

ON December 23, 1963 the EEC Council of Ministers agreed, after long deliberation, on price levels for several agricultural commodities and on policies for the forthcoming negotiations with the United States under the Trade Expansion Act. Had the Six failed to reach accord on agricultural problems, the EEC might have lost the support of its members. The agreement initialed in Brussels enables the Common Market to move one step toward the attainment of the goals set by the Rome Treaty.

The latest agreements on agricultural policy reflect decisions taken by the Six in January 1962. At that time the EEC Council agreed to establish an agricultural policy based upon import levies. Under such a system consumers in an importing country would make up the difference between lower world prices and those in its domestic agricultural market. The Six also agreed in 1962 upon provisions for an agricultural fund to finance rebates to Community exporters, to provide subsidies for producers whose prices exceeded those set by the EEC, and to enable less efficient farmers to adapt themselves to the Common Market agricultural system. With this agreement, the EEC, at the beginning of 1962, entered the second of the three stages specified in the Rome Treaty.

The Six, however, had side-

stepped temporarily the thorny problem of specific price levels required by the accord of January 1962. In that agreement, the Six had committed themselves to the harmonization of agricultural prices at a level between those of West Germany and France. A Common Market price for agricultural commodities would be established. Certain sectors of the Federal Republic's agriculture produce foodstuffs at prices considerably higher than their French competitors. Under the agreement of January 1962, therefore, West German food prices would be lowered, while those of France would be raised. Less efficient, subsidized German farmers would eventually face competition in the markets of the Federal Republic from lower-cost French producers. In turn, the Bonn government could no longer, at the end of the EEC transitional period, continue to subsidize its farmers as in the past.

As a result of their agreement of December 23, 1963, the EEC has established a timetable for the creation of Community prices for rice, beef and dairy products. Furthermore, the Six agreed that grain prices will be set before April 15, 1964 on the basis of the Commission's "Manholt Plan." According to the proposal of the EEC's Vice-President, a single market together with a community price would be established for grain on July 1, 1964. The "Manholt Plan" provides for substantial reductions

in wheat and rye production in the Federal Republic, together with a decline in farm income and slight increases in bread prices. Agricultural incomes in Luxembourg and Italy would probably decline under this plan. However, farmers in these countries would receive compensation from the Community during the transitional period. The Community's scheme for the harmonization of agricultural prices calls for levies upon countries exporting to other EEC members. Such levies are to be determined on the basis of the difference between the market price of the commodity in the producing country and the target price established by the EEC. Levies are to be imposed upon some agricultural imports from outside the Common Market. Having established a target price within the Community, the EEC members will place upon imports of grain, for example, a levy fixed at the difference between the target price in the Common Market and the selling price of the imported farm commodity.

EEC members who purchase farm products from third countries will pay a proportion of the levy upon such imports to the European Guidance and Guarantee Fund. The objective of this fund is to assist in the structural reorganization of the Community's agricultural system. It was this provision of EEC farm policy to which the British negotiators objected during the Brussels negotiations for Great Britain's entry into the Common Market. The British appeared unwilling to subject imports of food-

stuffs from the Commonwealth to taxes by the EEC. The latest EEC accord on agriculture, therefore, may pose yet another obstacle to eventual British EEC membership.

The agreements which emerged from December's EEC meeting provide directives to the Community's negotiators in negotiations scheduled for May 1964 under the Trade Expansion Act. In 1963 representatives of the United States and European countries met in Geneva from May 16-21 to prepare the way for the 1964 "Kennedy Round" of tariff bargaining, so called because of the authority granted to the Administration to lower trade restrictions under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

At this meeting the delegates reached agreement upon two principles which will govern later tariff negotiations. First, the negotiators will follow the general rule of equal linear reductions in tariff structures. This method of tariff cutting, used by the Common Market, provides for percentage reductions in a nation's entire tariff structure, in contrast to the traditional procedure of item-by-item negotiation. Linear reductions permit a gradual lowering of tariffs while minimizing economic pressure upon less efficient industries in a particular nation.

Secondly, the conferees at the May 1963 talks in Geneva agreed upon the need for exceptions to the rule of linear reductions. According to the agreement, "in those cases where there are significant disparities in tariff levels, the tariff reductions will be based upon special

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rules of general and automatic application." The May meeting, however, had not produced a clear meaning of "significant disparities." The United States and the EEC each left the conference with differing interpretations of this principle.

The December meeting produced agreement among Common Market countries upon criteria for identifying "significant disparities." The EEC Council agreed also to minimize the number of exceptions to the principle of linear reductions in tariffs. The United States, at last May's meeting, had rejected initially the "significant disparities" principle. Subsequently, the American negotiators acceded to this proposal, but hedged their acceptance with the proviso that the term "significant disparities" be narrowly defined, and that, in most cases, the principle of equal percentage cuts be followed. The December accord in the EEC may enhance the prospects for success in the negotiations between the United States and its European allies scheduled for May 1964.

In the months following France's veto of British membership in the EEC, the movement toward European unity appeared to lose much of its momentum. Europeans who had favored Britain's entry into the Common Market resented the action taken by President de Gaulle at his press conference on January 14. France's EEC partners were not prepared to protest French policy by withdrawing from the Common Market, but they were reluctant to contemplate further measures toward European unity.

Thus the agricultural accord marks the first major EEC agreement on European unity since President de Gaulle's rejection of the British bid for Common Market membership. French and German leaders have voiced their interest in further steps toward political unity. In his 1964 New Year's address, President de Gaulle declared that France had as a principal objective to achieve "the union of Europe, including as soon as possible the regular and organized cooperation of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France in the domains of politics, defense and culture, as will be the case in that of economics." With the support of President de Gaulle, Chancellor Erhard proposed, on January 10, the merger of the executives of the Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market, and Euratom. Undoubtedly, such a proposal envisages the eventual granting of additional powers to the successor organization of the three communities.

The Gaullist vision of a united Europe, however, emphasizes cooperation among existing governments, rather than the creation of authorities with supranational powers. European unity, as propounded by President de Gaulle, includes such measures as periodic meetings of heads of governments, harmonization of military doctrine, joint training of armed forces, cultural exchanges, and agreement upon basic foreign policies vis-à-vis states outside Europe. Discord exists among Europeans about the size of

a united Europe. Those who oppose the admission of new members to the EEC fear the problems likely to arise in accommodating the Common Market to a "massive entourage" of countries with differing backgrounds and policies. Other Europeans envisage, however, an "outward looking" EEC embracing Britain and perhaps other countries in Europe.

Hence, the success of Europeans in achieving greater unity during 1964 depends to a considerable extent upon their ability to devise proposals which reconcile conceptions of a federal Europe and those who favor a *Europe des patries*, as well as divergent views of an "inward looking" and an "outward looking" Europe. The agricultural agreement concluded in Brussels removes one obstacle from the road toward European unity.

Cuba: Internal Failure and External Menace

January 1, 1964 marked the fifth anniversary of Fidel Castro's assumption of power. When Castro entered Havana in January 1959, his 26th of July Movement enjoyed a measure of popular support rarely bestowed upon any government. Cubans then hoped for an administration under which Cuba would advance economically as well as politically. Today Havana resembles in drabness communist capitals behind the Iron Curtain. Castro's popular support has been vastly reduced, and the revolutionary fervor has cooled. Although government leaders exhort the populace to produce more for revolu-

tionary Cuba, the national economy languishes and the output of sugar, Cuba's principal export commodity, has declined below the prerevolutionary level.

Rationing, introduced in March 1962, has spread to include many kinds of foodstuffs. Cubans must now register with four food stores for groceries, meat, poultry and vegetables. Registrants receive a ration number, and may only purchase the wares they desire when their number appears in the shop window where they are registered. Because of irregular deliveries, family members must watch the shops almost constantly to avoid missing a turn. Current monthly rations allow each person to purchase six pounds of rice, two ounces of butter, two eggs, two pounds of chicken, three ounces of coffee, and about two quarts of milk (with more for children under seven). Shoes, clothing, linens and other standard household items are also rationed. Unfortunately for the Cubans, the rationing system merely permits certain purchases, but does not insure the presence of the items in the stores. Black and gray market sales at highly inflated prices absorb much of the already inadequate Cuban production, leaving the shelves of stores empty. In November, even sugar appeared on the ration list.

Severe crop damage inflicted by Hurricane Flora has contributed to Castro's economic problems. But the 1963 sugar crop, even without a hurricane, would have barely equaled one-half the annual sugar production of pre-Castro Cuba.

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During the first year of Castro's regime "Che" Guevara, then head of Cuban agriculture and industry, publicly welcomed the Eisenhower Administration's break in the sugar purchase arrangement between the two countries. Guevara argued that Cuba's one crop economy operated to the favor of the United States. Ironically, Cuba has attained a similar status in the Soviet scheme. Reductions in Cuban sugar production since 1959 have eliminated Cuba's once favorable balance in world trade.

Cuba's economic plight appears to have brought several changes in both the governing revolutionary party and the Cuban military organization. The new military program introduces a compulsory three-year draft for all men between the ages of seventeen and forty-five. Women may volunteer for two-year enlistments. The new arrangement is designed to provide increased flexibility to the armed forces. Cuba's military establishment has never recovered fully from the destruction of Batista's officer corps and the absorption of militia groups into its standing forces. The new program is designed also to alleviate Cuba's economic crisis: it provides that each man serve up to one year of his three-year commitment in "productive tasks" such as the cutting of sugar cane. Annual pay for soldiering in Cuba will be reduced. Thus, the Cuban government plans both to save money and increase production.

In mid-November, Dr. Juan Marinello, long a member of the

Cuban Communist Party, was removed as rector of the University of Havana and dispatched to a secondary diplomatic post at UNESCO in Paris. At the same time, Joel Iglesias was replaced as head of the Union of Communist Youth, and there were rumors that Carlos Rafael Rodriguez might be removed from his post as head of the Agrarian Reform Institute. In addition to making personnel changes, Castro is preparing his party for a national conference sometime in 1964. New members are being admitted from among candidates from state factories and farms who have demonstrated their support of the revolution by high production records and participation in volunteer activities.

These shifts seem to indicate a trend toward greater Cuban independence of the Soviet Union. However, in the past, Castro has removed old line communists without lessening his ties to the Soviet Union. The exiling of Anibal Escalante in 1961, for example, presaged no real change in Castro's attitude toward the Kremlin. During and after the missile crisis of October 1962, Castro seems to have disagreed with some of Khrushchev's actions. Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan was poorly received when he arrived in Havana in December 1962. Guevara hinted publicly that Cuba might adopt a more independent foreign policy. But Castro's forty-day visit to the Soviet Union in late spring 1963 served to relax whatever degree of Cuban-Soviet

strain existed. Following this trip, all of Castro's public statements were flavored with praise of the Soviet Union and its leader. Of communist countries, only the Soviet Union can supply even the basic needs of the Cuban economy. Castro's actions during the past year, including his sudden trip to Moscow in January 1964, have been consistent with his pro-Khrushchev statements.

Castro continues to make use of Cuban territory as a base for subversion in Latin America. Five years ago, the Castro regime launched several poorly planned invasions of its neighbors in the Caribbean. Since that time, Cuba has developed a network for subversion which includes instructors from the communist world. Latin American revolutionaries receive expense-paid trips to Cuba, where they undergo training in guerrilla tactics and other forms of warfare. An estimated seven thousand persons have returned from such training programs in Cuba, prepared to engage in revolutionary activities against noncommunist governments in Latin America.

In Venezuela, communist terrorists fought to disrupt the presidential elections scheduled for December 1. In early November the Venezuelan government discovered on a remote beach of the Paraguaná Peninsula some three tons of military equipment which had been shipped from Cuba. President Betancourt charged the Castro government with subversion and called upon the Organization of American States to take action to end

such interference in Venezuela's affairs. Following the election, the Venezuelan delegate to the OAS accused the Castro regime of "intervention and aggression." Subsequently the OAS voted 16-0 for an investigation and sent a five-nation committee to Venezuela. It has yet to approve measures designed to increase Cuba's isolation in the hemisphere.

During rioting which erupted in the Canal Zone on January 9, Castro's agents exploited differences between the United States and Panama. Moreover, terrorists trained in Cuba reportedly helped in the overthrow of the government of Zanzibar, which was replaced by a self-styled "people's republic."

Meanwhile, exile groups harass Castro's regime. Small, well-armed parties regularly attack Cuban coastal shipping and land on Cuban territory. In Las Villas Province guerrilla warfare on a small scale is in progress. During 1963, one command group damaged an oil refinery at Casilda, a power plant at Santa Lucia, a lumber mill in Cayo Guin and naval patrol boats at Isabela de Sagua. The Revolutionary Recovery Insurreccional Movement carried out a series of air strikes by light planes which evidently had no great difficulty penetrating Cuban coastal defenses.

There is little doubt that the Soviets have tired of certain features of their Cuban commitment. Soviet aid may total four hundred million dollars in 1963, by far the largest single communist assistance program, equaling all Soviet aid to other parts of the world. The

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Soviet base in Cuba at times has menaced the United States as well as countries in Latin America. Yet, Khrushchev has not succeeded in making Cuba a "show window" for communism in the Western Hemisphere. Such an achievement may well be beyond the Soviet Union's present capabilities. East Europeans have borne much of the burden of supplying Cuba. The October conference of the Communist Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) refused Cuban requests for increased aid and may have decided to cut Cuba's allotment for 1964. Perhaps because of the limitations of the Soviet assistance program, Cuba has sought more contacts with the nations of Western Europe—and possibly even the United States itself. In November, Castro, in interviews with the Ambassadors of France, Italy and Great Britain, asked for increased trade. In December, a Cuban trade mission arrived in Paris, and Cuba signed an exchange agreement with Spain. Finally, in January, Castro's government arranged for the purchase of buses from a British manufacturer and hinted that additional orders for goods from Britain might be forthcoming. Castro's public statements regarding relations with the United States have become more conciliatory. During November and December, broadcasts from Havana called upon the United States to resolve difficulties between the two countries.

A relaxation of tensions in the Caribbean could serve both the long and the short term interests

of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin would retain its Caribbean foothold for subversion—but the Soviets would be relieved of much of the financial strain of their present aid to Cuba. Castro's regime would benefit economically from a return to relatively normal trade relations. The Cuban dictator would gain time to strengthen his hold upon Cuba, while planning for the next active phase of revolutionary activity in Latin America. In the light of Castro's economic plight, the United States and its hemispheric partners might review their policy toward Cuba's communist regime in an effort to prevent communist subversion in the Free World.

The Soviet Agricultural Crisis

The Soviet Union has contracted or is negotiating to purchase \$1 billion worth of grain from the Free World countries. The Soviets offered to buy grain from the United States on terms which called for the immediate payment of 25 per cent of the cost, with the remainder to be paid within 18 months. Under these terms the Soviets would spread their payments over two years. Presumably, the Soviet gold stock would be reduced by some \$800 million in this transaction. Since the Soviet Union has gold reserves of between \$5 and \$9 billion, the communists are apparently willing to spend a sizeable portion of their gold reserve stocks on grain. About 10 million tons of grain can be obtained by this outlay.

In 1958, which was the year of

the best harvest in history, the Soviet Union allegedly produced 76.6 million tons of wheat, and has grown about 65 million tons annually between 1959 and 1962. Its total grain production was 157 million tons in 1958 and about 150 million tons during 1959. Thus, the billion dollar purchase improves the Soviet grain supply at most by some 7 per cent, a surprisingly small benefit for such a large investment. An examination of per capita Soviet grain production reveals an increase from 1102 pounds in 1950 to a peak of 1610 pounds in 1958. By 1961 this figure had declined to 1519 pounds.

Some of the increase in grain production from 1950 to 1958 may have been diverted to feed cattle, whose numbers allegedly have increased by some 45 per cent since 1950. Yet there is much good pasture land in the Soviet Union, and the density of cattle is lower than in the U.S. or Canada, and just about one-tenth that of Holland. Hence there appears to be no real need to divert wheat and rye from human consumption in order to feed livestock.

Khrushchev has intimated that the harvest decline in 1963 may be about 20 per cent. If Soviet figures for 1953-1962 are accurate, the Soviet Union, which has exported grain during the past five years, should have a reserve of about 15 million tons. Such a figure makes the massive Soviet imports hard to explain.

The question arises: Are Soviet agricultural statistics wrong, or does the harvest decline exceed the 20

per cent level and thus constitute a genuine catastrophe? Apparently, the Kremlin did not anticipate the grain shortages of 1963; otherwise the Soviet Union would not have regularly exported grain in large amounts. The communists, it might be expected, would have been anxious to keep food reserves in order to avoid emergencies. Of the approximately 7 million tons of grain exported in 1960, 1.8 million went to East Germany, partly for consumption by the Red Army; another 2.5 million tons were shipped to Czechoslovakia and Poland. Nevertheless, 1.3 million tons went to NATO countries. In short, in 1960 the Soviets exported about half as much grain as they purchased in 1963 from Free World countries. Over the five-year period before 1963, they exported considerably more grain than they are now importing for their own consumption.

There is no reason to doubt Soviet assertions that their grain acreage has been increased since 1950 by about 30 per cent. Without increases in yield, the increase in acreage alone should suffice for a per capita production of almost 1321 pounds or enough to provide the Soviet citizen with adequate nourishment. Except for the decreased yield of oats and potatoes, the Soviets reported yield increases for all crops.

Soviet fertilizer production has risen by at least 54 per cent between 1950 and 1961. There are indications that the production increase continued during 1962 and 1963. Fertilizer figures show, how-

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ever, one anomaly which casts some light on Khrushchev's recent pronouncements. Soviet potash production seems adequate, and output in phosphoric oxide reportedly is substantially higher than that of the U.S. These two types of fertilizers, which can be obtained without complicated industrial processes, do not seem to be short in supply. By contrast, nitrogen production clearly presents formidable problems for the Soviets, for they seem reticent to disclose figures about its manufacture. Apparently, production plans are not being met, despite the fact that until 1962 their goals had been quite modest. Soviet consumption of nitrogen is only about one-third that of the U.S. On a per capita basis it is less than one-fifth that of East Germany.

This deficiency may reflect Soviet backwardness in the more advanced sectors of the chemical industry. It may be due to shortages of electric power. Moreover, it may be indicative of production priority assigned to explosives. Possibly all three factors provide the explanation. But there also are indications of errors in agricultural planning. Grain production generally increases with increases in the utilization of nitrogen. It is likely, therefore, that the Soviets made a mistake when they enlarged acreage instead of concentrating on increasing yields.

If we assume that Soviet acreage rose only 20 per cent (instead of 30 per cent) and yields only 10 per cent (instead of an average 21 per cent), then the Soviets should have a grain crop of 130 million tons.

If they are so hard pressed that they must resort to large imports, then perhaps their production has fallen to the per capita level of 1950. In this case their crop must have dropped to 110 million tons, an overall decline of 27 per cent from average production during the past few years. This would mean that in some areas crops must have declined by about 50 per cent.

A clue to the Soviet agricultural problem is provided by articles in the Soviet press about crops rotting in the fields. Peasants apparently have been reluctant to put their best effort into the task of harvesting. For years the Soviet government has fought the battle against the individual plot. As recently as 1963, it restricted the size of such holdings. Private plots account for merely 3.3 per cent of the sown acreage, but this fraction of the land provides sustenance for 30 per cent of the cattle, 47 per cent of the cows producing milk, 26 per cent of the pigs, and 81 per cent of the goats. Private plots deliver 45 per cent of the meat, 46 per cent of the milk and almost 80 per cent of the eggs. The yield of the private plots in fruit is twice per acre that of the "socialist sector," and even the yield of potatoes is about two-thirds over that of the collective farms.

In brief, peasants may have been concentrating upon their private plots, using some of the precious fertilizer allotted to state and collective farms. Khrushchev's plan for increased use of fertilizer will work only if he can win the voluntary cooperation of the peasants.

But this may prove difficult to achieve if there is basic discontent among peasants with respect to state and collective farming.

The Kremlin, therefore, may be forced to take additional counter-measures, including the purchase of foreign grain, in order to supplement Soviet agricultural production. The grain sales of the Free World could help Khrushchev to carry through a beneficial reform of the Soviet agricultural system. However, it is more likely that they will enable the communists to consolidate their hold once again and halt the evolution toward a freer system.

Unrest in the Middle East

For decades the Middle East has seemed to be in a state of chronic crisis. Periodically, Arab governments undergo military coups which, in spite of eloquent promises that life will be better under the new regime, usually lead sooner or later to more of the same. Compared with the internal upheavals and great power rivalry which shaped international relations in the Middle East in the three years following the Egyptian-Czech arms deal of 1955, however, the region as a whole enjoyed a relatively quiet interval between 1958 and the last quarter of 1963.

In the early years of the 1960's, the policies of President Nasser became more moderate, or perhaps more subtle. Nasser may have been chastened by the experience of 1958, when the effort of Arab nationalists to subvert the Lebanon from bases in Syria and to destroy

the Jordanian and Iraqi monarchies led to Anglo-American intervention. Premier Kassem of Iraq, whose revolution against Faisal and Nuri es-Said had at first been interpreted in the West as a Nasser-inspired maneuver, became a foe of Nasser's UAR. Furthermore, Kassem's policies produced such a rise of communist influence in Iraq that even Nasser himself apparently became alarmed. A pro-Nasser uprising in Mosul in March of 1959 had deepened the rift between Cairo and Baghdad, the two major rivals for control of the Arab unity movement, but it also compelled Kassem to take a second look at the manner in which Arab nationalists were inclined to view his attitude toward the communists.

In the last decade, however, the rulers of many Arab countries have courted danger by their distinction between domestic communism (which they opposed or watched suspiciously) and the communist states (with which they sought friendly relations and various forms of cooperation). Nasser, even more than Kassem, attempted to compensate for increased economic collaboration with Moscow (e.g., his allowing the USSR to participate in the second-stage financing of the Aswan Dam, beginning in 1964) by mending his fences with the West—toning down his attacks upon King Hussein of Jordan, re-establishing diplomatic relations with Britain and France, and entering into agreements with U.S. aid agencies and Western-sponsored banking institutions.

In the meantime, the forces of

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Nasserism had been dealt a disappointing blow during 1961 when the Syrians, chafing under Egyptian efforts to dominate the UAR economically, militarily and politically, rejected the experiment in "Arab socialism" and seceded from the UAR. For the next two years, Nasser tried fitfully to re-establish hegemony over Syria in the face of a growing possibility that Syria and Iraq might manage to revive the pre-Nasserite scheme for a Fertile Crescent Union (or "Greater Syria" project, as it was sometimes called).

This possibility, which posed a danger to Nasser's program, appeared to be closer than ever to realization during 1963, when the Ba'ath ("Renaissance") Party first came to power as a result of military coups in both Baghdad and Damascus. During 1963, the Ba'ath emerged as the most efficiently organized socialist international operating on a regional scale in the Middle East. It was professedly anti-communist, although it was difficult to say how many Arab communists, handicapped by legal proscription, had found their way into its ranks. The Ba'ath also proved to be increasingly opposed to Nasser for it sought to substitute ideology for personality as the basis of the movement toward Arab unification.

The drive to bring Arabs from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf under one banner appeared, by the end of 1963, to have less impetus than it did five or six years earlier. Its leadership was more fragmented; intra-Arab disputes were more numerous. Ben Bella's repu-

tation in the Maghreb rivaled Nasser's. Bourguiba, not fully trusting either Nasser or Ben Bella, sought to bolster his position by demonstrating "republican solidarity" against conservative royal institutions—against Hassan in Morocco who was being pressed by Ben Bella, and against Hussein of Jordan and Saud of Saudi Arabia who periodically drew the fire of Nasser. Iraq remained suspicious that Cairo coveted her income from oil, while several of her neighbors wondered whether Iraq's renunciation of claims to Kuwait's oilfields was but a tactical maneuver. The fragmentation of the Arab world was increased by the Iraqis' exhausting and unpopular war against the Kurds, and the Algerian-Berber conflict in Kabylia which heightened border tensions between Ben Bella's republic and the kingdom of Morocco.

In April 1963, it appeared for a short time that an important step toward Arab unity had been taken. Egypt, Syria and Iraq announced agreement upon a federal scheme embracing the three countries in a new UAR. But once again, the constitution of a single Arab nation turned out to be a will-o'-the-wisp; the referendum on it never took place. The two Ba'athist regimes dragged their feet on the questions of unifying the command of the armed forces and dissolving all political parties so that the new union would draw its political inspiration only from the charismatic leader in Cairo. Frequent disputes between Ba'athists and Nasserists followed in Syria and Iraq, until

finally in November 1963 Iraqi Colonel Abdel Salam Arif, regarded as a pro-Nasser officer, led a coup against Ba'ath extremists in Baghdad, formed a new government and declared that he would soon resume negotiations with Egypt and Syria on the proposed federal constitution. Whether this development permanently strengthened Nasser's position against the Ba'ath, or represented only one more ephemeral triumph, remained to be seen.

Nasser, within the last two years, has undoubtedly felt himself hard-pressed to show that he is still chief spokesman for the cause of Arab unity. He has stood in need of a dramatic victory, one which would convince the faint-hearted that the "wave of the future" was still his personal chariot. But he has been extremely hesitant to carry out a frontal assault against either of the Arabs' foreign *bêtes noires*—the Western "imperialists" and the Israeli Zionists—lest such a move at this time prove too costly or too dangerous or both. It is one thing to boast occasionally that Egypt possesses missiles which are capable of falling on targets at "points south of Beirut." But if German engineers are helping to develop Egypt's military technology, Nasser cannot afford to forget that France, the United States and even West Germany have been aiding Israel.

Nasser, therefore, has been forced to seek change elsewhere. The most likely remaining target has been monarchical conservatism, either in Jordan or Saudi Arabia, the two countries against which he has

railed most vehemently from time to time. But here, too, he has had to make a choice. Jordan is much closer at hand than Saudi Arabia, and it has always been possible to attract a crowd into the streets of Amman for a pro-Nasser demonstration. What is more, if the Egyptian president could stage-manage a republican coup in Jordan it might enhance the prospects of an Arab federal union embracing Syria and Iraq. But Nasser is well aware that the security of Hussein's position still rests today on the same basis as in 1958. If the Jordanian monarchy should be destroyed, Israel has no choice but to presume that the entire Arab territory confronting her eastern border would fall under the control of Nasser or some other militant nationalist. Hence strategists everywhere take it for granted that Israel is prepared to meet an upheaval in Amman by occupying the west bank of the Jordan, thereby widening and strengthening her territorial position along what is now the narrowest and strategically weakest sector. For the present, Nasser is not prepared to destroy the Jordanian monarchy, and in January 1964 even received King Hussein in Cairo for the "summit meeting" on the Jordan waters question.

Thus Nasser is left with but *one* likely target, and that is Saudi Arabia, relatively backward and exposed, yet desirable for its oil-fields. Probably one of the principal motives for his military intervention in Yemen on behalf of the revolutionary regime of Abdullah Sallal

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was to gain a strategic foothold on the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula from which to operate against the Saudis. Sallal had ousted the royal government of the Imam al-Badr in September 1962, but in all probability his regime could not have survived as long as it has without large-scale Egyptian support. Prince Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, fearing that Nasser's intrusion into Yemen was actually a maneuver directed against King Saud, has steadfastly supported the Yemeni royalists.

A year has passed since the United States startled both the Saudis and the British (who are concerned over the future of the Aden Protectorate) by granting diplomatic recognition to the Sallal regime only a few days after the latter had openly boasted its intention to liberate the entire Arabian Peninsula. For three years now, American policy has been predicated on the assumption that Nasser is the "nicest Arab" of them all—much nicer than the reactionary royalists who seem so incompetent with respect to socio-economic reform, and decidedly preferable to his other chief competitors for the leadership of the Arab social revolution—the Ba'ath and the communists. American policymakers, so it seems, feel that they must hitch their wagon to one of the three dynamic political forces in the Middle East, all of which, unfortunately, are leftist, socialist-revolutionary and basically anti-Western. Consequently, they have decided to lend their support to Nasser, even to the point of allow-

ing him to increase his pressure upon monarchical regimes which are friendly to U.S. political, commercial and even military objectives in the area.

One can sympathize with the plight of U.S. policymakers who have such a limited range of available alternatives from which to choose. However, there is now practically no hope of politically moderate and stable constitutional systems emerging within the Arab world (except perhaps in the Lebanon); the only criterion of social progress applicable to the region is the degree to which the standard of living can be raised. Still, in view of the Egyptian government's economic performance during the last decade, it is not at all clear that Nasser's brand of Arab socialism can materially improve the lot of the inhabitants of a desert kingdom. The conservative regime of King Saud, with Western assistance, can probably do as much for his people as can an anti-Western successor government.

Nasser's adventure in Yemen has been carried out with the blessing and support of the Soviet Union, which supplied the bulk of the military equipment and an estimated 1,500 personnel. The U.S. decision to recognize Sallal has failed to reap the expected benefits. Soviet influence in the peninsula has not been reduced in relation to that of the United States. The Sallal regime has not moderated its attitude toward Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Aden. The Egyptian military presence has not been withdrawn, in spite of repeated

pleas from Washington and the UN. Nasser shuffled his feet as if to get up and leave the Yemen, but there was more rotation of troops than evacuation.

To pro-Western elements within the Middle East, it now looks as though the United States is virtually cooperating with the USSR in backing Nasser's imperialistic campaign to replace conservative monarchies with his satellite republics. The fact that Egypt sent a sizeable force (up to 28,000 men) to participate in the civil war of another Arab state has established an ominous precedent. During the fall of 1963, Congressional attempts to cut off U.S. economic aid to Cairo on the grounds that the latter was engaged in aggression against Yemen stumbled over the paradox that the Administration had granted recognition to the puppet revolutionary republic which requested Nasser's aid. The American decision was premature and unwise, and may yet lead to regrettable consequences.

Reverses in Southeast Asia

Toward the end of 1963, the American position in Southeast Asia deteriorated. The United States faced a series of setbacks, more distressing than any since the collapse two years ago of the U.S.-supported Royal Lao Army and the subsequent decision to "neutralize" Laos. Unless Washington can devise strategies for halting the gradual erosion of the noncommunist position in Southeast Asia, the United States may suffer a defeat which could dwarf

the French debacle in Indochina of just ten years ago.

In Laos, the communist Pathet Lao—who have shown no intention of abiding by the letter or the spirit of the Geneva neutralization accords—have wrested a number of strategic positions from the neutral and pro-Western forces. The immediate goal of these continuing attacks is not clear, but each victory weakens the noncommunist forces and promotes the long-range communist goal—the creation of a strategically placed communist satellite.

The pro-Western and neutralist leaders appear to have buried their animosity toward each other. But eighteen months after the Geneva settlement, Laos has not been stabilized; its security and neutrality have not been assured. Perhaps Washington and other Western capitals are bound, for lack of an alternative policy and in accordance with the Geneva agreements, to watch helplessly for another year or two while communist-style "neutralization" proceeds apace. But the West should be under no misapprehension about the outcome. If Laos is so unimportant that its communization would not seriously affect the remainder of the peninsula, then the United States might be well advised to continue its present policy and hope for the best. But the geography of the area strongly suggests that Laos is a strategic pivot. If Washington concludes that Laos cannot be lost with impunity, then it is time to consider other courses of action, e.g., partitioning Laos, in order to

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save the strategic southern and western portions for the defense of Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand.

Cambodia was the scene of another reverse. In November, Prince Norodom Sihanouk suddenly terminated the annual \$30 million U.S. program of economic and military aid to his country. Although many an American taxpayer might welcome such a decision by a neutral country, Washington was not amused by the sight of a small country angrily rejecting U.S. aid. Sihanouk followed this decision by threats to break off diplomatic relations with Washington. Ostensibly, the latest maneuver of this unpredictable ruler was related to Cambodia's allegation that the United States was supporting Cambodian rebels in South Vietnam and Thailand. But this charge had been leveled before without precipitating such a drastic move.

In reality, Sihanouk had other motives. Cambodian relations with Thailand and South Vietnam have never been cordial—a situation existing well before the present era. For several years, South Vietnam forces, claiming that the Viet Cong use Cambodian soil as a sanctuary and receive arms and supplies from across the border, have been involved in skirmishes with Cambodian troops. Sihanouk has repeatedly charged that these U.S. allies are plotting his overthrow, and he would like nothing better than to deal his neighbors a major diplomatic defeat—perhaps by having them “neutralized” for the sake of peace in Southeast Asia.

Moreover, Sihanouk has been trying to hedge against the future, a practice in which some other Southeast Asian rulers seem to have been engaging in recent months. To the north, Laos is gradually falling to the communists, and the signs from South Vietnam seem to point in the same direction. Sihanouk has threatened several times to ally himself with Red China if he cannot gain redress of his grievances from the United States. In all likelihood, this is merely bluff. But at the very least, Sihanouk wants to gain for Cambodia an internationally recognized status as a neutral, presumably so as to avoid offending Peking.

In pursuit of his goal, the Prince has repeatedly called for an international conference, on the scale of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva conferences, to grant permanent neutrality to Cambodia. The United States has been reluctant to agree to the convening of an international conference to neutralize another Southeast Asian state. The Administration fears that such a conference composed of Red China, the Soviet Union, France, India and other nations which do not agree with U.S. policy, would urge neutralization of other parts of the peninsula, including South Vietnam and perhaps even Thailand. Such a solution would be agreeable to Sihanouk, whose last complaint against the United States probably had as one of its objectives to force Washington to approve a conference for this purpose. The U.S. government has agreed to the principle of neutralizing Cambodia but believes a

signed declaration by the Geneva powers would be sufficient.

Another reason for Cambodia's sudden leap into the international diplomatic spotlight undoubtedly was the assurance from Paris that President de Gaulle, embarking on a new French policy in Asia, would be willing to replace U.S. aid with French assistance and would support Cambodia's request for a conference to neutralize Cambodia, if not the entire peninsula. Cambodia's goal coincided with De Gaulle's plans to neutralize Vietnam as the only solution which would stop the fighting and be acceptable to all parties.

During 1963 the United States became embroiled in another Southeast Asian controversy when President Sukarno, fresh from his takeover of West Irian with U.S. and UN assistance, announced a policy of "confrontation" vis-à-vis Malaysia. His target was the plan to merge the British territories in North Borneo — Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei — with Malaya and Singapore. The British for some time had looked forward to the day when their Borneo dependencies would be incorporated into a state governed from Kuala Lumpur; and both the British and Malaysians had sought ways of joining to Malaya the great entrepot of Singapore. Malaysia seemed to be the ideal solution. An independent existence for the small British territories, predominantly Malay in race, did not appear feasible; as part of a larger Malaysia they would have a better chance for economic growth and political stability.

They would also be less likely to fall prey to Indonesian or Chinese communist expansion. For Malaya, the principal attraction of Malaysia is that it provides a way of bringing Singapore, with its predominant Chinese population, into the federation without overturning the favorable racial balance for the Malays. Malaysia—without Brunei—was born on September 16, 1963.

For more than a year Sukarno has denounced Malaysia as a British creation designed to perpetuate Western imperialism in Southeast Asia, especially through its control over the oil, tin and rubber of North Borneo and the maintenance of British bases on Indonesia's doorstep. Moreover, Djakarta asserts that London and Kuala Lumpur have violated the right of the peoples of North Borneo to self-determination. Sukarno has other reasons for opposing Malaysia. It is a potentially wealthy nation, with rising living standards under a free enterprise system and one of the most stable democratic governments in the underdeveloped world—a sharp contrast to Sukarno's own "guided democracy" and economic failures.

Moreover, Malaysia looms as a roadblock to Sukarno's designs on the isolated and weak North Borneo territories. Sukarno's Indonesia has become an imperialist power in Southeast Asia, bent on expanding its borders and influence. If Malaysia were to jell into a viable state, Sukarno's foreign adventures might be ended; he would be forced to turn his attention to economic troubles at home, not to

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mention other internal problems, with which he has never been able to deal successfully. Sukarno realizes that such a development is not likely to bring him the same measure of personal popularity as have his foreign adventures.

Sukarno has tried various tactics in his campaign against Malaysia. He sought the support of the Philippines—which has put forward rather tenuous claims to Sabah—but Manila has maintained a cautious neutrality. He has openly armed guerrillas and sent them into the North Borneo territories to join those elements which oppose Malaysia. He has sought and received support from Moscow and Peking for his “confrontation” policy. He has condoned riots against British property in Djakarta which he then took over as an allegedly protective measure. He broke off diplomatic relations with Kuala Lumpur and imposed a trade embargo against Malaysia—a move which, to date, has done far more harm to Indonesia’s shaky economy than to Malaysia’s.

Another tactic of Sukarno’s “confrontation” has been the planned discrepancy between his behavior and statements at various conferences with President Diosdado Macapagal of the Philippines and Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia and his actions and speeches in Djakarta. In these meetings, Sukarno has exuded charm and reasonableness, enabling the three leaders to sign a number of accords and giving rise periodically to the hope that all their differences could be peace-

fully settled. Yet, at the conclusion of these meetings, Sukarno has returned home to assure his people that “Malaysia will be crushed” and to press the border attacks.

Through this device, Sukarno managed, at the August 1963 tripartite meeting, to secure two limited objectives. He agreed to join a loose confederation, Maphilindo, whose members would meet regularly on economic and political problems and threats to their security. Reacting to Sukarno’s show of cooperation—and to U.S. pressure — Prime Minister Rahman agreed to postpone by two weeks the formation of Malaysia so that a UN team, with Filipino and Indonesian observers, could conduct a survey to determine whether the peoples of the Borneo territories wanted to join Malaya. When the survey team reported that a large majority clearly favored the federation, Indonesia rejected the findings.

Sukarno’s other move caused greater concern in Washington and London. In order to placate Sukarno, Malaya and the Philippines consented to regard the U.S. and British bases on their territories as “temporary” and to prohibit any further extension of these foreign military installations. The three nations also agreed to “abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defense [e.g., SEATO], to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers.”

The “confrontation” policy has not gone unnoticed in Washington. Early in 1963, advisers from the U.S. government and the Inter-

national Monetary Fund drew up with Indonesian authorities a comprehensive economic stabilization program. Under this program, initiated in May, the Fund was to provide \$50 million and the United States was to add \$10 million to an earlier (March 1963) loan of \$17 million; the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD was also planning to participate. However, when Sukarno increased his pressures against Malaysia—particularly when he proclaimed a trade embargo against the new federation, a step which was bound to reduce Indonesian export trade—the United States, the Fund and the DAC suspended the stabilization program.

In addition, in mid-September Washington announced that it was suspending all new economic aid to Indonesia and would review its policies toward that country. The new foreign aid law which Congress enacted late in 1963 requires the end of aid to Indonesia unless the President specifically finds that U.S. interests require a continuation. Thus armed by the Congress, President Johnson sent a note to Sukarno pointing out that it would be difficult to reach such a conclusion if Indonesia persisted in its "confrontation" policy. Early in the new year, Attorney General Robert Kennedy was dispatched to Southeast Asia to make another attempt to bring the principals together in the hope that Sukarno could be persuaded to live in peace with his new neighbor.

The nature of guerrilla warfare in the Borneo terrain which favors the aggressive party, the fact that

Indonesia's population is ten times that of Malaysia, the deteriorating U.S. (and, thus, British) position in Southeast Asia, and the support which Moscow and Peking have given to Sukarno's objectives—all these factors have led the Indonesian President to the conclusion that he possesses certain long-term advantages in this confrontation. Unless the United States, in conjunction with Britain, is willing to apply its considerable diplomatic, military and economic power in the area to thwart his policy, Sukarno will have little incentive to accept Malaysia as a permanent fact of life. Should Sukarno persist in his policy, Malaysia and its Western protectors might find it necessary to warn him that the long Indonesian coastline and the simmering discontent on Indonesia's outer islands offer opportunities for the use of British-trained Malayan and Sumatran guerrilla fighters in retaliation against Sukarno's regime.

* * *

Vietnam continues to pose the most complex and urgent problem in Southeast Asia for U.S. policymakers. On November 1, a group of military officers, led by Major General Doung Van Minh, seized control of the government of South Vietnam. President Ngo Dinh Diem and his influential brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were murdered. Whether these were political assassinations or were simply the work of overzealous captors now seems unimportant. The result was the downfall of a regime which had preserved South Vietnam from total chaos and communist takeover in the crucial years 1954-56;

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initiated, with U.S. assistance, land reforms and other programs designed to improve the lot of the people; and then fell victim to guerrilla warfare which mounted in intensity during the last five years.

There is no question that Ngo Dinh Diem was an authoritarian ruler who became immune to criticism and advice toward the end; that he committed many grave blunders in his struggle against the Viet Cong and in his relations with his domestic opposition. But his rule must be viewed in perspective and with dispassion. His rule was not the main cause of discontent in South Vietnam. Immediately after the partition of Vietnam in 1954, some one million Vietnamese fled south to escape Ho Chi Minh's communist paradise. The Diem government did what it could to resettle these refugees and then set about to bring order to South Vietnam. Impartial observers credit the Diem government with considerable success under the worst possible circumstances. When it appeared that Diem would be able to establish a stable government and a slowly improving social order, the communist Viet Cong intensified their guerrilla operations. Terrorism, hit-and-run raids and assassination of village and land reform officials spread. Because the French-trained Vietnamese army was ill-prepared to combat this type of warfare, the Viet Cong were able to entrench themselves throughout large parts of the countryside.

The turmoil and insecurity that followed was not the doing of the Diem regime. Discontent, of course,

existed in South Vietnam from 1954. Surely it existed in North Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh, however, took more ruthless measures to crush his domestic opposition and to prevent future unrest from developing. Had the Viet Cong not intervened in the south after the 1954 Geneva accords, had the South Vietnamese been able to live at peace for the next nine years, it is entirely possible that serious unrest in South Vietnam would have largely disappeared by now and the peoples of this unfortunate land would be living under a benevolent authoritarian government.

But the Viet Cong did intervene and President Diem, harassed by the ensuing guerrilla war, gradually fell into disfavor with certain influential segments of his army and his people. When the Kennedy Administration found Diem increasingly unwilling to accept U.S. advice, it began to look for an alternative. On November 1, a military junta, with U.S. encouragement if not support, brought down the House of Diem. The full story of the last years of the Diem regime remains untold; we must wait for historians to render a fair judgment. Meanwhile, it behooves Americans to look for lessons in this tragic course of events, for the communists will undoubtedly confront us with similar situations in future "wars of national liberation."

The communists, wherever they carry on a protracted guerrilla campaign which the local military forces are not fully prepared to combat, can create unrest, turmoil and even chaos throughout the countryside. Under these conditions

the communists can more easily establish front organizations or infiltrate existing groups, which are then used to protest loudly against the legitimate government in order to convince Americans, officials and citizens alike, that they are supporting an unpopular, corrupt and oppressive regime. In some cases it may be true that genuine noncommunist opposition groups are developing on their own and that the legitimate government is rotten; on the other hand, this may not be true. This type of situation calls for a careful appraisal of opposition groups to determine their nature and origins.

Whenever a nation under guerrilla attack lies adjacent to a communist sanctuary, local forces will be hard pressed to defeat the guerrillas unless supply routes are interdicted or the borders effectively closed. In Southeast Asia anti-communist forces have been successful where the communists lacked dependable supply routes, e.g., Malaya and the Philippines. They were unsuccessful in northern Indochina and in Laos where the communists could be supplied with impunity. They may well be defeated in South Vietnam unless the Viet Cong can be isolated from North Vietnam, southern Laos and Cambodia.

A successful counterinsurgency effort must be directed by popular leadership — men who can communicate with the people and who can rally them to the fight against the insurgents. The anti-guerrilla efforts in Malaya and the Philippines proved this. But a popular regime is only one factor. The

popularity of a regime will diminish no matter how progressive it seems unless the leadership can point to some victories in battle and success in pacifying the countryside. In short, a “popular” leader who is losing on the field of battle will soon find his “popularity” slipping away. There is a close relationship between victory and popularity, defeat and discontent.

Land reform and other farsighted programs designed to benefit the people and to win their allegiance are necessary. However, these programs may force the communists to step up their campaign of violence in order to prevent the reforms from being carried out and creating popular support for the government. The communists preach social justice, but the only social justice they recognize is their own brand; any other brand is simply an attempt by the capitalists and imperialists to hoodwink the native peasant. Thus, wherever communist “liberation” forces are operating, social and economic reforms must be initiated in conjunction with a determined counterinsurgency effort. If the countryside is not secure from communist insurgents, the reforms will mean nothing.

The morale and the attitudes of the masses are crucial factors. An important tool which should be employed in counterinsurgency — and which by and large has been left idle by the West and its allies — is propaganda and psychological warfare. The population-at-large, harassed by a barrage of communist propaganda, often fails to develop a sense of common purpose

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with and loyalty to the government. In some countries it may be possible to create a national ideology, simple in concept, perhaps similar to the San-min Chu-i, the Three Principles of the People—nationalism, democracy and the people's livelihood — which inspired Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary movement in China.

The prospects for democratic governments in embattled countries are not bright. Malaya and the Philippines were exceptions for several reasons, not the least of which were the enlightened colonial rule which preceded independence and their geographical advantages. Some American critics of Diem called for an immediate end of U.S. support for his regime without ascertaining whether a responsible political replacement could be found. As a matter of fact, it did not exist. Had the political opponents of Diem come to power, the situation in all probability would have been worse than under Diem. This is not meant to suggest that the United States must forever support rulers like Diem, but Washington must be able to find stable, pro-Western alternatives to regimes it dislikes. There is always the danger that the group which is brought to power will be even more authoritarian, will lapse into political infighting or will simply be unfit to rule. It is too soon to predict whether the South Vietnamese army will supply adequate leadership; clearly, it was the only alternative to Diem.

In the immediate aftermath of the November coup, U.S. government and military officials express-

ed hope for an early victory against the Viet Cong. Yet, by January this assessment had given way to a more realistic view that the war may continue for an extended period of time and will also require far more vigorous prosecution of the fight against the communists and, above all, an end to the reshuffling of personnel within the ruling military junta. U.S. officials have been disappointed that the junta thus far has offered no specific program for dealing with the country's problems.

The United States has four alternatives in its policy toward the war in South Vietnam—none of which is pleasant. First, Washington could decide to continue its present policy of providing military training and equipment to the South Vietnamese army and pressing the junta leaders to "meet the people" in a major effort to win their loyalty. Under this policy, the war would drag on indefinitely with the outcome in doubt.

Second, the United States, with or without the consent of the South Vietnamese rulers, could accept the idea of neutralizing South Vietnam and seek to include North Vietnam in any neutralization arrangement. At this time, neutralization of South Vietnam has little support in Washington or in Saigon, but further setbacks in the fighting might induce officials of both countries to consider the idea more favorably. It appears that the Viet Cong have deliberately set about to promote the idea. Since November, they have redoubled their efforts to seize the initiative, to move closer to the towns and cities, and to terrorize

U.S. soldiers and dependents. Moreover, France and Cambodia are advocating this solution. Should Washington accept this way out of the dilemma, the psychological impact of its move would inevitably be felt in Thailand, Burma and Malaya. Neutralization of South Vietnam, as of Laos, is only a brief pause on the way to communization; its major achievement is the withdrawal of U.S. troops, leaving the field to communist irregulars.

Third, the United States could decide to extend the battle to the soil of the attacker. The risks involved are great, and Americans are not comfortable spreading violence and unrest to other lands. If the United States and its allies are unwilling to engage in this form of retaliation, we will forever be fighting on the soil of the Free World, never in a position to make an advance, only to accept defeats or at best to hold the line. There is increasing evidence that North Vietnam, with its economic and agricultural difficulties, is more vulnerable to guerrilla operations today than was South Vietnam in the late 1950's. The promotion of insurgency in North Vietnam would be a serious move, however, to be undertaken only with the most careful forethought and planning. If the effort is launched without wholehearted U.S. support, it could turn into another Bay of Pigs disaster. U.S. combat troops would not be required; but the South Vietnamese forces would have to be carefully selected, trained and equipped. Moreover, the United States would have to stand by its

Vietnamese allies in the event Peking decided to intervene in order to halt the spread of guerrilla warfare to its "peace zone."

Finally, the Johnson Administration might decide to commit U.S. troops to actual battle. This would probably be as difficult a decision to make as the previous one, and the Administration would be unlikely to make it before the November 1964 elections. Unfortunately, the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese comrades understand this; during the next several months they are likely to continue increasing their pressure on the embattled Saigon government. If the United States waits until 1965 to intervene on a larger scale, it may be too late.

The continuing deterioration of the Free World position in Southeast Asia necessitates a reassessment of U.S. commitments and objectives there. If U.S. leaders decide to avoid the showdown and neutralize South Vietnam, they should ponder the effect this will have on other countries in the area and on such nations as Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, India and Pakistan. The entire Free World presence in East Asia could be placed in jeopardy by the sight of another United States withdrawal in the face of the communist challenge. If the United States, on the other hand, decides to increase its commitment, such action should be taken at the earliest possible time and as part of a carefully designed strategy for the defense of U.S. and Free World interests in Southeast Asia.

“OVERKILL”: THEORIES AND IMPLICATIONS

by *E. H. Hartsook*

PERHAPS no one has done more to popularize the theory of “overkill” than Dr. Ralph Lapp.¹ The proposition he advances is as stark as it is simple: Both the United States and the Soviet Union possess enough nuclear weapons to kill each other’s population not just once but many times over. Hence the U.S. defense budget should be cut drastically, particularly with respect to nuclear stockpiling, research and development, and procurement. The advocates of these economies assert that it is only the Pentagon, the defense industry and Congressional susceptibility to a “more of everything” defense philosophy—the Military-Industrial Complex—which keep the U.S. arms budget spiraling. Although spending makes work for the defense industry, it robs the country of technological and financial resources needed elsewhere in the economy. They have undertaken a campaign to bring the issue to the attention of the public and enlisted in this effort the support of numerous scientists and scholars.

In 1963 the concept of “overkill” was publicized by Seymour Melman, Professor of Industrial and Management Engineering at Columbia University, who took his case to the public and to members of Congress.² Congressional response to Melman’s views included a detailed query on “overkill” addressed to Defense Secretary McNamara by Representative William F. Ryan of New York, and a speech on the Senate floor by George McGovern (D-S.D.) endorsing the “overkill” theory. Growing support for the idea on Capitol Hill moved General Maxwell Taylor and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, to present a detailed refutation of it in August 1963 before the Senate Appropriations Committee.

The “overkill” theory appeals to many people concerned with such issues as tax reduction, federal budget-cutting and the growing interest in arms control. Since its proponents have introduced it for the purpose of influencing the U.S. military posture, the theory needs to be analyzed carefully to determine how well it can, in fact, be applied to national security problems.

¹Ralph E. Lapp, *Kill and Overkill: The Strategy of Annihilation* (New York: Basic Books, 1962), 197 pp.

²See Seymour Melman, editor, *A Strategy for American Security—An Alternative to the 1964 Military Budget* (New York: Lee Offset, Inc., April 1963), 26 pp.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF "OVERKILL"

Let us examine the assumption on which the proponents of "overkill" have based their thesis: an existing surplus of nuclear weapons. Although Ralph Lapp and Seymour Melman differ as to the degree of "overkill" that they think exists and should be eliminated, they would agree on the following main principles.

In any nuclear war, they say, there will be no opportunity for maneuvering of forces or defending territory: once a salvo of missiles has been fired, there will be no "stages" of attack, only a paroxysm, all-destructive and all-consuming. They do not share the view that a nuclear conflict could or should be controlled and kept from expanding. Melman believes that "The Soviets would have to use all of their available striking power in any first strike, since their offensive capability is significantly less than that of the United States."³ Lapp writes:

. . . I find it hard to believe that the men in the Kremlin would authorize a nuclear strike at the United States and then unleash only a small fraction of their strike force.

But even if the enemy should not launch a massive attack in the first stage, it is even more difficult to believe that our return fire would be mathematically and precisely tuned to the degree of assault. . . . But an even more important factor weighs on my mind. . . . Our [missiles] have been sited on former Air Force bases. An attack upon these prime military installations involves an automatic attack upon millions of Americans who live downwind. . . . If a deterrent policy of graduated response is to work, the Secretary of Defense must either arrange for the protection of the downwind population or remove the missile sites and place reliance upon off-continent sites and upon a sea-based deterrent.⁴

The odds on defense, according to Melman, are virtually hopeless since "all defensive strategies and technologies can be saturated, overwhelmed or evaded by a variety and quantity of offensive power."⁵

Because of these factors, both agree, the United States needs for its security only an adequate number of "relatively secure" missiles that will threaten an aggressor with destruction of his country through decimation of his major population centers. U.S. nuclear needs can therefore be computed on the basis of the number of enemy cities and the nuclear megatonnage required to obliterate

³From Melman's letter to Representative W. F. Ryan, June 3, 1963. In this letter, Melman comments on a Department of Defense reply to Ryan, answering questions on alleged U.S. "overkill" capacity.

⁴"The Strategy of Overkill," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April 1963, p. 8.

⁵Melman, *A Strategy for American Security*, *op. cit.*

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them. According to Melman, “for the 140 major cities of the Soviet Union, U.S. overkill capacity is 78 times, even allowing for a 50 per cent failure of nuclear warhead carriers.”⁶ Since it is not possible to destroy a population more than once, nuclear military power has reached its limits and no addition to the existing surplus of strategic power is required.

FLEXIBLE, CONTROLLED RESPONSE AND SUPERIOR STRENGTH

The foregoing strategic concept, sometimes known as “minimum deterrence,” has long been debated by U.S. government planners. They favor the present strategy—flexible, controlled response—for two major reasons.

First, they believe that a wider range of strategy options is more in the interest of U.S. security than the single option of “minimum deterrence.” The key requirement of our present strategy, as set forth by Secretary of Defense McNamara, is a capability for flexible, controlled response to counter any form of aggression. Since the United States is not likely to strike the first nuclear blow, a second strike force must possess enough power to survive a surprise attack and then be still capable of destroying the attacker’s strategic forces. Thus the United States, rather than having only the choice of fighting an unlimited, all-out nuclear war, will be able to counter aggression through lesser, controlled means as well. Present U.S. strategy specifically requires that the United States *not* confine itself simply to destroying the enemy’s cities and people. Instead, by concentrating initial response, as it does, on military targets, it aims to limit damage to the U.S. and provide an opportunity to bargain for a favorable truce or for political settlement—i.e., to conclude a nuclear war without a holocaust which might destroy the governments and societies of the participants. At the lower end of the conflict spectrum, national strategy also seeks to be able to respond with something less than all-out nuclear force—as for example, the selective, limiting tactics possible with small tactical nuclear weapons. Within each type of conflict situation, U.S. planners want to be sure of having the capability for choosing the most advantageous strategy for the United States under any and all circumstances.

Obviously, these numerous contingencies suggest the availability of many more types and numbers of weapons than would be

⁶*Ibid.*

used under any single targeting option. Of course, no one argues that all would or should be used in general war. Certainly, the United States should be prepared to respond on a selective basis to any probable contingency. Above all, the U.S. should have alternatives to “giving up” or “going all the way.” As General Maxwell Taylor, testifying on August 4, 1963 before the Senate Appropriations Committee, put it:

Certainly it would be much simpler and would save money in time of peace if we determined now a single target list which we would strike under conditions of retaliation. This is the so-called strike capability against cities, which appeals to some advocates of substantial reductions in our military spending.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered this option and have thus far rejected it, feeling that it lacks the flexibility which we consider indispensable; that is, we have rejected it as the only strategy. Personally, I would seriously question the rightness of restricting the choice of our President to this one dreadful alternative.

U.S. civilian and military planners do not favor a “minimum deterrent” strategy for another reason. In order to operate successfully vis-à-vis any aggressive power, it is imperative for the defender to deal from a position of superior strength—not parity or comparative weakness. Rather than agreeing with “overkill” proponents that a substantial reduction in our nuclear forces would enhance the prospects of peace and disarmament, U.S. policy-makers are strongly persuaded by history’s lessons that military weakness tempts the aggressor and increases the likelihood of war.

Neither of these two major premises of current United States strategy—flexible, controlled response and a posture of superior strength—could be adequately served by a deterrent of the size recommended by the “overkill” theorists. This becomes more apparent if one examines some specifics.

TARGETING, WEAPONS AND DELIVERY REQUIREMENTS

Given current U.S. strategy, which is directed toward minimizing civilian casualties and the destruction of cities and toward destroying enemy military bases and forces, the targeting picture is not as simple as the 140 cities specified by the “overkill” strategists make it appear to be. Instead, U.S. targeting requirements include airfields, communications centers, missile bases, radar sites, defense control centers and military headquarters. This makes the number of targets at least ten times greater than the suggested 140.

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Under present targeting concepts, these objectives are not approached as targets in the sense that Hiroshima was in World War II. Each target possesses known physical characteristics which allow for the mathematical computation of the damage effects necessary to accomplish the purpose of a given attack. In each case, targeting requirements are based on a careful reckoning of target worth, damage expectancy, available forces and weapons, and capability of delivery systems to survive and penetrate to the target.

Increases in the number and variety of targets must be met by increases in the number and types of weapons required to reach and destroy them. Even with the larger number of targets, however, one may not proceed on a simple one-weapon-for-one-target ratio in calculating weapons requirements. Duck hunters are not forbidden to carry more than two shells on a trip to the blinds because the bag limit is only two ducks a day. Many additional factors must be taken into consideration. It is never certain, for example, that there will be sufficient warning to permit the U.S. to strike the known targets of the enemy before his missiles and bombers leave their launch areas. If the U.S. does not strike until some or all of the enemy's weapons have hit our military bases, it can be assumed that many of our missiles and planes will have been destroyed or rendered ineffective. Moreover, U.S. missiles and planes will have to be launched in sufficient numbers to compensate for additional losses due to the enemy's active defense measures.

Since U.S. strategy emphasizes military targets rather than cities, the Soviets can be expected to seek to make such targets invulnerable. This in turn calls for a variety of weapons of more precise capabilities. If the Soviets achieve invulnerability through the hardening of target sites, the U.S. will need missiles of far greater accuracy and perhaps warheads of increased yield.⁷ If the Soviets improve their defenses through greater mobility or wider dispersal of such targets, the U.S. will need a greater number and variety of weapons as well as of delivery systems. If invulnerability is sought through active defense of targets, whether via surface-to-air missiles or interceptor aircraft, the U.S. must have greater numbers of spare weapons to compensate for unpredictable losses.

The delivery factor is of special significance in estimating weap-

⁷Many authorities believe there is almost an inverse geometric progression between increased accuracy and increased yield, and if the former is achieved the latter may not be necessary.

ons requirements: the number of available warheads must be related plausibly to the number as well as the adequacy of delivery vehicles. Although the "reliability factor" in the new missiles system has been increasing, it remains below that of manned aircraft, necessitating a correspondingly larger number of available weapons to achieve the desired result. Thus, adequate provision must be made to compensate for possible losses and aborts between launch point and target, and mechanical malfunctioning of the weapons in flight and at point of detonation.

The present changes in weapons systems must also be considered. For the next few years, while the build-up in missiles continues, SAC and its manned bombers are responsible for handling the delivery of at least 75 per cent of U.S. nuclear strength. As the USSR continues to build up its ICBM forces, U.S. manned bombers on the ground become increasingly vulnerable to surprise attack, requiring an increase in the proportion of bomber forces maintained on a fifteen-minute ground alert. In effect, Washington can rely only on those bombers maintained on such an alert—which means about half or less of the B-52's and B-58's Seymour Melman includes in his calculations. As the Minuteman and Polaris missiles become available in greater numbers within the next few years, the B-47's, which in Melman's statistics account for 6,000 megatons, will be phased out of the strike forces. Some of the early Atlas missiles, deployed above ground, are highly vulnerable to attack. In short, when evaluating the adequacy of our inventory, it is not sufficient to depend upon the total number of delivery vehicles currently available, but only on those capable of surviving a massive surprise attack.

PROCUREMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS

Aside from the greater weapons requirements posed by our present multiple-option strategy, there are other needs which appear to be insufficiently recognized by the "overkill" proponents. The latter mistakenly hold that nuclear power can be equated with consummate destructiveness and that nuclear weapons represent some absolute quantity in a definitive, perpetually effective state of development and readiness: once these weapons have been bought, their utility remains constant, and additional ones will not be needed. In actual fact, while nuclear munitions are of a particular order of effectiveness, they are not immune to many of the factors which affected munitions requirements in

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non-nuclear days. The constant battle that has to be waged against obsolescence is a prime example. Continuous procurement is needed, not merely to maintain U.S. firepower, but to equip U.S. forces with new, more effective weapons. In addition to the introduction of new weapons, the warheads of existing weapons need to be improved. And just as is the case with conventional weapons, it is necessary to overhaul weapons and stock a supply system.

A major problem of procurement is the need to provide for an overlap of old weapons systems with the new. Given the complexity of most of our major weapons and their long procurement lead-times, it is impossible simply to scrap one system and introduce another. Similarly, in some programs there is no such thing as cutting back only the production of the weapons themselves. The cutback in the production of fissionable materials advocated by some of the "overkill" proponents, for example, would not only halt warhead production, but would force cancellation of the entire military program, including basic research and development of reactors, and a number of other programs completely unrelated to warhead production as well.

If any one aspect of meeting the nation's security requirements demands full recognition and attention, it is that of maintaining technological superiority. This is the central fact of international relations today. Military technology is moving so fast that any relaxation in efforts to stay ahead of the opponent may cost the U.S. a lead which, once lost, might never be recovered. Suggestions, such as those made by the "overkill" theorists, that we can maintain our military strength without continuing large outlays for research and development, are akin to saying that all the U.S. had to do to win World War II was to have on hand at the outset enough ammunition and weapons to destroy the German and Japanese forces. There would have been no need to develop new gun sights, tanks, bazookas, aircraft, radar, atomic weapons and the like. History furnishes telling examples of technological developments which brought victory to their originators—the longbow, gunpowder, the armor piercing shell, the reinforced armor. The game of technological leapfrog never stops. The fact that the margins of advantage accompanying a new development can be so overwhelmingly decisive—today even more than in the past—makes it suicidal for one side to call off the game, or even to play it half-heartedly. If we contemplate present U.S. efforts to catch

up with the USSR in the ability to launch heavy payloads into earth orbit and into space, we can see how difficult it is to recover a technological lead once it is lost.

In the face of the ever-changing technological picture, no one system can forever be depended upon to provide a deterrent capability. The Soviet Union may, at its present technological level, solve the problem of seeking out and destroying the Polaris submarine and its missiles. If this happens, the Polaris weapon will no longer be one of the "relatively secure missiles" advocated by the "overkill" strategists. Similarly, technology could make the anti-ballistic missile system operational sooner than skeptics expect. If the USSR alone were to develop an effective anti-ICBM defense, there would no longer be any conditions of parity based on invulnerable missile systems.

Again, with further research on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, it is not inconceivable that the whole character of warfare would be changed. The discriminating tactics that these weapons allow are particularly applicable in our "controlled response" strategy. Their ability to remove key targets effectively with minimum expenditure of resources and collateral damage permits greater selectivity and more effective control. In some cases they can be made more discriminating than conventional arms. Given adequate concentration on development of accuracy, it is possible to develop very small air-to-surface missiles that would be as effective on specific targets as the much larger but less accurate ones. Regardless of the controversy over their use, there is a real need to work with and learn about the effects of tactical nuclear weapons.

As technology in the nuclear weapons field moves ahead—both here and abroad—the U.S. cannot afford to be so foolhardy as to leave refinements and improvements solely in the hands of others. As in everything else, some new "wrinkle" in application or development can nullify what was only yesterday an outstanding advantage.

POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS

One of the principal reasons for pursuing the strategy adopted by the United States is the need for dealing from a position of superior strength in order to deter and, if need be, defeat aggressive powers. This premise is closely related to another set of factors that must be included in computing nuclear weapons requirements: their political worth.

Most everyone remembers the world-wide political impact of

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Sputnik, Soviet development of the H-bomb, and the numerous times the Soviets have used nuclear blackmail for political ends. General de Gaulle's *force de frappe* and the anticipated effects throughout Southeast Asia of Red China's acquisition of a nuclear capability are current examples of the political use of nuclear weapons. While the United States may not have exploited the propaganda worth of its nuclear capabilities as systematically as the Soviets have done, the political impact of American nuclear power has been felt throughout the post-World War II era. More recent events have demonstrated forcefully the political implications of the United States' possession of a large and varied nuclear arsenal. The increasing build-up in U.S. strategic and conventional forces and the high degree of credibility they lent to U.S. actions in the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban crisis of 1962, issued in political resolutions favorable to the U.S. and yielded a degree of political leverage which Washington would like to retain. Maintaining the military posture to do so obviously requires more than confining ourselves to a “one string to our bow” strategy such as minimum deterrence. Rather, the U.S. must be capable of quietly but firmly demonstrating its prowess at every level of conflict. The allies of the United States must feel assured and confident not only in the “rightness” but in the security of their alignment with us. As General Maxwell Taylor pointed out in a recent statement to Congress, any degradation of the U.S. strategic posture would only “encourage all our allies to follow suit with the net dismantling of the defense structure of the West.”⁸

Strong and versatile nuclear forces not only foreclose aggressive efforts of *all* kinds—and not merely all-out attacks against cities—but also improve the prospects for further progress toward disarmament. Paradoxical though it may seem, strong armament is the prerequisite of a sensible disarmament policy: the U.S. will not be able to strike any bargains with the Soviets unless it has the chips to bargain with. As Secretary McNamara put it during the Senate Test Ban Treaty hearings, “This treaty is a product of Western strength. Further progress in arms control arrangements with the Soviet Union . . . depends critically on the maintenance of that strength.”⁹

⁸*Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1632.*

⁹*Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, p. 109.*

U.S. nuclear weapons, then, have to serve three purposes: (1) they must, above all, deter an attack, (2) they have to be able to counter an actual attack, and (3) they must help to prevent the Soviets from making any political gains in terms of undermining the credibility of the U.S. deterrent or the confidence of our allies in the firmness of our purpose. In addition to their destructive potential, nuclear weapons have—by their mere existence, whether used or not—a political potential, a factor which, though it cannot be readily computed, enters into the calculation of the requirements for them.

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing analysis has examined some implications of the “overkill” theory as it relates to defense strategy and planning assumptions, to procurement and research and development, and to political considerations. Because, as national strategy planners believe, the United States is safer with a strategy of flexible response to aggression rather than with a strategy offering the single alternative of destruction of enemy cities, the United States incurs requirements for a much higher level of nuclear preparation. The numerous contingencies provided for under a strategy of flexible response require many more types and numbers of targets, weapons and delivery systems than would be needed by a single strategy such as minimum deterrence. Procurement and technological needs, though costly under any strategy, are correspondingly greater under a multi-option one. Political considerations call for strong nuclear forces, not only to foreclose actual aggression, but also to retain the support and confidence of our allies and to provide a bargaining position for any progress toward disarmament.

A strategy for national defense is not as simple as the “overkill” thesis would make it appear. It is true that there is a continuing need to reduce taxes and pare the federal budget. From a common-sense point of view, any cuts that can safely be made in defense spending should be made. But national security and the strategy that assures it must be assessed in their own right. The price is high. The needs for flexibility and diversity in strategic responses, for constant technological improvement and for military superiority put a high price on national security. But these are the factors that make U.S. strategy effective.

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by *Walter F. Hahn*

MUCH has been said and written in recent years about the baffling phenomenon of Soviet secrecy—the welter of inordinate sensitivities and suspicions which warp the Soviet Union's image of the world-at-large. The fear, real or alleged, of foreign espionage restrains the Soviet Union from paying the price of territorial inspection for any meaningful agreement on arms control. In this context, the discussion has centered largely on what are deemed the “legitimate military motives” underlying the Soviet secrecy complex. It is pointed out that secrecy has been one of the primary Soviet assets in the contest of strategic power with the United States. The Iron Curtain has served to shroud weaknesses in the Soviet military establishment and thus enhance the credibility of Soviet deterrent power. At the same time, by protecting a physically “soft” weapons system against U.S. targeting, the policy of secrecy has enabled the strained Soviet economy to forgo expensive programs of rendering offensive weapons “invulnerable” through hard-siting and mobility. Finally, by obscuring the rate and direction of Soviet military-technological progress, secrecy offers to the Soviets the most plausible possibility of matching or overtaking the United States in the strategic race—by staging an “end run” in the form of scientific, technological or tactical surprise.

There is no discounting the importance of these factors in the Soviet outlook. They reflect imperatives which, to one degree or another, traditionally have influenced the conduct of nations: the defensive motive of screening vulnerabilities against their exploitation from abroad, and the offensive motive of furthering national objectives through deception and surprise. The uniqueness of the Soviet phenomenon lies perhaps not so much in external requirements and objectives as it does in the peculiarities of a complex social organism. If, tomorrow, the Cold War were miraculously ended and the armies of all nations were disbanded and their weapons destroyed, the likelihood is that secrecy would still shroud Soviet society. Between the Soviet citizen and his meaningful interaction with the world-at-large would still stand

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two major barriers: (1) an historical-cultural-ethnic tradition, and (2) the imperatives of the communist system.

ETHNIC, HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS

Students of Soviet society seem generally agreed that profound distrust of the world beyond Soviet borders is one of the most salient characteristics of the individual Soviet citizen. Psychologists who interrogated defectors from the Soviet Union after World War II concluded that this suspicion reaches "the point of pathology":

There is, on the one hand, a grudging recognition and even admiration of superior science and technology in the West. On the other hand, there is deep resentment of what is felt to be derogation or contempt on the Western side, and a stubborn conviction that Slavs in general and Russians in particular have a strength and peasant type of shrewdness which, in the long run, will triumph over "the decadent West."¹

There seems to be general agreement, also, on the fact that this trait—a deep national sense of insecurity—is not a recent phenomenon but runs as a heavy thread through the pages of Russian history.

The Byzantine Influence. Historians trace the beginnings of the Russian state to the conquest by the Varangians of Sweden in the latter part of the ninth century. Because of the easy access to the area that eventually became the Russian Empire, a multitude of other ethnic and cultural influences left their imprint. One of these was the Byzantine Empire. "When the emperors in Constantinople sent Cyril and Methodius to teach the Slavs Christianity and their scholars to teach them how to read and to write, their painters to teach them art, and their architects to teach them how to build their onion-steeped churches," notes Charles W. Thayer in his entertaining book on diplomacy, "they also sent along their diplomats who, intentionally or not, taught them the deception, chicanery, and treachery which characterized the Byzantine diplomacy of the day."²

After nearly a millennium of what might be considered a separate Russian identity, the Oriental strains in Russian life are still strongly evident. As Thayer suggests, it is difficult to believe that Byzantium left only its artistic and architectural

¹Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works: Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes*, Russian Research Center Studies, No. 24 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 164.

²*Diplomat* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), p. 49.

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signatures without also, in the process, bequeathing to its "disciples" a measure of the Oriental characteristics of secretiveness and deviousness.

Russian Historical Experience. Few historians can agree on the ethnological composition of today's Russian. They can point only to the major transigrations which left discernible marks on Russia's ethnography: the Scythians, the Sarmatians, the Goths who descended from the north in the third century, and the Huns, the most predatory of the nomadic invaders who swept eastward from the Mongolian desert in the fourth century, inundating a large part of Europe. Let us briefly review the major invasions which, during the thousand years following upon the collapse of the Hun empire, overwhelmed Russia:

1) In the tenth century, the Pechenegs, a people of Turkish stock, swept over almost all of what is today South Russia, penetrating as far north as Kiev.

2) The Pechenegs were replaced, in the eleventh century, by the Cuman Turks (or Polovtsi) surging up from the southern steppes. Their raids far into Russian territory (the first major thrust occurred in 1061) continued intermittently for 150 years, right up to the Mongol invasion.

3) The Mongols, or Tatars, occupied Russia at the beginning of the thirteenth century under Genghis Khan's grandson Batu. In all, the Mongol yoke endured for two and a half centuries.

4) In the middle of the thirteenth century an invasion by the Knights of the Teutonic Order was repelled by Alexander Nevsky at Lake Peipus.

5) The Teutonic Knights were followed, in the early part of the fourteenth century, by Lithuanian armies, and later by the combined forces of Lithuania and Poland, which had merged their dynasties. Between the early fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, Poland occupied most of Russia west of Moscow and down to the Caspian Sea.

6) In the seventeenth century, the Swedes raided deeply into northern Russia. The conflict was climaxed by Charles XII's defeat at Poltava in 1709.

7) A little more than a century later, Napoleon's army traveled the road to Moscow, only to meet the fate that befell its predecessor.

8) The German invasion of Russia in World War I was more successful. By 1917, the Emperor's armies had occupied the entire

Ukraine, most of White Russia and the Baltic area, and in the following year imposed the peace of Brest-Litovsk upon the Soviets.

9) The peace with Germany was followed, in 1918, by the Allied interventions and the Allied-supported "White Russian" forces commanded by Denikin, Wrangel, Kolchak and Semenov. These interventionist efforts were not defeated until the spring of 1920.

10) In that same spring, Polish forces under General Pilsudski drove into the Ukraine, reaching the Dnieper and capturing Kiev by early May 1920, to be driven back finally by Red Army forces under Budenny and Tukashevsky.

11) In 1941, Adolf Hitler took the well-traveled road to Moscow.

A thousand years of almost unremitting struggle have left their scars on the Russian psyche. This heritage has accentuated the Russian people's submissiveness to authority—the acceptance of discipline characteristic of besieged societies—and made the Soviet citizen acutely responsive to warnings about new threats to his existence from a hostile outside world. It has contributed to a deep sense of inferiority, symptomized by a fierce pride in the accomplishments of the society.³

The specifically Soviet contributions to the Russian secrecy complex will be discussed below. The point can be made here, however, that this historical sense of inferiority forms an important link in the Russian-Soviet continuum. Historians point to the affinity between Russia's authoritarian tradition and communism's totalitarian blueprint as one of the principal explanations for the ease of the Bolshevik assumption of power. It was easy for a people, often conquered, backward and dazzled by the power and opulence of Western Europe, to identify itself with the image of the oppressed proletariat assaulting the ramparts of wealth and privilege and marching toward inevitable victory.

Stalin merged Russian nationalism and communist ideology in his program of "socialism in one country." The following speech made by Stalin, on February 4, 1931, illustrated the national paranoia lurking behind communist ideology:

One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she

³Interrogators of defectors from the Soviet Union were startled to determine that this pride in the accomplishments of the communist regime generally coexists with vehement rejections of the regime on humane, philosophical and emotional grounds. See Bauer, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100.

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suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her—because of her backwardness, because of her military backwardness, cultural backwardness, political backwardness, industrial backwardness, agricultural backwardness. They beat her because to do so was profitable and could be done with impunity. You remember the words of the pre-revolutionary poet: “You are poor and abundant, mighty and impotent, Mother Russia.” Those gentlemen were quite familiar with the verses of the old poet. They beat her, saying: “You are abundant,” so one can enrich oneself at your expense. They beat her, saying: “You are poor and impotent,” so you can be beaten and plundered with impunity. Such is the law of the exploiters—to beat the backward and the weak. It is the jungle law of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak—therefore you are wrong; hence you can be beaten and enslaved. You are mighty—therefore you are right; hence, we must be wary of you.⁴

When viewed thus against the background of Russian history, the obsession with “capitalist encirclement” appears as a variation upon a time-honored theme. The variation is important, if for no other reason than the fact that for decades it conjured forth for the average Russian the specter of invasion by a rapacious West. Many Western observers hold that the Allied interventionist attempts during and after World War I provide *the* key to the profound sense of insecurity which underlies Soviet attitudes toward the United States. The evidence suggests, however, that we are dealing with a more profoundly pathological phenomenon which, though perhaps exacerbated by the events of the twentieth century, has its roots in Russian history.

The “Peasant Mentality.” Sociological generalizations are at best hazardous, but some have stood the test of history. One of these is that predominantly agricultural societies have tended to be more “atomized” in structure, and more introverted in their relations with other societies, than their urbanized, commerce-oriented neighbors.

The reasons for this contrast are fairly obvious. One is isolation—the physical remoteness from other pockets of the society which engenders, on the one hand, a tight interlocking of the particular community itself and, on the other, a wariness vis-à-vis all intruders into the community domain. This attitude is bolstered by the conservatism of people who are tethered to their plot

⁴J. V. Stalin, “The Tasks of Business Executives,” in *Works: July 1930-January 1934*, Vol. 13 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955), pp. 40-41.

of land and to an unchanging routine imposed by nature. It is reinforced by suspicion, tinged with a mixture of contempt and envy, of the "city slicker" common to rural societies.

Historically in Europe, the rigors of the institution of serfdom varied with locality. They gave way slowly under the breakdown of the feudal system and the consolidation of power by the monarchs, and more quickly before the sweep of the industrial revolution. Nevertheless, for centuries Europe's peasants bore the crushing burden of feudalism and warfare. Their two-pronged battle for survival—against nature and against their exploiters—molded the attitudes traditionally associated with them as a social class: cunning, scheming, reticence and distrust toward outsiders, combined contrastingly with joviality and uninhibited behavior toward members of their own group in the spirit of companionship-in-misery.

In Russia feudalism endured longer than elsewhere in Europe. Serfdom was not legalized until the early part of the seventeenth century; but as a practical condition of life it dates back to the fifteenth century or even before. The plight of the Russian peasantry was symbolized by two institutions: serfdom, by which the peasant was bound in perpetuity to the soil and to the master he served; and the village commune, or *Mir*.

Narrowly defined, the *Mir* was the village assembly. Functionally, however, it was much more than that. The word in Russian has no plural forms; historically it is the same as the word for "world." The *Mir* was the peasant's world—the world which regulated his life, governed his interactions with the fellow-inhabitants of this world, and impersonally linked him with the "outside world." The collectivism inherent in the institution emerges clearly in the following description:

That a mystical-religious sanction was given to the decisions of the mir is indicated in such common folk sayings as "The mir is like a wave; one man's thought is everybody's thought," and "The mir's conclusion is God's decision." These expressions of feeling about the mir had a direct parallel in the religious concept of *sobornost*: congregational or collective equality and responsibility in the eyes of God. The fact that the communal unit and not the individual made the decision permitted the individual to slough off his responsibility and assign it to the group. Life and personality were thus given to the group. Things sanctioned by the mir inevitably were "right."⁵

⁵Thomas Fitzsimmons, Peter Malof, John C. Fiske, *USSR: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1960), p. 409.

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Serfdom was abolished in Russia in 1861 by Tsar Alexander II, long after the last vestiges of feudalism had crumbled in Western Europe, but the embracing mystique of the *Mir* has lingered. Wright W. Miller points out that, although peasants now form less than half the Russian population (as compared with 80 per cent before the Revolution), most of the Russians who are today forty or more years old must have been raised in the atmosphere of the *Mir*, while persons under that age were born into communities where the "*Mir* spirit" was still strong. The collectivization of 1930-1933 decimated the peasantry through deportation, killing or starvation. It converted the old patchwork of *Mir* lands into collective farms. But in this drive, as well as the second collectivization of 1951, the villages were preserved as basic units. Miller concludes that, if anything, the "*Mir* spirit" in rural areas of Russia has been strengthened: "An inevitable result of so many years of interference [by the communist regime] has been to drive the country people more compactly together, in a reaction which anyone in town clothes can feel as he attempts to make contact with suspicious villagers."⁶

When we speak of a "peasant mentality" in the Soviet Union, we allude, therefore, to environmental factors which have conditioned the great majority of the Soviet population—by virtue of either present status or formative childhood experience. They are starkly reflected in the traits of a man like Khrushchev:⁷ joviality combined with crudely articulated anger; acute sensitivity to criticism and fierce pride in accomplishments; and an expansive attitude toward kindred spirits, contrasted with distrust toward the forces of exploitation in the "outside world."

Secrecy and the Russian Authoritarian Tradition. In Russia, secrecy has historically been a uniting link between the values of the society and those of its government. As an attitude toward the outside world on the part of the rulers, it was the reflection of the various historical and cultural factors sketched above, and

⁶*Russians As People* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1961), p. 82.

⁷Admittedly, little is known about Khrushchev's early childhood. It has been established, however, that he was born in the village of Kalinovka (later transformed into a model state farm which bears his name). His father is described as a "worker-miner" in official Soviet biographies. Since there are no mines in the Kursk region, the father was probably one of the peasants who, customarily at the turn of the century, traveled south during the winter months to work in the Donets coal mines. As one of Khrushchev's biographers points out, at the time of Khrushchev's birth the difference between worker and peasant had not become as categorical as in the West. Except in a few highly developed areas, most workers were peasants as well. See Konrad Kellen, *Khrushchev: A Political Portrait* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 7.

shared by the people as a whole. At the same time, as a policy it served the needs of the ruling class in its effort to maintain itself in power. The motive of the Tsars was essentially the same one which has animated their communist successors—namely, to protect a hierarchic society against what they deemed the debilitating ingress of the outside world.

In more modern times, secrecy served as the moat between the autocratic system of the Tsars and the industrial revolution. Secrecy became a self-perpetuating force. In order to safeguard their power, the Russian rulers deliberately preserved the backwardness of the country. The wider grew the gap between Russia and her industrializing Western neighbors, the greater became the imperative of secrecy. The Russian masses had to be prevented from comparing their abject lot with that of their more fortunate neighbors, and they had to be protected against contamination by the “dangerous” ideas which in Western Europe traveled in the wake of the industrial upheaval. At the same time, backwardness had to be barred to the inquisitive eyes of foreigners, lest they employ knowledge of the intrinsic weakness of Russia in planning military adventures.

Even during those rare moments of history when the more enlightened among the Tsars realized that their policy of insulation was making Russia a straggler in the world community, the remedies they applied were as half-hearted as they were superficial. The Tsar most celebrated for this insight is, of course, Peter the Great, who in the year 1697 traveled through Europe incognito as “Peter Mikhailov” in order to evaluate firsthand the extent of Russia’s backwardness—the first Russian ruler to venture beyond the boundaries of his country. As a result of this trip, Peter instituted some far-reaching reforms in Russia. Nevertheless, the small windows to the West that he opened were within reach of only a few. True, foreign craftsmen and technicians were imported to teach their skills to the Russians. True also, young Russians were sent abroad to study the new ways of the industrializing world. But this intercourse with the outside world was highly limited and selective. In this respect, Peter’s tactic foreshadowed that of the communists in their drive to bring Russia abreast of the rest of the world: the careful and selective grafting onto Russian society of the benefits harvested by the more advanced countries, but with a minimum of human contact. The insularity of the country

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is summarized vividly in the following description of Russia's cultural legacy:

So Russia did not share the mighty ferment of ideas that coincided in Europe with the struggle between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. It also missed the humanistic culture of the Renaissance. Until the nineteenth century Russia conveys the impression of a nation asleep, so far as cultural life is concerned. There is no fourteenth-century Russian Dante, no sixteenth-century Russian Shakespeare, no seventeenth-century Russian Newton, no eighteenth-century Russian Voltaire.

Now and then a European would bring into semi-Asiatic Russia some western influence. . . . But there was only a very dim and pale Russian reflection of the humanist movement of the West, of the rediscovery of the Greek and Latin classics, because there were so few Russian scholars. Russia was a force to be reckoned with politically and militarily long before it was able to make a notable contribution to European culture.⁸

Even during the stirrings of cultural life in the nineteenth century, when the Tsars began their losing battle against a swelling flood of internal intellectual and artistic activity, the barriers to the outside world were maintained with dogged tenacity. Some of the observations noted by the Marquis de Custine in his famous book, *La Russie en 1839*, could easily have been made by more recent visitors to the Soviet Union. The following is a sample:

In Russia secrecy presides over everything: secrecy—administrative, political, social; discretion—useful and useless; silence—superfluous for assuring necessary security; such are the inevitable consequences of the primitive character of this people, corroborated by the influence of its government. Every traveler is indiscreet; so it is necessary, as politely as possible, to keep track of the always too inquisitive foreigner lest he see things as they are—which would be the greatest of inconveniences.⁹

The external and internal functions of secrecy—its role as a defense against attack and its use as an instrument of social control—thus tended to reinforce each other. Given the structure of Russian society and the motivations of its upper strata, however, the internal function became by far the more important one. The contrast between Tsarist autocracy and Soviet totalitarianism can perhaps be best summarized as follows: The Tsars saw the sharp division between ruling class and people as the basic prerequisite of the maintenance of power. The Soviets, by contrast, seek to

⁸William Henry Chamberlin, "The Soviet Union Cannot Escape Russian History," in Samuel Hendel, editor, *The Soviet Crucible: Soviet Government in Theory and Practice* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1959), p. 20.

⁹Phyllis Penn Kohler, editor, *The Journals of the Marquis de Custine; Journey for Our Time* (New York: Pellegrini and Cudahy, 1951), p. 190.

bridge the gulf between rulers and ruled by harnessing the entire society to a common ideal. Despite sporadic reforms, the Tsars viewed national progress as inimical to the preservation of the old order. The Soviets regard progress as a motivating and unifying social force.

THE COMMUNIST CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECRECY COMPLEX

While there is continuity in the Russian-Soviet experience, there has also been a significant break with the past. To determine how much of Soviet Russia is "Russian" and how much "Soviet" is as fruitless an effort as arguing over the relative influence of heredity and environment in the shaping of individual personality. Nevertheless, it is clear that the objectives of "statism" in Russia have undergone significant changes in the transition from the old to the Bolshevik order, and that, along with these objectives, there has been a change in the *rationale* of power. While the principle of social control—and secrecy as part of that control—has remained fairly intact, the relative importance attached to the various tools through which control is exercised has varied since 1917. The unique communist inputs into the old secrecy complex might be sketched as follows:

The Conspiratorial Nature of the Party. The hallmark of Leninism was the concept of the role of the Communist Party as a disciplined, highly selective "vanguard of revolution," and the driving force of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" which would guide the revolution from its first, "bourgeois" phase to the ultimate condition of communism. Disdaining the revolutionary consciousness of the masses—"workers have to go to work in the factory as if on a chain gang, and neither time nor possibility remains for them to become socialists"¹⁰—Lenin regarded the role of the Party as that of the teacher, the manipulator, the propagandist and the agitator. The keynote of the revolutionary tactic was opportunism or "expediency." Bolshevism, Lenin wrote, "stands on the point of view of expediency: We shall support [any other group] depending exclusively on whether or not we should then be able better to strike a blow against our enemy."¹¹

Thus, superimposed upon chicanery and deception as the

¹⁰Lenin, *Sochineniia*, Vol. 23, p. 82, cited in Alfred G. Meyer, *Leninism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957) p. 30.

¹¹"Workers and Bourgeois Democracy," *Sochineniia*, Vol. 7, p. 65, as cited in Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

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traditional tools of the Russian leadership was a conception which elevated conspiracy to the level of an operational dogma—a dogma embraced by men who had spent the better part of their lives in the darkness of the conspiratorial underground. Inexorably, this dogma entered into the official ideology and thus passed on to the new generation which did not itself take part in the initial Bolshevik experience. Barghoorn lists among the irrational factors in Soviet thinking “those generated by the long underground struggle of the Bolsheviks against heavy odds.” These factors, he asserts, “have been incorporated into Soviet thinking in the form of political maxims strewn throughout key works of Lenin and Stalin which Soviet leaders study in school and then re-study in special Party educational institutions. Thus, they become steeped in them.”¹²

By its very nature, the system which evolved in the Soviet Union after the Revolution placed a premium on conspiracy. In the absence of any clearly defined stepladder to political power—and in Stalin's world in which political survival tended to be synonymous with physical survival—the political process became a game of wits, deception and ruthlessness. The present Soviet elite not only inherits the older tradition of scheming and conspiratorial technique, but now has behind it a generation of specifically Soviet experience. The members of this elite, although they have cut the Stalinist umbilical cord, are in positions of power because they proved to be the most successful disciples of the wily dictator: “They draw upon a whole bag of tested tricks.”¹³

Prevention of Invidious Comparison. As was pointed out in the discussion of the historical-cultural bases of Soviet secrecy, one of the abiding objectives of Tsarist rule was to prevent the masses from obtaining a clear picture of their abject lot compared with that of their neighbors. Under the Soviets, this tendency has been strengthened by the need of maintaining the fiction of communist progress as contrasted with the decay of capitalist society riven by “contradictions.”

This need became ever more pressing after World War II. Historically, the conflict marked the first genuine break in Russia's isolation. In order to ward off the mortal danger to the “Soviet homeland,” Stalin was forced to pay the price of modifying secrecy.

¹²Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 167.

¹³Bauer, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

On the crest of lend lease and other forms of inter-allied cooperation came a sizeable influx of Western personnel into the Soviet Union. What is more, after the tide of conflict turned, millions of Red Army soldiers, pursuing the *Wehrmacht* into Germany, gained their first vistas of life outside the Soviet Union. Their behavior in the unfamiliar surroundings of Western civilization gave rise to the joke, popular in Europe after the war, that Stalin had committed two cardinal errors: he had shown the Red Army to Europe, and he had shown Europe to the Red Army. Once victory had been achieved, Stalin moved quickly to draw the shutters. One analyst comments:

The Second World War offered to many Soviet citizens their first opportunity to emerge from enforced isolation and to see Western ways of life for themselves. Of course, there are no means of discovering how deep and lasting the Western impact was this time.

But a totalitarian regime cannot take chances. The Soviet leaders, trained in historical thinking because they are Marxists, could not overlook the existence of an analogy between 1814 and 1945. The intellectual isolation of Russia had to become watertight. A quarantine was imposed in 1946.¹⁴

The quarantine has been eased with the swelling flow of Western tourists into the Soviet Union since 1956, and the considerably smaller flow of Soviet citizens beyond the Iron Curtain. To preserve the contrasting image of communist economic justice and capitalist inequities, the Soviet leadership has been forced constantly to belittle the prosperity in the West, or at least to ridicule it as a cheap veneer which camouflages the widespread misery and poverty of the masses. Consider, for example, the following warning by Otto V. Kuusinen, a member of the Presidium, to the select corps of Soviet citizens privileged to travel abroad:

Among Soviet people there sometimes appear nearsighted Philistines who, going abroad in happy tourist groups, take the magnificent show windows of stores as signs of abundance of goods and products. Actually, in many stores [in the West] the shelves are bursting with goods, but in no show window is written how many millions of people in such a country suffer poverty and cannot buy these goods.¹⁵

"Comparison prevention" presents one of the most persistent motifs in Soviet domestic propaganda. Observers find that this

¹⁴W. W. Kulski, *The Soviet Regime: Communism in Practice* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1959), p. 10.

¹⁵Quoted in Robert Strausz-Hupé, "The Sino-Soviet Tangle and U.S. Policy," *ORBIS*, Spring 1962, p. 29.

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propaganda effort has been fairly effective—that the great mass of Soviet citizens is thoroughly indoctrinated with the idea that the standard of living of the rank-and-file citizen of Western countries is lower than in the Soviet Union. Despite the respect generally held for American productive capacity as reflected in the avowed goal to “surpass the United States” in various fields of the economy, the regime maintains that the bulk of production does not benefit the ordinary American citizen. “Many, though probably not a majority of Soviet Russians accept this contention even though their own standard of living is low.”¹⁶

Maintenance of Ideological Conformity. The importance of communist ideology in the postwar Soviet scheme of things has been the subject of much controversy. There seems to be general agreement among observers of the Soviet scene that the doctrinaire fervor of previous decades has sloughed off noticeably. To quote Walt W. Rostow: “The ideological enthusiasm which marked the generation of revolutionaries and even the early days of the First Five-Year Plan has given way to standards of bureaucratic efficiency and conformity.”¹⁷

Rostow made this observation in the early fifties, in the waning years of Stalin’s iron-fisted rule. Since that time, the general consensus of visitors to the Soviet Union is that the ideological rigors have eased even more. Khrushchev is described by most men who have met him face to face as a man who, though deeply committed to the cause and objectives of communism, is above all a pragmatist, not above taking liberties with communist doctrine and bending dogma to meet external and domestic exigencies. Be that as it may, that doctrine has by no means ceased to play a meaningful role in Soviet life. Whatever may be the decline—if any—of communist ideology as a determinant of Soviet external policy, there is little question that, as a secular religion practiced with more or less ritualistic dedication, it continues to constitute one of the most significant cohesives of Soviet society.¹⁸ Ideology serves as a means of communication: the Soviet leaders were trained in a Marxist vocabulary, and they continue to couch their views of the world in its language. The esoteric nature of

¹⁶Bauer, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

¹⁷*The Dynamics of Soviet Society* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1952-53), p. 94.

¹⁸According to Rostow, “it is the role of ideology as the medium for relating individuals to each other and to their environment which is probably its most important residual function in the Soviet Union.” *Ibid.*

that vocabulary enables them to dissimulate the real nature of the strains and contradictions within the complex system to others while continuing to communicate among themselves: "Communist theory supplies a ritual language through which the Soviet rulers communicate their intentions, define the razor's edge which divides loyalty from rebellion, distinguish friend from foe, and convey to the initiated an official interpretation of current situations and forces."¹⁹

Second, ideology serves to cushion the impact of the accelerating process of socio-economic change in the Soviet Union. In this respect, it fulfills roles analogous to those of religious movements in the transformation of internal values. "Changes in the structure of the society are . . . 'justified' in terms of a system of beliefs which are held with high emotional intensity and are indeed, in their sociological characteristics and functions, far removed from 'technical' considerations of economic efficiency and political effectiveness."²⁰

In addition to explaining away the contradictions within communist society, communist doctrine is essential to the ruling elite for another, and perhaps compelling, reason: it provides the sole basis of legitimacy for the maintenance of their rule. In this all-important respect, the CPSU differs from the various one-party systems which have emerged elsewhere on the globe. The Francos, Trujillos and Perons have based their mandate on sheer weight of power and personal charisma—this despite occasional and largely unsuccessful attempts to embellish their respective despotisms with some sort of ideological halo. The communist, by contrast, anchors his authority in the dogma of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." True, Lenin spoke of the ultimate transmutation of the power relationships in the approach toward communism—the "withering away of the state." This, however, was a prediction based upon Marxist principles, not an operational doctrine for the benefit of his heirs. Meanwhile, "Marxism-Leninism" serves the CPSU as a "divine right" to power such as that claimed by the European monarchs of past centuries. A Soviet defector describes succinctly the crucial place of ideology in the structure of communist power:

¹⁹Gerhart Niemeyer and John S. Reshetar, Jr., *An Inquiry into Soviet Mentality* (New York: Praeger, for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1956), p. 43.

²⁰Talcott Parsons, "Some Principal Characteristics of Industrial Societies," in Cyril E. Black, editor, *The Transformation of Russian Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 21.

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... there is one thing which the Party professional would resist to the bitter end: the loosening of the Party's grip on the people. He himself may be disdainful of Communist doctrine, but he will allow no one else to question it, since all his claims to a privileged position in Soviet society, as well as his Party's sole claim to power, are based on doctrine. Whatever the citizens may think in the solitude of their minds, they must conform outwardly. The Party will maintain its monopoly on the means of communication for no other reason than to check the spread of "heresy." Criticism of Marxism, the Party, or the policies of the leadership will remain a punishable crime. Soviet citizens will continue to be denied any but official sources of information and forced to accept the official interpretation of events.²¹

Ideology remains an extremely important rationale of the Soviet socio-political structure and of its inner workings. The Soviets' fear of "contamination" is understandable, especially in an age of far-reaching socio-economic change—an age, moreover, in which ideology is challenged from other parts of the world communist system.

The Dogma of Progress and the "Conniving Society." In a debate on the NBC-TV program "The Nation's Future" in June 1962, the visiting Soviet editor of *Izvestia* (and son-in-law of Khrushchev), Alexei Adjubei, was asked by White House Press Chief Pierre Salinger why the Soviets had not revealed the preparations for Yuri Gagarin's flight into space—in contrast with the openness which attended a similar venture by America's Alan Shepard. Adjubei answered blandly: "Let me tell you this, it is better to fly than to write a great deal before flying. We are modest people. First we fly, then we write about it, because otherwise if one writes first it may not turn out."²²

Adjubei would have been more truthful had he substituted the word "sensitive" for "modest." Essential to Soviet policy, external as well as internal, is the image of progress—the image of communism as the "wave of the future." The image demands the careful manipulation of information—the accentuation of positive accomplishment and the dissimulation of failure. This image is raised not only as a magnet for impressionable peoples abroad, but also to serve important domestic needs.

In the curious secular religion that is communism, there is a sharp distinction between Man and The System. Man, no matter how lofty his position in the hierarchy, is fallible: he makes errors,

²¹Vladimir Petrov, "Whither Soviet Evolution?," *ORBIS*, Fall 1959, p. 293.

²²Transcript of "How Free Should the Press Be?" on "The Nation's Future," National Broadcasting Corporation, June 24, 1962, p. 13.

he is selfishly motivated, he may even commit crimes against the State. The System, on the other hand, can do no wrong. Man and The System eventually will merge with the advent of communism, when the "New Soviet Man" will be perfected—selfless, principled, and in perfect harmony with his environment: "For all their diversity, the requirements of people will express the sound, reasonable requirements of perfectly developed persons."²³ Meanwhile, however, man continues to fall prey to the "remnants of the bourgeoisie"—to enticements to corruption and self-aggrandizement—and to outside forces hostile to the construction of communism.

This division between Man and The System provides the rationale for the ever-changing power relationships in a socio-political structure which lacks anything resembling the orderly, constitutional processes of Western society. Since the system is infallible, the blame for any dislocations in the system *must* be traced to human hands. The "scapegoat" technique is universal; but in the Soviet Union it has the full backing of the ideology. The manager of a collective farm cannot blame his low crop on the shortage of machinery or on the lack of incentive of his peasants within the general scheme of the Soviet economy. The System is beyond criticism.

The result is that every man in official life—from the lowest functionary to the member of the Presidium—feels constantly and grievously vulnerable. He copes with the ever-present and unpredictable threat in two ways. First, he tends to adopt the "closed-mouthedness" which is the universal defense mechanism of bureaucracy. The complaint is often heard in the U.S. that secrecy labels serve not so much to safeguard security as they do to shield incompetence. In the Soviet Union, where culpability tends to be divorced from such criteria as competence and ability, the practice of withholding information is a ubiquitous characteristic of the society. More than that, because the stakes of "failure" are higher, Soviet society has become what might best be described as a "con-ning society." Thus, the factory manager whose future, perhaps even survival, hinges on meeting an arbitrarily imposed production quota, but who knows that the resources are not available for meeting the task, faces an acute dilemma. In the words of an expert in Soviet economics and recent visitor to the Soviet Union:

²³Draft of the Twenty-Year Plan, *New York Times*, August 1, 1961, p. 16.

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The Russian manager works within a fine mesh of rules, procedures, and detailed targets for all aspects of his operations. If he breaks these rules, he is not simply violating company policy. He is committing a criminal offense under Soviet law; for it is sacred Soviet dogma that "The Plan is law!"²⁴

The obvious exit from the dilemma is dishonesty. Books are juggled, figures are falsified, and superior officials are "persuaded" to close their eyes at the appropriate moment. Alternatively, the needed resources which are unavailable through legitimate channels are obtained through illicit means. The factory manager is by no means the only offender. The Soviets have a word for their whole system of "wheels within wheels"—the word *Blat*. According to Edward Crankshaw: "*Blat* in its classic form stands for an extremely elaborate and all-pervading 'old-boy' network: the granting of favours in the hope, the expectation, of favours to come. Everyone, including the most ardent Party members, deals in it—everyone, that is to say, who has anything to offer."²⁵

Admittedly, the sacrosanctness of The System was more pronounced under Stalin than it is in the Khrushchev era. The indications are that the Soviet Union's current leaders take a more realistic view of the imperfections of The System and its occasional tendency to sputter because of built-in defects and not because of sabotage perpetrated by the "remnants of bourgeois society." (After four-and-a-half decades of communist rule, acknowledgment of the continued existence of such "remnants" becomes progressively more embarrassing.)

Nevertheless, whatever change has taken place since 1953 seems to be one of degree rather than substance. Although The System has been tampered with, many of its basic parts (e.g., the collective farms) remain inviolate. The need for scapegoats remains acute—perhaps all the more so since Khrushchev is not adorned with Stalin's halo of infallibility. In any event, the fact that the "conniving society" continues to exist and represents a rising source of trouble for the regime is reflected by death penalties against "profiteers," currency speculators, corrupt officials and other members of the "conniving society."

In short, the very nature of the Soviet system and its ideological-political mainsprings tends to encourage secretiveness. The distinction between the infallibility of The System, on the one hand,

²⁴David Granick, *The Red Executive: A Study of the Organization Man in Russian Industry* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960), p. 43.

²⁵*Russia Without Stalin: The Emerging Pattern* (New York: The Viking Press, 1956), pp. 60-61.

and man's frailty, on the other, strongly influences disclosure of policies at the official level. It stands to reason that large-scale dislocations cannot be attributed to the machinations of "bourgeois remnants" or hostile foreign forces; they reflect upon The System. Since The System is infallible, the logical tendency is to deny these setbacks by hiding the facts and diverting attention.

Retention of the Image of a Hostile World. Internal censorship was a stock-in-trade of the Tsarist regime; the Soviets merely took over a well-established tradition. Again, however, while the instrument is essentially the same, the motivation back of its use has undergone subtle, but significant, change.

Visitors to the Soviet Union who make contact with ordinary Soviet citizens are struck by the stark gap between their knowledge of domestic and foreign affairs. Apparently, despite the ubiquitous censorship, the Soviet people are relatively well-informed on internal matters in the Soviet Union. In the realm of foreign policy, by contrast, the Soviet citizen is almost totally at the mercy of official sources. As Richard Pipes put it: "Here there is little opportunity for confronting theory with fact, and therefore less likelihood of succumbing to that skepticism which . . . sets the tone of the public mood in domestic matters."²⁶

The Soviet leadership goes to prodigious lengths to control information on foreign policy. For example, the systematic jamming of foreign broadcasts beamed into the Soviet Union has been a massive undertaking, the cost of which was estimated to exceed the entire budget of the United States Information Agency. Anyone who reads the Soviet press tends to find himself in a shadowy "never-never land" in which the imagery seldom changes: the peaceful, selfless "socialist camp" beleaguered by the dark, aggressive forces of imperialism. In order to maintain this image, facts are distorted beyond recognition or they are not mentioned at all. For example, the Soviet public was informed only weeks after the fact, and then only tersely, about the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing. By contrast, a propaganda barrage depicted the "inhumanity" of the U.S. test series in the Pacific. The reader of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* is told in florid detail about the presence of "imperialist gangsters" in South Vietnam who are intent upon placing that country in bondage, yet he knows nothing about Soviet material help to the rebel forces in Laos.

²⁶"The Public Mood," in supplement, "The Mood of the Russian People," *Harper's Magazine*, May 1961, pp. 107-12, esp. 110.

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He is firmly convinced that the purpose of the wall in Berlin is to protect the "peaceful" inhabitants of the German Democratic Republic from the incursions of fascist agents and provocateurs; never has he seen any mention of East Germans being shot while attempting to escape to the West.

The question arises: why this elaborate effort? The general consensus of observers of the Soviet scene seems to be that the "average" Soviet citizen does not care very much about foreign policy—and that, in any event, the old Russian nationalism asserts itself most vigorously in this area. Soviet citizens may grumble about the inequities of the environment which affect them directly. Generally, however, when challenged on an issue of Soviet foreign policy, they tend to spring to the defense of the regime. It could be argued that Soviet censorship is a wasteful exercise: the screening of domestic affairs is relatively ineffective because most Soviet citizens get fairly complete information on the overall state of the domestic economy through the "grapevine," and the screening of foreign news is superfluous because most persons either care little about foreign affairs, or—to the extent that they do care—are generally ready to support the regime.

Nevertheless, the regime continues to devote huge resources to censorship. This extravagant behavior is prompted by several reasons: one is leadership conservatism. The apparatus of social control has been in operation for over four decades. Although Stalin, in the avowed view of his successors, operated it too ruthlessly (thus making it counterproductive in terms of social incentive and overall morale), this does not mean a negation of the apparatus as such. One can loosen the nuts and bolts occasionally, as Khrushchev has done, but this is a long step from dismantling the apparatus entirely. Taking this step would mean the advent of the "New Soviet Man"—selfless, perfectly predictable and completely trustworthy. Until the "objective pre-conditions" for communism are created (in twenty years, according to the Soviet timetable), Soviet man obviously will *not* be completely trustworthy: he will still be subject to the influence of the "bourgeois remnants."

In addition to this general inhibition, the regime is influenced by more specific and tangible considerations. The "average" Soviet citizen may not be unduly shaken by the revelation that Soviet practice abroad does not conform always to the lofty platitudes mouthed by the regime. The members of the higher Party

echelons, too, may not be shocked by such revelations, having a personal stake in the preservation and smooth functioning of the system. But, between these two layers of society is another, burgeoning stratum: the privileged class of technicians, managers and scientists whose loyalty is essential to the regime and its commitment to progress. Although many members of this rising class have been absorbed by the Party machinery, and thus share more or less of the "preservation of power" anxiety, many others have not. They represent the only real basis for a "thinking minority" in the Soviet Union which, though committed to the regime's broad policy, conceivably might grow strong enough to exert significant pressure upon its day-to-day decisions. This is a danger which the higher strata of the Party, jealous of their prerogatives, cannot contemplate blithely. It is much easier to suppress the facts than to cope with the possible consequences of their revelation.

Beyond this practical and specific consideration, however, there is another, broader one which bears upon the functioning of the system as a whole. Totalitarianism is obsessed with self-justification of absolute power, a psychological trait which Richard Lowenthal terms the "collective paranoia":

The two-camp doctrine is the Communist version of what we have called the element of "collective paranoia" in totalitarian ideology—its need for a single, all-embracing enemy who is assumed to pull the wires of every resistance to the Party's power. The term "paranoia" is used here not to infer that the phenomenon in question is due to psychotic processes in either the leaders or the mass following of totalitarian parties, but merely to describe, through a convenient psychological analogy, the ideological mechanism of projection that ascribes the regime's drive for unlimited power to an imagined all-enemy. The essential point is that in the nature of totalitarianism, any independent force—either inside or outside the state—is regarded as ultimately hostile; the concept of "two camps" and that of "unlimited aims" are two sides of the same phenomenon.²⁷

Walt W. Rostow relates this phenomenon to the specific Soviet case in the following terms: "Perhaps the only indispensable function of ideology in the Soviet Union is a rationale for the acceptance of a stage of internal siege—required, in fact, for the maintenance of the regime's domestic authority, but explained to the Russian peoples in terms of the external world's implacable de-

²⁷"The Logic of One-Party Rule," in Abraham Brumberg, editor, *Russia Under Khrushchev: An Anthology from Problems of Communism* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 33.

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signs on Russia.”²⁸ In other words, the rationale of the “imperialist bogey.”

This rationale obviously ties in with other factors that we discussed above. The Soviet regime fitted easily the image of “capitalist encirclement” into the traditional Russian sense of insecurity. After more than four decades in power, it has become ludicrous to attribute dislocations in communist society to “bourgeois remnants.” Much more plausible is the tactic of blaming them on the nefarious work of outside forces: either directly on the activities of “imperialist agents” against whom the Soviet populace must practice constant vigilance, or more broadly on the need to funnel national resources into the defense against the unrelentingly aggressive designs of capitalism.

According to Khrushchev, the “capitalist encirclement” has now been broken: obviously, the image of Russia-at-bay is no longer compatible with the image of Soviet military-scientific advances.²⁹ Nevertheless, the fact that “encirclement” has been breached does not mean that the Soviet Union no longer is in danger of a treacherous attack by the imperialist powers. Doctrine teaches quite the contrary: the stronger Soviet power, the greater will be the pressure by irreconcilable forces in the “imperialist camp” in favor of a strategy of preventive war. The need to guard against this danger provides the justification for the sluggish progress of the consumer sectors of the Soviet economy. Thus Khrushchev, when he asked for the “understanding” of the Soviet people for the price rises in basic agricultural items, did not explain this new imposition on the consumer sector in terms of the Soviet Union’s agricultural crisis; rather, he justified it on the grounds of the West’s aggressiveness, and the need to divert Soviet economic resources toward the defense of the Soviet Union.

In short, the major motive is not so much to withhold information on *specific* aspects of Soviet foreign policy, but rather to control information so as to make it conform to a *general* image of the world—a world divided neatly into three distinct compart-

²⁸Rostow, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

²⁹Cf. Khrushchev’s statement: “I would like to draw your attention to the fact that at present the concept of ‘capitalist encirclement’ of our country itself seriously needs a more accurate definition. With the formation of the world system of socialism, the situation in the world has altered radically, and it has not altered, as you know, to the advantage of capitalism. At present it is not known who encircles whom. The socialist countries cannot be considered as some kind of island in a rough capitalist sea.” (Interview with Serge Groussard, *Le Figaro* [Paris], March 19, 1958.)

ments: the socialist countries, by definition "peace-loving" and trustees of the aspirations of the majority of mankind; the "ex-colonial" and "semi-colonial" countries whose "national liberation movements" are attempting to sever the remaining fetters of imperialism and who are well-launched on the path toward socialism; and the imperialist powers, by definition "aggressive," "revanchist," "counter-revolutionary," and always disposed toward lashing out against their inevitable fate.

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

Two Poles of U.S. Attitude Toward Soviet Secrecy. In recent times, opinion in the United States on Soviet secrecy has tended toward two opposing poles. One of these might be characterized as the "Soviet rationality school." While acknowledging the lingering influence of historical factors, this school of thought perceives of Soviet secrecy as a largely rational impulse which springs from the very real asymmetries of the U.S.-Soviet military confrontation. All that is needed to cut the Gordian knot of arms control or of other East-West issues, proponents of this view suggest, is to design schemes which do not offend the Soviet penchant for security. Once the Soviets are assured that a breach of the Iron Curtain could not be used by the West in any aggressive plot to destroy the USSR, they will come to terms.

There is an opposite school which sees Soviet secrecy as a predominantly irrational phenomenon. The policies of the Soviet government, according to this view, reflect a deeply rooted national malaise, aggravated by historical experience. The individual Soviet citizen is given to paranoid tendencies because a long history of chronic backwardness has imprisoned his outlook. Soviet policy is simply an expression of this paranoia at the highest level. Perhaps time and experience will heal the Soviet traumas. Meanwhile, however, there is little that the United States can do. At the individual level, Americans cannot penetrate the Soviet mentality precisely because the secrecy barriers prevent them from doing so. At the official level, the U.S. cannot hope to influence the decisions of the regime inasmuch as the latter is in the throes of a society-wide syndrome. In short, any change in the Soviet secrecy complex, if it is to come at all, must come from within.

The preceding sections of this article suggest the fallacy of the first view. It is clear that, when the Soviets accuse the West of

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attempting to use arms control as a means of “espionage” against the Soviet Union, the term embraces a great deal more than simply the ferreting out of Soviet military secrets. If further evidence is needed, consider the following discussion of “strategic intelligence” in the first authoritative Soviet treatise on strategy since the Second World War:

Strategic intelligence, both in peace and war, provides political, military, economic, scientific, and technical data on the states which are potential enemies; it also studies their military capabilities.

Soviet intelligence differs basically from the intelligence of capitalist countries with respect to its class nature as well as to the content of its assignments and how they are carried out.

Intelligence [activities] by imperialist states are not confined simply to collecting the above data. It is also assigned tasks of organizing political pressure on domestic and foreign policy, particularly in small countries. For this purpose, the intelligence agencies of capitalist countries either exploit or organize internal political dissension and dissension among nationalities [and races in a particular state], conspiracies, and political assassinations. They blackmail and bribe statesmen, party leaders, prominent scientists, newspaper publishers and editors. Moreover, they rely on the most reactionary bourgeois, nationalistic and other anti-democratic elements and groups. Such missions and techniques are alien to Soviet intelligence.³⁰

Satisfying the Soviet security penchant, therefore, entails a great deal more than allaying Soviet fears about Western targeting or R & D intelligence. However, if optimism is not warranted, neither is the extreme pessimism implicit in the second view.

Soviet Secrecy: Xenophobia or Policy? Is Soviet secrecy predominantly a cultural reflex or does it reflect the attitudes of the Soviet leadership? We might attempt an answer to this question by citing another passage from the travelogue of the Frenchman, the Marquis de Custine, who observed Russia firsthand in the early part of the nineteenth century. He notes the following:

I observed from the beginning that any Russians of the lower classes, suspicious by nature, detest foreigners through ignorance and national prejudice; I have since found that any Russian of the upper classes, equally suspicious, fears foreigners because he believes them hostile; he says: “The French, the English, are convinced of their superiority over all peoples.” This is sufficient motive for the Russian to hate the foreigner. A barbaric jealousy, an envy—childish but impossible to allay, governs most Russians in their relations with people of other countries; and as you sense this unsociable tendency everywhere you finish, while feeling sorry

³⁰V. D. Sokolovskii, editor, *Soviet Military Strategy*, annotated by Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Gouré, Thomas W. Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, for the RAND Corporation, 1963), p. 446.

for yourself, by showing the distrust that you inspire. You conclude that a confidence which never becomes reciprocal is fraudulent; hence you remain cold and reserved.³¹

De Custine thus drew a rough division between Russian elite and popular attitudes pertaining to secrecy. The Tsars and the aristocracy were motivated largely by envy and superiority and the imperative of preserving the Russian power structure. The Russian intelligentsia, to the extent that it accepted Russia's relative isolation,³² did so because it shared the aristocracy's envy of the more progressive and opulent world beyond Russia's borders, and attempted to compensate for its sense of inferiority with Slavophile beliefs regarding the inherent superiority of Russian institutions. By contrast, the xenophobia of the broad masses fed upon ignorance and backwardness. Linking these three attitudes was the submissiveness in the Russian character, born of a long authoritarian tradition—a tradition which was in turn reinforced by the very policies of secrecy which it helped to implement and sustain.

Contrast now De Custine's observation of more than a century ago with the following report made by an experienced observer after a recent visit to the Soviet Union:

What particularly strikes an observer is the naïve enthusiasm and thirst for knowledge of every kind displayed by these gifted people who have only quite recently learned to read and write. They apply themselves with a discoverer's zest to the tasks confronting them. . . .

A primitive curiosity is at work in this historically young nation. It manifests itself in a thirst for knowledge, a desire to understand the world—surely one of the most fruitful of human characteristics. Soviet man would, indeed, be fundamentally different from his fellow men if he were not inquisitive and accepted unchallenged everything his rulers set before him. Fortunately, he has not lost his desire to get at the bottom of things; on the contrary, he inquires into everything, and he does not stop at national boundaries.³³

Klaus Mehnert's description bespeaks an impression which nearly every recent visitor has brought back from the Soviet Union. There is little doubt that the revolution in education—which in the span of four decades has transformed a nation of earth-bound peasants into a formidable challenger of the U.S. in the space age

³¹Kohler, editor, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

³²It should be noted, however, that a sizeable "Western" segment of the Russian intelligentsia fought against this isolation—particularly in the ferment of the late nineteenth century.

³³Klaus Mehnert, *Soviet Man and His World*, translated by Maurice Rosenbaum (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 139-40.

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—is also in the process of transforming Soviet society and confronting its leadership with a host of problems of social and ideological control. Whatever may be the ultimate implications of an enlightened populace and a burgeoning “new class” of technicians and specialists for the structure of Soviet society, popular xenophobia (such as that reflected in the “*Mir* spirit”) is apparently weakening as a pillar of the Soviet secrecy complex.

This does not mean that these trends will remove the secrecy barriers or the regime’s hold on the society. The Russian people remain submissive to their masters. Western observers who have spent protracted periods of time in the Soviet Union report fairly drastic ups and downs in their access to Soviet people at unofficial levels. They attribute these fluctuations to an almost uncanny ability of the individual Soviet citizen to sense changes in official policy and pattern his conduct accordingly. For example, U.S. diplomats who were able to foster cordial social relations with individual Russians during the halcyon “Camp David” period of Soviet-American relations suddenly found the same contacts barred following the U-2 incident in the summer of 1960. Of late, a barrage of “vigilance campaigns” in the Soviet press, punctuated by a series of spy trials, has further tended to isolate the visitor from the populace-at-large. In short, however aroused may be the curiosity of the new Soviet generation, it has thus far tended generally to accept the regime’s limitations upon that curiosity, especially as it concerns relations with the outside world.

Moreover, the conclusion that Soviet secrecy is primarily a policy-elite phenomenon does not necessarily render it a more rational one. Although Soviet material progress may gradually allay those acute feelings of inferiority which have nourished distrust and resentment toward the outside world, envy and suspicion of the West probably will continue to color heavily the outlook of Russia’s present rulers. Even to the extent that secrecy policies mirror the regime’s concern for preserving the levers of internal control, this concern may not be a rational one—in the sense of being susceptible to reasoned persuasion. Thus, the regime may well underestimate the extant level of popular support for its policies. It may overestimate the need for secrecy as an instrument of internal control.

Yet, the recognition that secrecy is primarily a policy problem—and perhaps in conflict with popular desires—does modify the pessimistic notion that the entire phenomenon is beyond our

reach, and suggests at least some broad avenues of U.S. initiative.

Sub-Official Penetration of Secrecy. If popular attitudes in the Soviet Union are susceptible to influence—i.e., if minds are not closed to the outside world—then a concerted policy of penetrating Soviet secrecy at the sub-official level could reap results. It may not be possible in the foreseeable future to make rapid headway against the regime's abidingly rigorous lines of internal authority, let alone to exert direct pressures against the regime and its apparatus. At best, any hope of success must be a long-range one. Americans must temper their thirst for quick and lasting results and live with the realization that vast social change does not occur overnight. At the same time, they must dampen their ingrained optimism and recognize that such change is not pre-ordained by any laws of social evolution or industrial progress—that, in order to capitalize on some of the forces now stirring in the Soviet system, we must attempt to encourage them.

True, United States policy has been addressed to this goal in the past. However, whatever effort has been directed toward gaining access to the grass roots of Soviet society seems generally to have been desultory, piecemeal, uncoordinated and carried out on sorely limited budgets. What is called for is a more comprehensive plan of attack, based on a careful assessment of the broad "landscape" of the problem, its areas of greatest "give" and greatest resistance. Perhaps even more important is the need for greater coordination among the official and private bodies engaged in the penetration effort, such as the intelligence agencies, the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, authorized tourist agencies (e.g., American Express and Cosmos), and business concerns involved in East-West trade. The coordination should not be institutionalized, certainly not advertised. Indeed, any consistent signal of U.S. intent to the Soviets is likely to result in a narrowing of those limited apertures to the system now available. For the same reason, the pure intelligence objectives of penetration should be separated as much as possible from the main thrust of the effort.

Pressure Against the Regime. The above suggestions are concerned with an indirect and long-range approach to the problem of Soviet secrecy—an effort to bring about or spur change from within the system. More promising in terms of short-range results is direct pressure against the regime itself.

The very sensitivity to outside criticism which constitutes an

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important prop of Soviet secrecy policies is exacerbated by these policies themselves. Put differently, the Iron Curtain serves not only to shield from the Soviet people the extent of their backwardness relative to the rest of the world, but it is intended also to hide the weaknesses and shortcomings of the society from gloating foreign observers. At the same time, however, the Soviets have betrayed their sensitivity to the charge that a great, powerful, technologically advanced nation, living in "socialist harmony," should not have to stoop to petty measures of surveillance and censorship characteristic of more primitive and oppressed societies.³⁴ It seems quite plausible that this sensitivity has already accounted for some otherwise inexplicable modifications of Soviet secrecy practices in the past: e.g., the abolition of direct censorship of the dispatches of foreign correspondents in the Soviet Union and the relaxation of efforts to jam Western broadcasts. Again, U.S. propaganda has sought to exploit Soviet vulnerability. The contrast between the open and closed society, for example, has been a consistent theme accompanying U.S. man-in-space efforts. Yet the U.S. can, and should, stress this theme more loudly and consistently.

CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion can be summarized as follows: Soviet secrecy confronts the United States at two principal levels. At the military-strategic level, it obstructs our insight into Soviet capabilities and intentions, thus keeping alive a variety of "destabilizing" elements in the thermonuclear environment, particularly the perils of war triggered by surprise attack, pre-emption or miscalculation. At the level of Soviet domestic society, secrecy helps to perpetuate the arbitrariness of the communist system and the regime's irresponsibility in its conduct of external Soviet policy. It tends to block outside attempts at penetrating the system, spurring popular pressures against the leadership's freedom of action and thus helping to transform the Soviet regime into a more responsible government and the Soviet Union into a more mellow member of the international community.

³⁴One Soviet reaction to such criticism has been to "put the shoe on the other foot." Thus TASS, on May 16, 1962, concluded a lurid description of the "shadowing" of Soviet journalists in the U.S. with the following comment: "The [*Izvestia*] correspondent notes that the tale of the shadowing of the correspondents is of some interest if for no other reason than to make up for certain omissions in the work of our American colleagues. They see nonexistent moles in other people's eyes, but refuse to see a beam in their own."

These two dimensions of Soviet secrecy as a United States policy problem suggest two objectives for breaching secrecy barriers: the short-range objective of lifting the military Iron Curtain, and the longer-range aim of influencing change in Soviet society. The urgency of the first objective has waned conspicuously during the past half-decade. The march of technology, which has placed fantastic new weapons at the service of military planners, at the same time has yielded equally fantastic means of detecting and appraising these weapons in the arsenal of the opponent. Our policymakers seem reasonably assured that the "intelligence gap," which in the past bestowed considerable advantages to communist conflict management, has dwindled substantially in important strategic sectors. They are confident that their knowledge of Soviet strategic capabilities-in-being (as distinct from weapons in the research and development stages) is increasingly comprehensive and incisive.

If the military side of the Iron Curtain is thus becoming progressively porous, however, there still remains the longer-range task of what might be described in shorthand fashion as "social penetration." The urgency of this task has not receded, despite the breakthrough in strategic intelligence and despite the current climate of U.S.-Soviet *détente*. The most accurate and up-to-date knowledge of the opponent's capabilities cannot yield an accurate gauge of his intentions, especially so long as these intentions are not circumscribed by internal restraints. By the same token, no *détente* can be considered permanent so long as a small and ideologically oriented leadership elite continues to function without having to bend to popular pressures, thus remaining in a position to change course overnight.

But on this "social-systemic" level of the secrecy problem, too, opportunities are beckoning. Forces are stirring in the Soviet Union which, although still largely inarticulate and not addressed to an "opening" to the outside world as such, certainly seem to be pointed in that direction—or, at least, can be pointed in that direction. As was suggested earlier, however, we can neither assume that these forces will become irrepressible in their own rights, nor can we blithely hold to the hope that the Soviet regime will substantially lower secrecy barriers either as a reward to a thirsting intelligentsia or as a sacrifice to a *détente* with the West. The Soviet leadership, in its theoretical pronouncements as well as its actions, has made it clear that "liberalization" stops at the

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point of a meaningful intercourse between the Soviet citizen and the outside world. This is one of the implicit meanings of the "continuing ideological struggle," as Khrushchev has defined this qualifying dogma within his "peaceful coexistence" concept. This is also the message of recurring spy trials and harassment of Western visitors, such as the recent arrest of Professor Barghoorn.

In short, the forces at work in the Soviet Union require encouragement—or, more crassly, "manipulation." Any strategy of exploitation, however, must be a comprehensive one in which success is not measured merely by such superficial yardsticks as the volume of Western tourists traveling the prescribed Soviet routes or the number of American athletes competing in Moscow's stadium. And to be comprehensive, the attack must be carried out with as much coordination as the United States policy apparatus can muster.

RATIONAL CONSENT AND DEFENSE BUDGETS: THE ROLE OF CONGRESS, 1945-1962

by Edward A. Kolodziej

WITHIN the framework of representative government, military policies, to be judged rational, must meet two essential tests: (1) they must rest on the consent of the governed; and (2) they must adequately support the nation's foreign policy objectives. In meeting the first test, a representative government often falters before the second, as occurred in France in the late 1930's. The military policies of the Third Republic rested on a broad popular consensus, yet they did not deter German aggression, nor did they check its advance across Europe. The failure of the Third Republic to develop military policies that balanced societal and foreign policy imperatives illustrates the problem facing the United States today. Whether these imperatives are being balanced successfully is a question of the most practical and immediate importance. This paper attempts a partial answer to this question through an analysis and evaluation of Congress' use of its power over appropriations to shape military policy since 1945.¹ Part I presents a scaled model of what role Congress should play, or at least should approximate, in military policy-making. Parts II and III review and evaluate the process and the product of Congressional decision-making in security affairs in terms of this model.

I

Since Congress alone has the power to provide for the military establishment, the President must secure its consent before the

¹This study centers on the annual and supplemental defense appropriations bills for the defense establishment. Therefore, it is principally concerned with the actions and decisions of those Congressmen who have guided this legislation through Congress. These primarily include the members of the House and Senate Defense Subcommittees and, before 1949, the Navy and War Department Appropriations Subcommittees. For a treatment of the relations between the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees, especially those growing out of Section 412 (b) of the Military Construction Act of 1959, see S. Rept. 253, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, pp. 1-3; Bernard Gordon, "The Military Budget: Congressional Phase," *Journal of Politics*, XXIII, No. 3 (August 1961), pp. 689-710; and Raymond Dawson, "Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legislative Authorization of Weapon Systems," *American Political Science Review*, LVI, No. 1 (March 1962), pp. 42-57. Section 412 (b), as amended, requires that no funds "be appropriated . . . to or for use of any armed force of the United States for the procurement or research, development, test, or evaluation of aircraft, missiles, or warships unless previously authorized by legislation." 72 U.S. Statutes at Large (hereinafter cited as *Stat.*), p. 322; 76 *Stat.*, p. 55.

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human and material resources needed to implement his defense proposals will be furnished. In exercising its consent power, Congress, no less than the Chief Executive, must meet basic tests of rational decision-making. For purposes of this paper, Congress' role in military policy-making through its control of the purse will be judged according to two widely accepted principles of rational strategic planning.²

First of all, its consent to the President's military budget should be guided by the principle of political primacy.³ This principle has two aspects which may be distinguished in theory, if not always in practice. On the one hand, it requires that Congress assure itself that the military capabilities reflected in the defense budget can achieve the nation's foreign policy objectives. Such assurance can only rest on the knowledge that the military proposals of the Executive Branch for various amounts and kinds of military power are always informed by, and subordinated to, the nation's policy goals. Since these goals establish the criteria for defense policy, Congress must identify for itself the likely military threats to these objectives and the military power needed to cope with these threats. In resolving these problems, Congress will necessarily be concerned with the actual and threatened use of military power. Nevertheless, this preoccupation will not relieve Congress of the task of continually examining the added possibility that, under some circumstances, arms control and disarmament arrangements might be in the nation's interests.⁴ Con-

²For a fuller discussion of the role that Congress can, and should, play in strategic policy-making, see my "Congressional Responsibility for the Common Defense: The Money Problem," *Western Political Quarterly*, XVI, No. 1 (March 1963), pp. 149-60. For a different view of Congress' role in strategic matters that is stated with excellence and precision, see the following works of Samuel P. Huntington: (1) *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 123-46; and (2) "Strategic Planning and the Political Process," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII, No. 2 (January 1960), pp. 285-99. The approach here differs from Huntington in his emphasis of Congress' role as a prodder of the Executive Branch. Congress should prod and lobby, as Huntington correctly suggests, but it should do more, too. Unless its consent to the President's strategic proposals is based on a rational calculation of alternatives, the danger is increased that a gap will develop between the quantity and the quality of military forces that the Congress and the public will politically support and those required for an effective foreign policy. Hanson Baldwin has aptly stated the problem of rational policy-making in a democracy: "Are national policies ever really forged in secrecy and by a small group? Do they not require the support and substantiation of Congress, and public opinion?" Quoted by Ernest R. May, "Political-Military Consultation in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXX, No. 2 (June 1955), p. 180.

³This analysis draws heavily on Robert E. Osgood's *Limited War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 17-27.

⁴The circumstances under which it may be to the nation's advantage to use or to limit the use of military power are discussed, for example, in J. David Singer's *Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962).

gress must be attentive to this possibility, for military force per se can never be a legitimate end of a democratic government. It is always the political ends at issue that justify and limit power.

On the other hand, the principle of political primacy requires that Congress' consent to stated foreign policy goals be consistent with the nation's actual or potential military capabilities. The adoption of policies and objectives which exceed the military means to secure them will result in failure and, within the context of a democratic community, in widespread frustration and disillusionment. To forestall these depressing effects and to build a national consensus that will support feasible military and foreign policy objectives, Congress must assist the Executive Branch in systematically evaluating policy ends and military means so that these two elements are always kept in correct proportion. Moreover, since the proper definition of the terms of this proportion will inevitably change in light of the shifting power capabilities and foreign policy objectives of other, often hostile, nation-states, Congress must similarly develop a consensus on military and foreign policy that paces these changing circumstances. In the absence of a rational Congressional adaptation to these developing power relations in the international environment, the nation's security interests and foreign policy goals will suffer. Gaps will occur between the military and foreign policies to which the Congress consents and the changing conditions of international life. If too large a breach develops, the nation's security interests will be seriously compromised, or even undermined.

As for the second principle that should govern Congressional decision-making, Congress should weigh the claims for military power emanating from the Executive Branch against competing nonmilitary demands; and, in turn, all of these requests should be balanced against the strength of the economy which must supply the resources to underwrite them. These tasks can best be accomplished during Congress' review of the President's annual budget. The budget presents the information which Congress requires if it is to consent rationally to the President's defense policies. It summarizes the specific priorities which have been set for military and nonmilitary programs; the President's evaluation of the level of governmental spending that can be feasibly supported by the nation's economic system; and the basis on which military and fiscal policy has been coordinated. It is an overall review of the government's policy objectives, proposed activities and resource needs. In sum, it balances societal and

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foreign policy imperatives according to variously stated criteria.

In informing itself of the assumptions and the criteria underlying the President's budget, Congress forces the advocates of each spending program to justify their requests for funds in terms of the political benefits that will be derived. This is a traditional function of Congress. Congressional awareness of the political goals at stake within each proposed program aids its decision-making in determining the general question whether military spending is being unjustifiably curtailed in favor of taxpayer interests or nonsecurity programs. Furthermore, in informing itself about the strength of the economy, Congress can judge whether military spending can be increased without harm to the economy. Without such knowledge, there is the twin danger that unwarranted restraints will be placed on the development of military power or that military requirements will be formulated without an awareness of cost and budgetary limitations.⁵ There obviously are economic limits to the military power that the nation can support at any given time. Rational decision-making implies an understanding of these limitations and the impact which different levels of military expenditure will have on the economic system and on nonmilitary spending. It is only after these economic limits have been determined that Congress has a basis on which to evaluate the Executive's military proposals.

These principles which should guide Congressional decision-making do not imply that Congress can provide a substitute for strong Presidential leadership. No serious analyst today considers this possibility realistic, or even desirable. Given the need for technical competence in developing and deploying modern weapon systems⁶ and the need for unity of command, secrecy and swift, controlled responses in strategic planning and operations,⁷ initiative in defense must belong to the President and the Executive Branch. Rather, the principles noted above furnish a basis for evaluating Congressional policy-making. If Congress is to perform its elemental functions as the deliberating, criticizing, prod-

⁵James R. Schlesinger, *The Political Economy of National Security* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 121. See also Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKeon, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

⁶The problem of relating technology to warfare is described with telling effect in Herman Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), especially pp. 311 ff., and his more recent *Thinking About the Unthinkable* (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), pp. 209-254.

⁷On problems of controlling modern weaponry, see the discussion of Sir Solly Zuckerman, "Judgment and Control in Modern Warfare," *Foreign Affairs*, XL, No. 2 (January 1962), pp. 196-212.

ding and consenting power of the government, it must conform to these decision-making criteria. Failure to raise and settle strategic issues through such an ordered process will inevitably cause Congress' actions and decisions to be founded on whim, chance or an insufficient knowledge of the relevant facts in question. While adherence to these principles will not guarantee wise and prudent policies in the public interest, however defined, they do set standards for national decision-making which are based on as thorough a Congressional understanding as possible of the issues facing the nation.

Part II, which applies these decision-making criteria to Congress' handling of the defense appropriations bills since World War II,⁸ attempts to develop the proposition that Congress, although it has become increasingly sophisticated in its grasp of military power and foreign policy objectives, still fails to examine and decide strategic questions on the basis of a comprehensive view of the nation's policy goals and the military and nonmilitary capabilities needed to secure those goals. In addition, in Part II evidence is submitted to show that this weakness in its policy-making process has encouraged Congress (1) to consent to military policies that could not support the nation's foreign policy objectives; (2) to focus on only a part of the overall military threat facing the nation; (3) to respond too slowly or ineffectually even to its own limited perception of the strategic problem as, for example, in the pre-Korean controversy over a 70-group Air Force; and (4) to accept uncritically, and therefore to restrict itself unnecessarily to, the budgetary framework established by the Executive Branch for defense and nondefense spending.⁹

II

World War II—Korean War. In the postwar period, Congress and the President responded sympathetically to domestic demands for lower taxation, reduced defense expenditures, and relief from

⁸This discussion summarizes and therefore simplifies a great amount of historical data. Despite the increased danger of distortion, this approach is adopted in order to take into account more changes in Congress' examination of military appropriations than would be possible through a case study which is focused on a more narrowly defined span of time. While the perspective here is different, it in no way is meant to detract from such excellent studies as, for example, Warner Schilling's recent analysis of Congress' role in formulating the defense budget for FY 1950. Warner Schilling, editor, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 1-266.

⁹For a more favorable interpretation of Congress' handling of defense, examine Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957), pp. 400-427.

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the burden of military preparedness.¹⁰ Awareness of Soviet expansionist intentions and the debate over the appropriate remedies, including military force, to cope with growing Soviet power developed only gradually. Military spending was generally restricted to a \$15 billion ceiling that was never directly questioned in Congress. There was widespread agreement that the economy could not support a greater defense effort. Indeed, actual defense expenditures never reached the \$15 billion annual limit between FY 1947 and FY 1950.

Even before the surrender of Japan, the Legislative and Executive branches acceded approvingly to public insistence on "the discharge of the millions of men in the service."¹¹ Without protest, Congress and its military appropriations subcommittees lent their support to the largest, most rapid demobilization in the nation's history. If Congressmen had reservations about the nation's demobilization policy, they went largely unexpressed. Those which were recorded were of small consequence, limited essentially to marginally differing viewpoints as to the postwar composition of the Navy.¹² Indeed, questions were not raised in the annual appropriations review about the foreign policy and security implications of General George Marshall's observation before a special meeting of Congress "that the rate of demobilization has been determined by transportation facilities and by the availability of trained personnel to carry its administrative requirements out," and had no relationship to the future needs of the Army.¹³ Nor did the subcommittees challenge the manpower reductions of the armed services. Hearings were brief and, when compared with those conducted today, perfunctory.¹⁴ A military establishment of over 12 million at the close of World War II was reduced to less than a million and a half before the outbreak of the Korean War. The Army was hit hardest, shrinking from 8.3 million to 593,000, hardly more than a constabulary force.¹⁵

Congressional cuts in defense expenditures, particularly for the

¹⁰For an excellent summary of this period, see Huntington, *The Common Defense*, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-47.

¹¹Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1957), I, p. 507.

¹²House, *Hearings, Navy Appropriations for Fiscal 1947*, pp. 24-25, 37, 46-47, 386-87, 545, 573-74, 578-79, 593, 1280-81, 1415-19, 1420-21, 1479, 1984-85; H. Rept. 2085, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1946, pp. 1-5; *Congressional Record*, XCII, Part 5, 1946, pp. 5532-58. Hereinafter cited as C. R.

¹³S. Doc. 90, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, p. 1.

¹⁴Compare, for example, House, *Hearings, Military Establishment Appropriations, FY 1947*, and House, *Hearings, Defense Appropriations, FY 1963*, 6 vols.

¹⁵H. Doc. 227, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 123.

Army and Navy, contributed further to the diminution of armed force personnel strength, weapon system capability, overall fighting effectiveness and modernization.¹⁶ In 1947, Congress struck 58,371 civilian and 13,150 military personnel from the War Department payroll,¹⁷ and compelled the Navy to lower its projected manpower strength of 471,000 in FY 1948 to an actual force of less than 450,000.¹⁸ Naval aircraft operations were reduced in the same year from a 6,130-plane program to 5,793.¹⁹ Two years later the Army's hope for universal military training (UMT) was dashed when Congress ignored President Truman's \$800 million recommendation for the FY 1950 operation of this program.²⁰ Army procurement also suffered. A \$7.3 billion request for the Army and Air Force in the Military Functions Act of FY 1949 was cut by \$570 million, resulting in lower purchases of ammunition, rifles, higher powered bazookas, light tanks and armored utility vehicles.²¹

These reductions, totaling approximately \$2 billion between 1946 and 1950,²² indicated the narrow role which Congress had assumed for itself in military policy-making. All were made within the framework of the President's annually established ceilings on defense expenditures. Congress' acceptance of these budgetary restraints on the expansion of the military establishment foreclosed consideration of alternative budgets and variously composed military forces to counter Soviet power. Justification for its unquestioning adherence to these spending guidelines rested primarily on the unexamined assumption, shared by the Chief Executive, that a defense budget in excess of \$15 billion would lead to serious economic dislocation and collapse.²³ What movement there might have been in Congress to test this assumption was discouraged by the pressures for tax reduction.²⁴ Neither Congress nor its mili-

¹⁶Walter Millis, *Arms and the State* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), pp. 197-219, 238-50.

¹⁷C. R., XCIII, Part 8, 1947, p. 10234.

¹⁸House, *Hearings, Navy Department Appropriations Bill, FY 1948*, p. 112; H. Rept. 390, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, pp. 3-4; Senate, *Hearings, Navy Department Appropriations Bill, FY 1948*, p. 133.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 98.

²⁰*Budget of the United States, FY 1950*, pp. M20-21.

²¹House, *Hearings, Military Functions, National Military Establishment Appropriations Bill, FY 1949*, Part 1, pp. 25, 818; and Senate, *Hearings, Military Functions, National Military Establishment Appropriations Bill, FY 1949*.

²²Figure derived from S. Doc., *Appropriations, Budget Estimates, Etc.*, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., through 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., *passim*.

²³Walter Millis, editor, *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), pp. 438, 492-530.

²⁴Huntington, *The Common Defense*, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-43.

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tary appropriation subcommittees saw the need for an investigation of the real strength of the economy to underwrite different levels of military expenditures.

Operating within these sharply defined constraints, Congress could hardly have been expected to treat the President's military budget as a function of foreign policy. Congress retained instead its traditional approach to military appropriations which was epitomized in Representative Charles Plumley's opening statement as chairman of the Navy Department Appropriations Subcommittee in 1947:

During the war . . . Congress was forced to be very liberal in its response to the requests of the armed services for money since we realized that anything that would shorten the war . . . would save American lives

That atmosphere of crisis is now over. We now must return to good business practices as of peacetime . . . in which economy and efficiency are the keynotes. It is important to insure the stability and the strength of our country and the world that the expenditures of this Government be curtailed so that we can start making a reduction in the huge national debt which accumulated during the conduct of the war and try to balance the budget, to the end that eventually the burden of the individual taxpayer may be reduced.²⁵

Congress' main job was to curtail governmental spending, not to search for areas, such as national security, where greater overall expenditures might be advisable, or to question the adequacy of the President's defense policies. "Cutting our expenditures and meeting our obligations," noted Representative John Kerr of the House War Department Appropriations Subcommittee, "is the most serious duty that ever confronted us."²⁶

What doubts legislators may have had about the adequacy of the nation's military strength were generally resolved by three widely-held beliefs. First, many agreed with the House Appropriations Committee that Congress would "be in session in ample time to make provision" for additional defense funds in an emergency, as it had done after the attack on Pearl Harbor.²⁷ There was no urgent need to prepare for all conceivable military situations, or even for those which appeared immediately pressing.

²⁵House, *Hearings, Navy Department Appropriations Bill, FY 1948*, pp. 2-3. See also Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 274-75, n. 8.

²⁶C. R. XCIII, Part 5, 1947, p. 6277. It is no accident that Huzar's study of Congress and military appropriations, covering the years 1933 through 1950, concentrates on the budgetary and administrative aspects of Congress' review. Elias Huzar, *The Purse and the Sword* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), pp. 62-131, 207-373.

²⁷H. Rept. 2135, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1949, p. 10.

The prewar strategy of mobilization, resting on a small military force, reserves, and a massive industrial complex quickly adjustable to defense purposes, was retained. Congress (and the Executive Branch) was not ready to adopt a strategy of deterrence, which would have required a large defense establishment capable of meeting a wide range of military and political contingencies.²⁸ Second—and also closely associated with World War II thinking—many believed the nation could always count on “America’s industrial potential, America’s capacity to fight back and continue to fight back until victory had been achieved.”²⁹ The deciding element in modern war was the nation’s economic and productive base, not its actual forces in being. Unless engaged in combat, the latter still appeared wasteful of valuable national resources. Third, many, including a majority of those serving on the military appropriations subcommittees, rationalized that Congress could trust the President to make the proper defense decisions. “I must be guided first by the Commander-in-Chief of the nation,” observed Elmer Thomas, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Armed Service Appropriations; “he is in a position to get the best advice in the world, and he does get that kind of advice.”³⁰ Followed to its logical conclusion, this line of reasoning would have exempted Congress from the tasks of assessing the adequacy and the relevance to the nation’s foreign policy objectives of the President’s defense proposals.

These comforting assumptions, nevertheless, were not enough to quell the discontent of a minority of legislators, located predominantly in the House, who worked, albeit unsuccessfully, for some increase in defense spending. Their uneasiness was expressed in the slowly changing approach of the military appropriation subcommittees to defense problems and in the aborted attempts of a minority of members to increase Navy and Air Force appropriations. The subcommittees gradually abandoned their reluctance to raise policy questions. This departure became more clearly focused when in 1949 the House Armed Services Appropriations Subcommittee, under the newly assumed chairmanship of George Mahon, examined the money requests of the three military branches, combining the work of the War and Navy Department subcommittees. For the first time the opportunity was created—one which has yet to be fully utilized—for a single committee of

²⁸Huntington, *The Common Defense*, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-29.

²⁹C.R., XCVI, Part 4, 1950, p. 4685.

³⁰*Ibid.*, XCV, Part 9, 1949, p. 12308.

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Congress to assess the respective claims of the services for funds against each other in terms of the nation's overall strategic imperatives. Under Mahon's guidance some preliminary probes were made to discover what considerations had principally shaped defense estimates;³¹ whether each service was ready for war;³² and whether the Budget Bureau had perhaps had a deleterious influence on the nation's military policies. "If . . . [the defense budget] is submitted on a fallacious basis," observed Mahon during the Budget Director's appearance before the House group, "then we cannot afford to put much reliance in it. To put reliance in an ill-conceived program might imperil the safety of the country."³³

Another sign of legislative concern arose over the problem of the Navy's declining strength. As early as 1946, Congress approved \$350 million more for naval forces than the administration had recommended.³⁴ However, as pressure to decrease governmental expenditures mounted in the postwar era, similar efforts to expand naval power in succeeding years were effectively blocked. House amendments offered on the floor in 1947 to replace the almost \$300 million in naval funds reduced by the Navy Department Appropriations Subcommittee were decisively defeated.³⁵ Two years later, a similar fate befell floor attempts to add \$300 million more to the Navy's aircraft procurement fund than the President and the military appropriations subcommittee had recommended.³⁶ The Navy's setbacks in Congress were further compounded in April 1949 when Defense Secretary Louis Johnson canceled the super-carrier program. The super-carrier was crucial to the Navy's future and to its strategic thinking which stood opposed to the Air Force's strategic bombing concepts. Reports reaching Congressional offices from anonymous Navy sources charged that the Air Force's B-36 bomber, the key weapon system of the Air Force's strategic design, not only was incapable of carrying out its assigned mission but was procured through a questionable exercise of influence. The House Armed Services Committee

³¹House, *Hearings, National Military Establishment Appropriations, FY 1950*, Part 1; Part 2, pp. 15-17, 98-103; Part 3, pp. 1-3. Also H. Rept. 417, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, pp. 3-4.

³²House, *Hearings, Defense Appropriations, FY 1951*, Part 2, pp. 203, 213-15, 149-50, 380-83; Part 3, pp. 1315-17; Part 4, pp. 1749-54, 1895-96, 1947, 2608.

³³*Ibid.*, Part 5, p. 2659.

³⁴S. Doc. 263, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1946, pp. 1018-19.

³⁵C.R., XCIH, Part 4, 1947, pp. 5549-52.

³⁶*Ibid.*, XCV, Part 4, 1949, p. 4529.

investigated the Navy's charges, and found them to be false.³⁷ The Navy's failure to have its position vindicated before Congress provoked an open "rebellion" of its top military leadership, forcing Congress in a follow-up hearing to the B-36 investigation to review the nation's strategic posture.³⁸ The Navy induced Congress to consider strategic policy, and not the other way around.

In the final analysis, the Air Force's appeal to Congress for more funds and support was no less a failure than the Navy's. Over administration protests, Air Force officials repeatedly recommended a 70-group force.³⁹ Adoption of this policy would have required either lower spending levels for the Army and Navy or the shattering of the President's ceiling on defense expenditures. But pressures for reduced spending were equally compelling in Congress, and proved eventually powerful enough to nullify attempts to implement the Air Force's proposal. In the postwar period before Korea, Congress generally lowered Army and Navy new obligational authority each year, while it stabilized or slightly raised Air Force appropriations—though never so much in any fiscal year that the total appropriations granted by Congress exceeded the President's overall budgetary estimates.⁴⁰ A House Appropriations Committee proposal to cut Air Force appropriations for FY 1948 was partly offset by a successful floor amendment sponsored by Mahon to replace \$40 million.⁴¹ Actual Congressional add-ons to the President's annually approved Air Force budgets were made later. In the Defense Supplemental Act for FY 1948, Congress approved Air Force contract authorizations totaling \$822 million more than the President had advised,⁴² and it similarly granted a sum close to \$730 million over the administration's Air Force requests for FY 1950.⁴³ Many legislators hoped that their support of more strategic air power capable of delivering

³⁷House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, Investigation of B-36 Bomber Program*, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

³⁸House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings, National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy*, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950. Also, Millis., *Arms and the State*, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-42, 244-45.

³⁹See, for example, House, *Hearings, Military Appropriations, FY 1947*, pp. 401-402; House, *Hearings, Military Appropriations, FY 1948*, pp. 601 ff.; and House, *Hearings, National Military Establishment Appropriation, FY 1950*, Part 2, pp. 103-105.

⁴⁰See S. Doc. *Appropriations, Budget Estimates, Etc.*, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., through 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., *passim*.

⁴¹C.R., XCIII, Part 5, pp. 6279, 6354 ff.

⁴²*Ibid.*, XCIV, Part 4, pp. 4538, 4542.

⁴³H. Rept. 417, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, pp. 4, 30-34; S. Rept. 745, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, pp. 1-3, 31-32; 63 *Stat.*, pp. 1013-1014.

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nuclear weapons against enemy civilian and military targets could meet the growing communist military threat at a cost acceptable to the American people and compatible with the assumed strength of the economy. "There would have been no Pearl Harbor in 1941," reasoned Mahon in justifying more Air Force spending,

if we had been prepared to strike a quick and deadly blow at the vitals of Japan and Germany. We greatly diminish the likelihood of world war III when we prepare ourselves to strike a quick and deadly blow at the very heart of the potential enemy. . . . The only force under heaven that can now deliver the quick and devastating blow is the United States Air Force. So I say without hesitation that our first line of defense is the Air Force.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, Congress' episodic increases to the Air Force's budget had little practical effect. They expressed, instead, Congress' unwillingness to evaluate or to challenge seriously the President's overall defense and fiscal policies. The heated battles over greater airpower appropriations and the 70-group concept, which had occurred over the passage of the Supplemental Bill for FY 1948 and the military appropriation bill for FY 1950, were followed by curious periods of Congressional quietude in spite of growing signs of a deteriorating international environment. The circumstances surrounding the Taber amendment, which added \$822 million to the Air Force's FY 1948 budget, bore the marks of this inconstancy in Congressional decision-making. The Taber add-on, an almost reflex reaction to the crisis atmosphere created by the communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, was ostensibly aimed at halting future communist expansion. But, as events were to reveal, it neither deterred future communist thrusts against Free World interests nor succeeded, ironically enough, in increasing the nation's airpower strength. In granting the \$822 million to the Air Force, Congress, at Taber's instigation, authorized the President, already opposed to increased Air Force expenditures, to decide their "necessity," and it extended the time over which the additional amount could be spent—both provisions being tantamount to a nullification of any stepped-up effort for airpower.⁴⁵

Congress' enlarged Air Force appropriation in 1949 had an equally ambiguous impact. While the House pushed for a slight rise in the administration's defense ceiling, the Senate military

⁴⁴C.R., XCV, Part 4, p. 4429. See also the following Congressional debates for similar views, *ibid.*, XCIII, Part 5, p. 6471; *ibid.*, XCIII, Part 7, pp. 8605-14; and *ibid.*, XCIV, Part 4, p. 4536.

⁴⁵Millis, editor, *The Forrestal Diaries*, *op. cit.*, pp. 416-17.

appropriations subcommittee, impressed by Secretary of Defense Johnson's boast that a billion dollars could be saved in the Defense Department "by cutting out wastage, duplication, and by cutting down unnecessary civilian employment,"⁴⁶ recommended that he be given authority to reduce defense appropriations to a maximum of \$434 million "whenever in his discretion such action would not jeopardize the national security."⁴⁷ Though this provision was rejected in conference committee and the House-initiated airpower increase accepted, the Senate—and the President—still held the upper hand. Senator Elmer Thomas' hint to his colleagues that "if the money is appropriated it may not be used"⁴⁸ melted the upper chamber's opposition to the House demand for more Air Force funds. President Truman fulfilled Thomas' oblique prediction a few months later and impounded \$615 million of the House-inspired Air Force increase for FY 1950.⁴⁹ His action, however, did not elicit a prompt House counterattack during Congress' examination of the FY 1951 defense budget. In a curious turnabout, members of the House subcommittee, while offering passing criticism of the President's order and expressing apprehension over the military implications of China's fall to the communists and the Soviet explosion of an atomic device,⁵⁰ acquiesced in the Chief Executive's slimmed-down FY 1951 defense budget;⁵¹ and, going further, opposed any Congressional increase in it.⁵²

Meanwhile, as the furor over strategic airpower raged in Congress through 1948 and 1949, the problem of meeting military contingencies other than general war received little treatment. General Hodges' ominous report from his Korean command that his "dangerously low troop strength" was "a definite political liability" and "well below a safe level for the performance of [its] mission" was buried in the appropriation hearings.⁵³ Congress also disposed of President Truman's UMT recommendation and drained still more funds from his already shrunken military and

⁴⁶Senate, *Hearings, National Military Establishment Appropriations, FY 1950*, p. 32.

⁴⁷S. Rept. 745, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, p. 6.

⁴⁸C.R., XCV, Part 11, 1949, p. 14355.

⁴⁹*New York Times*, October 30, 1949, p. 3.

⁵⁰See, for example, House, *Hearings, Defense Appropriations FY 1951*, Part 2, p. 249.

⁵¹H. Rept. 1797, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.

⁵²C.R., XCVI, Part 4, 1950, p. 4685.

⁵³House, *Hearings, National Military Establishment Appropriations, FY 1949*, Part 3, p. 19.

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naval appropriation bills. "It is to be hoped," mused a House Appropriations Committee report, "that the world situation will soon stabilize so that we will have a better idea as to the exact future requirement [of the Navy]." ⁵⁴ That the deployment of greater military power of all types might check the spread of disruptive elements was a proposition neither understood nor fully explored by Congress or its military appropriations subcommittees. The North Korean invasion, rather than the foresight of the Legislative or Executive branches, finally forced a reconsideration of the restraints on military preparedness.

The Korean War to Sputnik. Broadly speaking, the Korean War had a threefold effect on the military strategic consensus in Congress. First of all, the \$15 billion budget barrier for defense was shattered. It was replaced in the fifties by a new upper limit on defense spending, set roughly at \$40 billion. ⁵⁵ Yet Congressmen were no more certain of the validity of this higher spending level than the \$15 billion figure. It was accepted without a thorough exploration of the capacity of the economy or the present and future military needs of the nation. The defense spending ceilings set by the administration essentially defined the scope of the defense debate in Congress for the remainder of the decade.

Second, the Korean War crystallized a Congressional conviction, which still endures, that the nation's most important military problem is the deterring of a general war with the Soviet Union and that the only way to accomplish this objective, or to win such a war, is through overwhelming nuclear striking power. Congress had expressed itself ambiguously on these matters before the North Korean attack. After 1950 it followed an admittedly devious, yet discernible, pattern of criticizing the President for his alleged failure to build an adequate nuclear deterrent; and of supporting these verbal assaults, particularly after the flight of the first Sputnik, by increases in the administration's requests for long-range air power, missiles or continental defense, or for all three.

Finally, there developed a body of Congressional opinion which opposed the administration's almost exclusive reliance on the nuclear deterrent to contain communist encroachments. The Korean experience, the French debacle in Indochina, and the Soviet possession of nuclear weapons encouraged legislators to press for an expansion of conventional military forces. Yet it

⁵⁴H. Rept. 2136, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, p. 3.

⁵⁵Actual military spending annually averaged \$39.3 billion between FY 1952 and FY 1960. H. Doc. 432, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960, p. 214.

remains to be seen whether Congress would actually be willing to support another Korean-type military action.

These changes in Congressional attitude came slowly. It was difficult for many Congressmen, and for the American people, to resign themselves to the idea that a single enemy nuclear strike could prostrate the United States. It was hard to grasp that at the outbreak of a general war there would be little or no time to transform economic power into military might; that an effective military machine could not be quickly organized after the devastation resulting from an enemy nuclear attack. Despite Korea, the point was not fully appreciated that actual forces in being could more effectively deter various forms of communist military aggression than potentially mobilizable military power. A Congressional majority reluctantly abandoned the World War II precept that the military establishment was simply the spearhead of the industrial economy, which would ultimately decide any military struggle with the communist world. So long as the economy was strong, even a blunt spear, as it were, would be an adequate deterrent. Almost three years after the Soviet detonation of a nuclear bomb, leading members of Congress still energetically pressed this argument:

Senator O'Mahoney: . . . When all is said and done, the economy of the United States is the basis for the maintenance of freedom in this world. As I have said before, it seems to me the economic front is the real fighting front in the whole international crisis. . . .

Senator Ferguson: . . . As the chairman said, I think the committee is looking at this matter in the light of first things first in our defense . . . if we are going to deter our enemies . . . we cannot do it alone by machine and military might; we have to do it by a sound economy at the same time. The fact that we have a lot of tanks and so forth will be of little value to us. . . .⁵⁶

The Democratic and Republican administrations of the 1950's sympathized with this point of view. In his FY 1953 defense budget, President Truman proposed that the defense goals of a 21-division Army, a 408-combatantship Navy, and a 143-wing Air Force be "stretched out" beyond 1954, the so-called year of "maximum danger" from Soviet attack.⁵⁷ In spite of this view of maximum threat, President Truman and Secretary of Defense Robert

⁵⁶Senate, *Hearings, Defense Appropriations, FY 1953*, p. 844. Senators Joseph O'Mahoney and Homer Ferguson were, respectively, the ranking Democratic and Republican members of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in 1952.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 332-36; *Budget of the United States, FY 1953*, p. M2.

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Lovett pared \$20 billion from the armed services \$71 billion budget for FY 1953. This "stretch-out" prepared the way for President Eisenhower's "long haul" defense recommendations which were embodied in his "New Look" strategy.⁵⁸ Target goals corresponding to "fixed dates of maximum danger" "were to be abandoned" for a defense budget "aimed at providing a strong military position which can be maintained over the extended period of uneasy peace."⁵⁹

The "long-haul" and the "stretch-out" were different slogans applied to similar attempts to stabilize defense spending. A leveling-off in military expenditures seemed feasible in 1954 because, as the President assured the Congress, "that precious intangible, the initiative, is becoming ours."⁶⁰ Moreover, with the New Look's "shift in emphasis to the full exploitation of modern weapons," the President noted further, "we are in a position to support strong national security programs over an indefinite period with less of a drain on our manpower, material, and financial resources."⁶¹ Almost \$5 billion was slashed from President Truman's already "stretched-out" defense estimates for FY 1954 by the incoming Republican administration; and requests for new obligatory authority for FY 1955, when the New Look was officially unveiled, were slightly more than \$30 billion for the Defense Department, \$5 billion less than the revised estimates of the preceding year.⁶² Throughout the Eisenhower period, budgetary guidelines held defense spending steady despite increasing defense costs and an expanding communist military threat. Military policy, consequently, was principally shaped by economic and budgetary considerations.⁶³ Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway charged after his retirement: "The force levels provided in all three [defense budgets for 1955, 1956 and 1957] were not primarily based on military needs. . . . They were squeezed between

⁵⁸House, *Hearings, Defense Appropriations, FY 1953*, pp. 87-88.

⁵⁹*Budget of the United States, FY 1953*, p. M38.

⁶⁰*State of the Union*, H. Doc. 1, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954, p. 2.

⁶¹*Budget of the United States, FY 1955*, p. M39.

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. M42; H. Rept. 601, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, p. 2.

⁶³Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1959), pp. 23-46, 118-22; Robert Donovan, *The Inside Story* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1956), p. 17. See especially Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' "Massive Retaliation" speech in which he argued that such a strategic doctrine would make it "possible to get, and share, more security at less cost." "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin*, XXX, No. 761 (January 25, 1954), p. 108.

the framework of arbitrary manpower and fiscal limits.”⁶⁴ Such fundamental criticisms, not unlike those made by the Navy before the Korean War, long received only scattered attention in Congress.

Congressional members sharing General Ridgway’s apprehensions about the nation’s military posture were unable to overturn a strong majority in Congress which supported the President’s defense programs based on a fixed level of defense expenditures. Except for 1956—an election year in which the two parties controlled different branches of the government—a Presidential-Congressional economy coalition of Democrats and Republicans successfully frustrated most attempts between 1952 and 1957 to shift priorities within the administration’s overall defense program or to increase defense spending. Congressional members, including a majority of both defense appropriations subcommittees, generally occupied themselves with the traditional search for economy *within* the framework of the administration’s defense budget. Thus, during the debates on the FY 1958 defense bill, the primary question of using nuclear weapons under different contingencies was transformed into a problem of what systems could most efficiently and economically deliver these destructive devices—to be sure an important, yet necessarily a secondary, issue of defense management. “These bombs are expensive,” stated Representative Errett Scrivner, ranking Republican member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. “Somebody ought to tell us how much it is going to cost to deliver a megaton bomb . . . by missile, by bomber, by carrier, by submarine. Somewhere, some place, there ought to be an answer as to which is the best and the most economical method.”⁶⁵ “Do not tell me,” affirmed Representative George Mahon, Scrivner’s Democratic counterpart, who was being swept along by the drive for economy, “that we could not have a reasonable and adequate defense program for approximately \$35 billion a year rather than \$38 billion a year, as presently budgeted.”⁶⁶ Interest in economy is of course a legitimate Congressional concern, but it can be considered rationally only as a function of the more fundamental question of military strategy and foreign policy. In its approach to these questions during this period Congress was putting the cart before the horse, and at the

⁶⁴Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1956), pp. 288-89.

⁶⁵C.R., CIII, Part 6, 1957, p. 7619.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 7605.

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TABLE I*

PRESIDENTIAL BUDGETARY ESTIMATES AND CONGRESSIONAL
APPROVALS FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
FY 1952—FY 1963
[in billions]

Appropriation Bill**	President's Estimate	Congressional Approval	Difference (+ or —)
DOD, FY 1952	57.68	56.94	—0.74
DOD, FY 1953	51.39	46.61	—4.78
DOD, FY 1954	36.77***	34.37	—2.40
DOD, FY 1955	29.89	28.80	—1.09
DOD, FY 1956	32.23	31.88	—0.35
DOD, FY 1957	34.15	34.66	+0.51
DOD, FY 1958	36.13	33.76	—2.37
DOD, FY 1959	38.79	39.60	+0.81
DOD, FY 1960	39.25	39.23	—0.02
DOD, FY 1961	39.34	40.00	+0.66
DOD, FY 1962	46.40	46.66	+0.26
DOD, FY 1963	47.91	48.14	+0.23

*Table adapted from the S. Doc. *Appropriations, Budget Estimates, Etc.*, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., through 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., *passim*. Supplemental and construction appropriation bills for the Defense Department are not included.

**Fiscal years are listed. This table actually covers data from the calendar years 1951 through 1962.

***President Eisenhower's revised estimate. H. Rept. 601, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2.

same time was neglecting the contents of the cart, the administration's overall defense package.

The keenness with which Congress pressed for economy in defense is summarized in Table I. Between 1952 and 1957, it made sizeable cuts in the President's annual defense appropriations bills. These reductions marked no intrinsic disagreement with the President's defense program. Rather, they reflected a strong Congressional belief that Defense Department estimates were overstated and the same amount of military power could be secured at a lower cost. Where defense policy differences occurred during this six-year period, they were essentially marginal in character, and did not raise into question the fundamental considerations underlying the defense budget. Commenting on Congress' review of the defense budget during the middle Eisenhower years, one perceptive observer complained that "no one, absolutely no one, ever, ever questions whether the proposed sum—whether it be \$13.2 billion or four times that much—is the proper sum to spend on national defense. In short, no one ever asks the important

questions.”⁶⁷ The defense appropriations subcommittees were still struggling to define a role for themselves that included an annual reappraisal of current strategic policies.

Paradoxically, what criticism there was in Congress of the administration's defense thinking was aimed principally at its failure to implement its own doctrine of Massive Retaliation. As early as 1953, a year before the doctrine was officially announced, the defense appropriations subcommittees provided a forum for the first of a series of Air Force attacks on the Eisenhower Administration. General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, asked Congress to restore the 23 wings that had been cut from the Truman-inspired proposal for a 137-wing Air Force as the target goal for FY 1954. Quoting from a March 1953 letter of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vandenberg warned that “any reduction of the program of 143 wings to be attained as soon as practicable after fiscal year 1954 would increase the risk to the national security beyond the dictates of national prudence.”⁶⁸ This appeal, while given a careful airing in the Congressional hearings,⁶⁹ was subsequently denied relief when Democratic-sponsored amendments in the House (to increase Air Force funds by \$1.75 billion) and the Senate (to expand airplane procurement by \$400 million) were defeated by wide margins.⁷⁰

Air Force lobbying yielded more positive results before Congress two years later. Partly at the insistence of Congressional leaders, including members of the defense appropriations subcommittees, the administration made a supplemental request of \$356 million for the Air Force FY 1956 budget, increasing B-52 production from 12 to 17 a month.⁷¹ A similar situation developed in the following year when Congressional pressure prompted another administration revision of its initial estimates for the Air Force budget. In this instance, Eisenhower defense officials proposed a \$248 million budget supplement to accelerate B-52 production from 17 to 20 a month.⁷² Their appetites whetted by these conces-

⁶⁷Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., “How Congress Strains at Gnats, Then Swallows Military Budgets,” *The Reporter*, XI (July 20, 1954), p. 35.

⁶⁸Senate, *Hearings, Defense Appropriations, FY 1954*, Part 1, p. 277.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, Part 1; Part 2, pp. 1870, 1891. Also House, *Hearings, Defense Appropriations, FY 1954*, pp. 476-95; and House, *Hearings, Air Force Appropriations, FY 1954*, pp. 959-68, 258-61, and 292-93.

⁷⁰C.R. XCIX, Part 6, 1953, pp. 7955-7970; Part 7, pp. 9585-9603.

⁷¹C.R. CIII, Part 1, 1957, p. 402; Senate, *Hearings, Study of Air Power*, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, Part XXI, pp. 1556-58, 1587-88; S. Rept. 545, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, p. 6.

⁷²Senate, *Hearings, Study of Air Power*, Part XXI, pp. 1587-88; H. Rept. 2104, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, p. 40.

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sions, Congressional Air Force supporters pressed their advantage, and convinced a majority of their colleagues to pass an additional \$900 million for more airpower in FY 1957.⁷³ This action was taken against a background of intensive Congressional investigation of the Eisenhower Administration's policy of maintaining "what it determined to be a sufficient Air Force . . . as a deterrent to any possible aggression" rather than an Air Force superior to the Soviet Union's "in the overall size . . . and in the number to be produced. . . ."⁷⁴ These inquiries indicated a growing Congressional concern about evidence that the Soviet Union was a "first-class airpower with a rapidly developing offensive as well as defense capability."⁷⁵ Yet, in sum, the effect of these efforts to secure more strategic airpower remained essentially scattered. Congress again lapsed into its established habit of clamoring for greater economy in defense operations and lower governmental expenditures during its review of the FY 1958 military budget.

Congressional-Executive conflict over nonnuclear forces proved even less consequential. Tight budgetary ceilings and a nuclear-strike strategy inevitably led to lower priorities for conventional forces, notwithstanding the administration's repeated assertions that it would not place "undue reliance on one weapon" or prepare "for only one kind of warfare. . . ."⁷⁶ Actual defense spending pointed toward the opposite conclusion, as Air Force expenditures between 1953 and 1955 climbed slowly from \$15.0 billion to \$16.4 billion, while Army expenditures dropped radically from \$16.2 billion to \$8.9 billion.⁷⁷ Annual Army cutbacks in personnel and procurement programs indicated that the administration had generally adopted the argument that "the clear possession by the United States of an effective strategic nuclear air offensive force in being" would meet the threat of an all-out nuclear attack as well as lesser threats.⁷⁸ On the strength of this conception of deterrence, some Eisenhower defense officials, like Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were prepared to

⁷³C.R., CII, Part 8, 1956, p. 11334.

⁷⁴H. Rept. 2104, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, p. 40. See also testimony of SAC Chief Curtis LeMay, Senate, *Hearings, Defense Appropriations, FY 1957*, pp. 1221-50; and Senate, *Hearings, Study of Air Power*, 2 vols.

⁷⁵H. Rept. 2104, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956, p. 40.

⁷⁶U.S., House, *State of the Union*, H. Doc. 1, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, p. 5. See also Senate, *Hearings, Defense Appropriations, FY 1956*, pp. 4-5, 37; and House, *Hearings, Navy Appropriations, FY 1956*, p. 2.

⁷⁷H. Doc. 436, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, p. 121.

⁷⁸Statement of General Curtis LeMay, Senate, *Hearings, Defense Appropriations, FY 1957*, p. 1225.

reduce the Army below 800,000, and, accordingly, to lower the threshold for the employment of nuclear weapons in battle.⁷⁹

The Army was not so easily put off. Still smarting from its frustrating experience in Korea, it presented Congress with an interpretation of the nation's strategic problems that contradicted the administration's position in almost every major aspect. As nuclear parity in the Cold War became a reality, both sides, Army spokesmen argued, would make every effort to avoid a general war. This situation placed a premium on conventional and irregular warfare forces, and encouraged the communists to use such forms of military power to extend "their boundaries at the expense of the West,"⁸⁰ as they had done in Asia despite overwhelming U.S. strategic superiority. Without sufficient limited-war fighting power, the nation's military response to a communist nonnuclear attack would be restricted to the possible initiation of an all-out war, nonresistance or ineffectual resistance. None of these avenues of choice was consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives. In the first situation nuclear war would be disastrous; in the latter two cases, the nation would be confronted with a dangerous, conceivably fatal, erosion of its diplomatic position.

Moreover, lack of a large conventional force, deployed in forward bases overseas, would expose allies to swift defeat, and would undermine the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. America's allies could not rely on the United States to defend them; they could count only on the possibility of U.S. liberation after a devastating nuclear war—a war which the United States would hesitate to start since its own existence would be gravely threatened. Such a corrosive frame of mind would encourage either a policy of nuclear diffusion or disengagement among our European allies. Army spokesmen pointed out, furthermore, that the use of nuclear weapons would require more, not less, troops. Dispersal tactics would have to be employed, necessitating greater numbers of mobile manpower and large reserve forces as replacement for the higher casualties presumably to result from the introduction of nuclears into battle.⁸¹

⁷⁹Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-79.

⁸⁰Statement of General Maxwell Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, House, *Hearings, Defense Appropriations, FY 1957*, p. 433.

⁸¹See General Taylor's entire testimony, *ibid.*, pp. 431 ff, and his "Security Will Not Wait," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIX, No. 21 (January 1961), pp. 174-84, as well as his *Uncertain Trumpet*, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 130-180. See also the testimony of General Matthew Ridgway, who preceded Taylor as Chief of Staff: House,

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The Army's arguments had little immediate effect on Congress. The Senate easily defeated an amendment to add \$350 million to the Army budget for FY 1955,⁸² in much the same way that the House rejected a similar floor proposal in the succeeding year.⁸³ The \$46 million Congressional increase in the Marine Corps budget to maintain it at a strength of 215,000, instead of the President's suggested level of 193,000 during FY 1956, marked simply a minor setback for the Chief Executive, and was never completely implemented by the Defense Department.⁸⁴

Sputnik and After. The shock of Sputnik upset Congressional confidence in the Eisenhower Administration's defense program. The Soviet space achievement prompted many legislators, including important members of the House and Senate defense appropriations subcommittees, to question the fundamental relevance of the Eisenhower Administration's security policies and its low rate of defense spending. Chairman Mahon of the House group expressed the new feeling of his colleagues when he presented the FY 1959 defense budget to the House. "Last year . . . we said the defense budget was too fat," he said. "In general, we approved the programs but said they could be financed with less money. . . . In hindsight it is obvious that the budget submitted to us last year should have made more provision for rocketry and space age weapons."⁸⁵ Sputnik had demonstrated that the Soviet Union was developing missiles powerful enough to destroy American cities and military installations with thermonuclear warheads. Massive retaliation was clearly a two-way affair, and there arose the possibility that the balance of terror between the two superpowers was tipping, perhaps irretrievably, in favor of the Soviet Union. Critics of the administration's defense policies, who had been simply a vocal minority, were now able to seize the initiative in Congress. They pointed to the Soviet space success as justification for more defense spending, and, aided by dissident groups of civilian and military officials within the armed services, marshaled sufficient voting strength in Congress to challenge the administration's poli-

Army Appropriations, FY 1955, pp. 41 ff; House, *Army Appropriations, FY 1956*, pp. 10-118; and House, *Defense Appropriations, FY 1957*, pp. 559-641. General Ridgway's views are discussed more candidly in his *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, *op. cit.*, pp. 274-332.

⁸²C.R., C, Part 6, 1954, pp. 8346, 8441-42.

⁸³*Ibid.*, CI, Part 5, 1955, pp. 6228-36.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, CI, Part 7, 1955, pp. 8682, 8705.

⁸⁵C.R., CIV, Part 8, 1958, p. 10016. For similar statements of the ranking Republicans of the House Defense Subcommittee, see *ibid.*, pp. 10020-21.

cies for nuclear and conventional forces.⁸⁶ The strength of these Congressional pressures for increased defense spending is suggested in Table I. Between the flight of Sputnik and the first two years of the Kennedy Administration, Congress, except for FY 1960, has annually appropriated more funds for the Defense Department than had been requested. Yet, again, the total amount approved for all federal programs was less than the sum of the President's recommended estimates. The defense debate still continues within the President's budgetary framework.

The possibility that the Soviets might achieve parity or superiority in long-range nuclear power led Congress between 1958 and 1962 to appropriate approximately \$3.6 billion more for larger strategic forces than administration officials thought necessary. Correspondingly, this issue of the size and composition of strategic nuclear forces has produced the greatest source of friction between the Legislative and Executive branches over defense policy.⁸⁷ Broken down, about \$2.7 billion of the increase has been for what might be termed offensive weapons, including principally the Polaris, Atlas and Minuteman missile systems, and the B-52, B-58 and B-70 strategic bomber programs. The balance of \$914 million has been allocated for defense strategic power made up of greater funds for air defense, air and ground alert, anti-submarine warfare, and early warning and military intelligence systems. During the later Eisenhower years, Congress placed most of its stress on long-range missiles, for it appeared that the Soviet Union was making most of its progress in this area. Here, the Polaris, receiving \$609 million and \$394 million in increased Congressional funds for FY 1959 and 1961 respectively, was heavily relied upon to close the alleged "missile gap."⁸⁸ But the Kennedy Administration's emphasis on strategic missiles,⁸⁹ combined with a

⁸⁶Other political forces were of course working to increase defense spending. Professor Morton Halperin argues that the Gaither report reinforced the position of defense spending advocates. Morton Halperin, "The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process," *World Politics*, XIII, No. 3 (April 1961), pp. 360-84. In this connection, see the Rockefeller Fund report on National Security, published in early 1958, and the testimony of Governor Nelson Rockefeller before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. House, *Hearings, Defense Appropriations, FY 1959*, pp. 44-107.

⁸⁷C.R., CIV, Part 13, 1958, pp. 16515-16; *ibid.*, CVI, Part 14, 1960, pp. 19524-29; H. Rept. 1830, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, pp. 64-65; S. Rept. 1937, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, p. 13; H. Rept. 462, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, pp. 3-5; H. Rept. 1607, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 61; H. Rept. 873, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, pp. 6-7; S. Rept. 653, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, pp. 31-32.

⁸⁸C.R., CVI, Part 14, 1960, p. 19525.

⁸⁹See the Kennedy Administration's initial changes in the Eisenhower defense budget, H. Doc. 123, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 13.

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lessening fear of Soviet leadership in missiles, has produced a countervailing Congressional interest in strategic bombers, particularly the B-70 program. In supporting stepped-up programs in long-range aircraft and missiles, Congress has sought to provide the military establishment with a greater degree of choice in employing strategic weapons; and to maintain overwhelming U.S. strategic superiority as a deterrent to communist attack.

The B-70 bomber, redesignated as the RS-70, is simply the latest example of Congressional-Executive disagreement over strategic capabilities. Congress has insisted that the RS-70 should be developed into a complete weapon system instead of being limited to the prototype program as recommended by the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.⁹⁰ With Air Force prompting, Congressmen of both houses have argued that the manned RS-70 weapon system can submit to greater military and political control; combines reconnaissance and attack features; is difficult to destroy; and is needed to replace B-52 and B-58 bomber aircraft—allegedly proven weapon systems. The administration reply that it has abandoned neither the bomber concept nor the RS-70 program has failed to stem Congressional pressure for additional long-range bomber funds. Since 1960, Congress has appropriated \$561.6 million for the RS-70 in excess of the President's recommendations.⁹¹ And, after President Kennedy's refusal to spend the \$180 million Congressional add-on to the FY 1962 budget for the supersonic bomber program, the House Armed Services Committee asked Congress to adopt the extreme measure of directing the Secretary of the Air Force, over the head of the Secretary of Defense, to utilize \$491 million for the RS-70 in FY 1963, \$320 million more than the Defense Department had requested.⁹² Although this radical procedure was finally rejected, it suggests the deep cleavage between the Kennedy Administration and important segments of Congressional opinion with respect to the nation's thermonuclear forces.

Few can quarrel with these attempts to evaluate the merits of different strategic weapon systems, such as the RS-70 and the

⁹⁰S. Rept. 1550, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960, pp. 27-28; H. Rep. 574, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, pp. 7-8; S. Rept. 653, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 5; H. Rept. 1406, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, pp. 1-9; S. Rept. 1315, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, pp. 1-2; H. Rept. 1607, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, pp. 7-9; S. Rept. 1578, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, pp. 4-5.

⁹¹*Ibid.* It should be noted that the Eisenhower Administration briefly acquiesced in Congress' demand for a B-70 weapon system in the final months of its term in office. C.R., CVI, Part 12, 1960, p. 16027.

⁹²H. Rept. 1406, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, pp. 1-9.

Minuteman ICBM, to accomplish the same missions. On the contrary, Congress must be commended for its attempts to weigh the competing arguments for and against the retention of the long-range bomber into the 1970's. That Congress is now concerned with the efficiency of competing weapon systems to accomplish variously assigned strategic missions is a noteworthy improvement over its previous disposition toward defense policy. Yet the disturbing fact remains that Congress continues to approach defense strategy largely in terms of military hardware, of the number of heavy bombers and missiles in the nation's arsenal, and remains preoccupied with the prospect of general war, only one aspect of the overall spectrum of military and nonmilitary threats to the nation's policy objectives. For example, the question as to whether further increases in military strength would seriously injure the opportunities for arms control and disarmament was still, at the end of 1962, largely unexplored in Congress. In much the same way that Congress ignored General Marshall's warning against swift demobilization in 1945, it overlooks the implications of Secretary of Defense McNamara's statement before a Congressional committee that "as the arms race continues and the weapons multiply and become more swift and deadly, the possibility of a global catastrophe, either by miscalculation or design, becomes ever more real."⁹³ In each case, though from an opposite point of view, Congress as a body has been slow to grasp the significance of the mutual and ever-changing relationships between military power and political goals.

The same slow and mixed response to changing military-political problems may also be observed in Congress' support for conventional forces. While its record has improved since 1958, there still appear important signs of Congressional uncertainty about the utility of such forces and the kinds of warfare that they are designed to fight. Sputnik provided tangible evidence of coming strategic parity and, consequently, increased demands for an enlargement of the nation's nonnuclear deterrent. The Army received appropriations from Congress to maintain a 900,000-man force in FY 1959—30,000 over the President's approved ceiling—and about \$825 million in excess of administration requests for

⁹³*Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee*, January 30, 1963, p. 27. Two Congressional actions that suggest a slowly developing understanding in Congress of the concept of arms control are its establishment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1962 and the Senate's approval of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

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Army modernization and airlift in FY 1959 through FY 1962.⁹⁴ The Marine Corps, too, has been extended financial help by Congress in every year since 1958 to be kept at an approximate strength of 200,000.⁹⁵ These increases anticipated, and helped prepare, the Kennedy Administration's changes in defense priorities which have resulted in greater expenditures for conventional forces, for acceleration and expansion of Army and Marine Corps modernization, and for more airlift. Yet the commitment of the Congress to a balanced deterrent remains tenuous. Correspondingly, its understanding of the wide spectrum of contingencies under which various kinds of force, from tactical nuclear weapons to irregular warfare troops, might have to be used to maximize the nation's policy objectives remains vague and unfocused. The shallowness of its acceptance of the concept of a limited conflict is suggested in the remark of Senator Richard Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, that he has "never been impressed by these people who write these great books giving all these alternatives of fighting."⁹⁶

Congress' wavering support for limited warfare can also be detected in its approach toward the problem of the strength and role of the Reserves. In the period studied here, it has frustrated every Presidential attempt to reduce the Army Reserves and National Guard below 700,000 men in paid status. That the Reserves can make a potentially valuable contribution to brushfire conflicts only partially explains Congress' efforts to protect the 700,000-man program. The more relevant factors lie elsewhere, deeply embedded in the nation's domestic political life.⁹⁷ The widely shared Congressional empathy for the concept of the citizen-soldier, however inappropriate it may be in an era of possible nuclear war, and the very real political influence of the National Guard Association and Reserve Officers Association at the local and state levels of government have been sufficiently powerful political forces to forestall any diminution in the num-

⁹⁴S. Rept., 1937, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, p. 6; S. Rept. 476, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 17; C.R., CIV, Part 13, 1958, p. 16515, *ibid.*, CV, Part 12, 1959, p. 15072; *ibid.*, CVI, Part 14, 1960, pp. 19527-29.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, CIV, Part 13, 1958, p. 16515; *ibid.*, CVI, Part 14, 1960, pp. 19527-29.

⁹⁶Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Hearings, Military Procurement Authorization, FY 1963*, p. 553. See also *idem*, *Hearings, Military Procurement Authorization, FY 1962*.

⁹⁷Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-77; Martha Derthick, "Militia Lobby in the Missile Age: The Politics of the National Guard," *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, Samuel P. Huntington, editor (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 190-235.

ber of Army reservists on paid status. Through legislative restrictions written into defense appropriations bills and "gentlemen's agreements,"⁹⁸ Congress has forced the administration to spend much of the half-billion dollars which it added to the defense budget between FY 1959 and FY 1963 for Reserve forces.⁹⁹ The Defense Department's position that less than a 10 per cent reduction, and a reorganization, of the Reserves would prepare them more readily for possible military situations in the future has been lost in a sea of political invective.¹⁰⁰ Congress has been unable to grapple with the Reserve problem, and Congressional claims as to the importance of the Reserves, especially in nonnuclear warfare, obscure the private domestic interests protecting the existing Reserve program. What to do with the Reserves to make them an effective conventional force continues as one of the major second-level defense problems confronting the Legislative and Executive branches.

III

Congress' inability to deal with the Reserves on the merits of their strategic utility buttresses the principal conclusions of this paper, summarized above.¹⁰¹ Like other aspects of defense policy, the problem of defining a role for the Reserves has tended to be isolated in Congress from other parts of overall strategic policy-making. Congress simply does not approach strategic policy as a whole, as a multifaceted problem requiring the integration of foreign and domestic policy. The same is true with regard to the defense budget. Congress' handling of the defense budget indicates as much. Defense appropriations are still largely considered apart from other parts of the President's budget and other crucial aspects of national strategy. Defense policy, consequently, tends to be segregated in Congress from the on-going process of foreign

⁹⁸72 Stat., p. 715; 73 *ibid.*, p. 340; 74 *ibid.*, p. 340; 76 *ibid.*, p. 319. Interview with Chief Clerk to the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, December 1959.

⁹⁹H. Rept. 1830, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, pp. 35-37; S. Rept. 1937, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, pp. 5, 26; C.R., CVI, Part 14, 1960, pp. 19527-29; *ibid.*, CVI, Part 12, 1960, p. 16028; H. Rept. 274, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, pp. 35, 37-38; H. Rept. 1607, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 3; S. Rept. 1578, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, pp. 2-7; C.R., August 1, 1962, pp. 14243-45, Daily Edition.

¹⁰⁰House, Committee on Armed Services, *Military Reserve Posture Hearings*, (1962) and House, Committee on Armed Services, *Report of Subcommittee No. 3 on Military Reserve Posture*, August 17, 1962. See also George Fielding Eliot, *Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1962). At the time of this writing, the Defense Department has apparently progressed rapidly in implementing its plan to reorganize the Reserves and to reduce their personnel strength on paid duty status.

¹⁰¹See above, p. 752.

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policy development by which the nation attempts to adapt to, and control, its international environment. Thus, the possibility is increased that Congress may approve policy goals beyond the nation's capacity to achieve, or provide inadequate support for feasible policy objectives. Moreover, comparisons between military and nonmilitary programs, even in secret session, are not conducted as a normal part of Congressional decision-making.¹⁰² In turn, security policy, of which military power is but one ingredient, is not coordinated with domestic policy, including fiscal planning. Seen from a detached perspective, the decision process in Congress treats each of these policy components, together with the inherently interrelated questions they raise, as if each were an island of issues entire in itself.

Even the defense budget as such is segmented as it moves through Congress for approval. Defense appropriations and military construction bills are divided and now, through the limitations set down in Section 412 (b) of the Military Construction Act of 1959, as amended, the Armed Service Committees must first authorize funds for major procurement and research and development before appropriations can be passed. The effect is to reinforce and extend Congress' already fractured approach to national security policy. By increasing the power leverage of the Armed Service Committees over the defense budget at the expense of the military appropriations subcommittees, each committee potentially checks the other more effectively. But in restricting the feasible influence of the other, the incentive of each to narrow further its policy focus is increased. The probability is also enhanced that the incidence of inter-committee friction will be greater and that the committees, now decreasingly capable of providing a common front, will find themselves subject to manipulation from outside.

Each Congressional committee and subcommittee is left to cope with the issues, or parts of issues, coming within the boundaries of its delimited jurisdiction, and to find what level of political support it can for the decisions it reaches. Each contributes its small share to the developing Congressional consensus. This process works satisfactorily so long as the consensus which is arrived at on various public policies bears a close relation to the political issues demanding resolution. There is serious doubt whether, since 1945, such a proper balancing of forces has always

¹⁰²Interview with a ranking Republican member of the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, August 1961.

been achieved in Congress' handling of the defense budget. The equilibration of political forces operating in Congress through its decentralized decision-making procedures has helped produce a shifting consensus that, at times, has either been out of touch with the requirements of a successful strategic posture or has discouraged attempts to formulate more effective security policies. This was true of the consensus which crystallized in Congress before the Korean War and, as critics of Massive Retaliation persuasively argue, during the Eisenhower years.

An annual, coordinated review of existing or proposed public policies, as an integral part of the budgetary process, would guard against an uncritical acceptance of strategic policies issuing from the Executive Branch. It would place upon Congress the responsibility of keeping itself informed about the changing conditions of policy-making and would keep Congressional opinion alert to opportunities that promise to maximize United States interests and objectives through the further expansion, contraction or even limitation of its military power. It would force Congress to keep pace with the rapid changes taking place in the world and to develop a moving consensus that adequately prepares itself and the nation for them. What is more, it would mitigate the potential dangers arising from Congress' traditionally pragmatic, issue-by-issue settlement of strategic problems. While the latter approach is reasonably well-suited to dealing with issues that are immediately pressing and clearly visible to all—such as the North Korean attack in 1950 or the flight of Sputnik in 1957—it characteristically has difficulty in anticipating problems of the more remote future and in taking steps to forestall their development or, at least, to soften their impact as they arise. The thrust of Congress' decision-making process, therefore, is in the direction of drift and irresolution; of fits and starts in long-range policy formulation; of uncertain, unreflective reactions to outside events. In an age of rapid technological change, particularly in military weapon systems, the need for a more rationally organized decision-making process, one more subtly attuned to the perils and opportunities of strategic policy-making, appears not only desirable, but compelling.

This analysis should not leave the impression, on the other hand, that there have been no salutary changes in Congressional attitudes and responses to the role of military power in foreign policy. The importance of military force in being, not merely potentially mobilizable military power, is now understood by most

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Congressmen. Since World War II, there has been a growing appreciation of the many and often conflicting dimensions posed by military force in resolving differences among nations. Furthermore, Congress has not only prodded the administration on behalf of specific defense programs, but has also increased appropriations for greater nuclear and conventional fighting power—sums that have been spent on occasion despite earlier administration opposition. In addition, it has acted, especially since Sputnik, as a constructive critic of defense policies. Its investigations, as they have been channeled through the appropriations process, have exposed gaps in defense planning, and have had the effect of setting standards which have served as measures of administration action. Finally, in providing a forum for dissent, Congress has in some instances ventilated differing points of view on strategic policy, and has contributed to the development of a reservoir of informed opinion about defense problems. It may be said that the Kennedy Administration was able to tap this resource when it embarked upon the largest peacetime defense spending program in the nation's history.

Yet the requirements for rational decision-making in strategic policy grow more complicated each year. While Congress has grown in this area, the problems of strategic planning, too, have multiplied in number and difficulty. Whether Congress will be equal to the tasks imposed upon it becomes more problematic each day. The collective power and mental acumen of Congress have not been fully set to the job of resolving the nation's strategic problems on a rational basis. The friends of popular government hope that they will be.

SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS AND THE CADRE-TERRITORIAL ARMY

by Walter C. Clemens, Jr.

HOW can a nation's posture in disarmament negotiations be orchestrated with its military strategy and economic requirements? One means to this end employed by Moscow during the 1920's and 1930's was, according to Chairman Khrushchev, given serious consideration by his government in 1960. In announcing to the Supreme Soviet on January 14, 1960, a major reduction of Soviet military forces, Khrushchev declared:

The Government and our Party's Central Committee are now pondering and studying the question of shifting at some time in the future to the organization of the armed forces on a territorial basis. This may possibly be a repetition of what Vladimir Il'ich Lenin did back in the earliest years of the Soviet regime, but in different circumstances and in a somewhat different frame of reference.

The territorial system would allow military units to "undergo military training without interrupting their regular work"; such troops could, if necessary, be moved rapidly to allow the regime "to concentrate forces wherever needed on [Soviet] territory."

Khrushchev announced that Soviet regular forces would be reduced by approximately one-third, from 3,623,000 men to 2,423,000, over the next one or two years.¹ This, Khrushchev noted, would bring Soviet forces to a level lower than that proposed in 1956 by the West. The reduction, Khrushchev made clear, was aimed in part at encouraging Western reciprocation. The territorial force might be developed in case "no disarmament agreement is reached"—a warning, it would seem, to the West.

Would all Soviet forces be organized on the territorial system? Or—as in the last two years of Lenin's life—would a relatively small regular army be supplemented by a territorial militia? Khrushchev's report provided no clear answer, nor did the speeches of Defense Minister Malinovsky and others who addressed the Supreme Soviet. Indeed, none of them even mentioned the idea of a territorial force, although many speakers—like Khrushchev—

¹See Table I on the next page for the fluctuations in the size of the Soviet regular—as opposed to territorial militia—forces from 1927 to 1963.

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stressed that Soviet forces could now be reduced in size because of their increasing nuclear and rocket capacity.²

Some Soviet military journals published articles reviewing favorably the history of the Soviet "cadre-territorial" army of 1922

TABLE I
SIZE OF SOVIET REGULAR FORCES, 1927-1963*
(exclusive of security and frontier forces)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Size</i>
1927	586,000
1933	562,000
1934	940,000
1935	1,300,000
1937	1,433,000
1941	4,207,000
1945	11,365,000
1948	2,874,000
1955	5,763,000
1958	3,623,000
1960	3,623,000
1961 (summer)	3,023,000
1962 (1960 Khrushchev projection)	2,423,000
1962 (actual)	3,600,000
1963	3,300,000

Note: For the size of regular Soviet forces 1920-1923, see below, Table II.

*The majority of figures cited are given in N. S. Khrushchev's report to the Supreme Soviet, January 14, 1960, which also comments on the reasons for increases and decreases in the size of Soviet forces. See *Pravda* or *Izvestiia*, January 15, 1960. The figures for 1933 through 1935 are from J. M. Mackintosh, "The Red Army, 1920-1936" in *The Soviet Army*, B. H. Liddell Hart, editor (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1956), pp. 60-61. The 1961 data are based on a calculation by Raymond L. Garthoff in his introduction to V. D. Sokolovsky, editor, *Military Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. ix. The 1962 and 1963 figures are from *The Military Balance 1963-1964* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1963), p. 3.

In 1936 the army of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Soviet Frontier Guards are said to have numbered about 250,000 men (Mackintosh, *loc. cit.*); in 1963 Soviet security and border troops numbered 300,000, while the paramilitary organization DOSAAF is several million strong, although only about 1½ million of these train actively (*The Military Balance, op. cit.*, p. 7). For a discussion of Soviet capacity to mobilize reserve forces, see *ibid.*, p. 5.

²Khrushchev's speech is in *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, January 15, 1960; Malinovsky's is in *Pravda*, January 15 and *Izvestiia*, January 16; other speakers' addresses together with the Supreme Soviet decree on the reduction are printed in *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, January 16. Khrushchev's speech is also given in full in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XII, 2 (February 10, 1960); others' speeches are in *ibid.*, XII, 3 (February 17, 1960). Only one contributor to the 1962 collection of Soviet strategic writings, *Voennaia Strategiia* (edited by V. D. Sokolovsky), suggests any utility for a territorial army. See Chapter VII by Col. Gen. A. I. Gastilovich.

to 1939, but no steps were taken to transfer troops discharged in 1960-61 to a territorial force. The announced troop reduction, after being carried out by perhaps 50 per cent, was suddenly canceled in summer 1961. Instead, as the Berlin crisis grew more intense, Moscow (like Washington) increased sharply its military budget, and carried out other security measures—including the resumption of nuclear tests.³

While Soviet leaders apparently have not revived the concept of a professional and militia force, the present period of renewed hopes for disarmament and East-West *détente* offers an appropriate moment to recall the origins of the Soviet cadre-territorial army and its relation to the Kremlin's disarmament campaign between the wars. This army, it will be argued, made it possible and expedient for Chicherin and Litvinov to champion disarmament, rather than denounce it (as Lenin did before and during World War I) as "harmful" to the revolution.⁴

COMMUNIST DOCTRINE AND SOVIET PRACTICE

Before the Bolshevik Revolution, and for many months thereafter, Lenin and other Russian communists had called for "a general arming of the people," "a people's army with elected officers," "a partisan struggle." The slogan of a "people's militia" was opposed to that of interstate "disarmament," a slogan which Lenin said could be only counterrevolutionary at a time when international war could be converted into a civil war. The professional standing armies of the capitalist governments were tools of the exploiting class, the Bolsheviks argued. Contrasted to these relatively small professional armies was the concept of an all-popular militia, a force, it was believed, which would overthrow

³For a review of the military journal articles, see the *New York Herald Tribune*, February 29, 1960, p. 4; for strategic aspects of a transition to territorial forces, see Walter D. Jacobs, "Die künftige Sowjetarmee: Elite oder Militz?" *Wehrkunde* (Munich), X, 3 (March 1960), pp. 126-29; for a discussion of the problems of morale and economic aspects of the troop reduction, see Nikolai Galay, "Social Problems in the Reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces," *Bulletin* (Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.), VII, 4 (April 1960), pp. 3-15. Some of the problems in resettling the discharged forces were suggested to the author in summer 1960, in chance meetings in various Soviet cities with soldiers demobilized according to the January 1960 decree. For documentation on the cancellation of the reduction and other developments in summer 1961, see U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *A Chronology of Disarmament Developments* (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1961), pp. 5-6.

⁴For Lenin's earlier position and the transformation of Soviet attitudes toward disarmament as a tactic for defense and for revolution see the author's "Lenin on Disarmament," to be published in the *Slavic Review* in 1964, and the author's "Ideology in Soviet Disarmament Policy," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, March 1964.

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the exploiting class, and go on to defend and extend the dictatorship of the proletariat.⁵

The Red Guard which was formed of Petrograd factory workers in the summer of 1917 was recognized by the Petrograd Soviet during the Kornilov affair as a "workers' militia." It was in the main a creation of the Bolsheviks and its ultimate loyalty was to the Party. It was useful in the execution of the Bolsheviks' coup d'état in October 1917. But the Red Guard was inadequate for the military requirements of the Soviet government. Therefore, on January 15/28, 1918, the day on which Trotsky returned to the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, the Sovnarkom issued a decree for the establishment of a Red Army to be composed of volunteers drawn from "the more class-conscious and organized elements of the toiling masses."⁶ Shortly thereafter, the Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party, in approving ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, called for the creation of strictly disciplined mass organizations and the establishment of universal military training for men and women.⁷

In the second half of March 1918, with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty ratified, the drive to organize the Red Army became more intensive. March 22, 1918 was proclaimed as "Red Army Day" to stimulate the recruiting campaign. In April, Trotsky became People's Commissar for War. When voluntary recruitment, however satisfactory ideologically, proved inadequate for filling the ranks of the Red Army, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decreed on April 22, 1918, that the whole adult population was liable for conscription: military training and service were reserved for workers and peasants, others were to work in labor battalions.⁸

The reason given by the decree for the decision to make all citizens liable for service was the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet state. Only when the workers achieved control in the cap-

⁵For examples of this argument from 1903, 1905, 1916 and 1917 statements by Lenin, see his *Sochineniia*, Second edition (30 vols.; Moscow: Gosizdat, 1926-1932), VIII, p. 397; XIX, pp. 314-42; XX, pp. 35-37; for examples of this argument by Stalin in 1917, see his *Sochineniia* (13 vols.; Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1946-1951), III, pp. 71, 154.

⁶Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923* (3 vols.; London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1951-53), III, pp. 60-63; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 40-42.

⁷Ia. L. Berman, editor, *Vsesoiuznaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiia (bol'shevikov) i voennoe delo*, Second edition, (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Voennogo Vestnika, 1928), p. 204.

⁸Carr, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 64-66; text of the decree is in *Izvestiia*, April 26, 1918, and in Erich Wollenberg, *The Red Army* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1938), pp. 251-53.

italist countries could the aims of socialism be achieved. These aims, the decree declared, included "the liberation of mankind from the burden of militarism and the barbarity of war between nations," "universal disarmament," "perpetual peace," and "the fraternal co-operation of all . . . races."⁹

These decrees paid lip service to the long-standing socialist ideal of the "people in arms." Soviet practice, however, agreed with the view expressed by Stalin in March 1919, when he said: "The facts show that a voluntary army is unsatisfactory, that our republic cannot be defended by it." What was needed, Stalin averred, was "a regular army, steeped in the spirit of discipline, with a well-organized political department, which at the first order can stand up and match the enemy."¹⁰

The resolution "On the Military Question" passed by the Eighth Communist Party Congress in March 1919, stated that the slogan "people's militia" had been included in the old Social-Democratic platform because of its "educational" value. The bourgeoisie, the resolution asserted, would never have permitted a "people's militia" to be formed.

In conditions of civil war, the resolution went on, the slogan "people's militia"—like that of "constituent assembly"—was counter-revolutionary. There could be no people's militia until a classless society had been realized. Until that time, there could be only a *class* militia. For the present, however, even a class militia was precluded by the urgency of defeating immediately the "internal and external class enemies" of the Soviet government. In theory, the strongest possible army would be one which was organically integrated with the productive process, i.e., its brigades, regiments and other units should be formed and trained parallel to the nation's factories and other economic sectors, thus identifying the soldiers with the workers of the country. Integration of defense and labor would provide the most powerful basis for the nation's military forces: economic recovery and increased production in industry and agriculture. However, since the conditions of civil war did not permit sufficient time to achieve such integration, the Soviet state was being defended by a "permanent," "regular" army, which—although it kept the nation's fighters from their places of productive labor—proved it could beat the enemy. Nevertheless, the resolution affirmed that the country was moving

⁹Wollenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-53.

¹⁰Stalin, *Sochineniia*, IV, p. 249.

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toward a militia, initially to a class militia, and then to a militia of the whole people.¹¹

This resolution of the Eighth Party Congress and the resolution of the Ninth Party Congress (April 1920) "On the Transition to the Militia System," were logical applications of Lenin's view that war is a test of the total resources—economic, technical and human—of each nation.¹² The resolution of the Ninth Congress was also consistent with the principles advanced in a speech to the Congress by War Commissar Trotsky. His speech and the Congress' resolution agreed that the imminent end to the civil war and the improvement in the international position of the Soviet Republic meant that basic changes were required in the country's military structure in order to cope with the economic and cultural problems of the day.¹³ The Soviet Republic would have to keep its defensive capacity on a high level, because the security was always in doubt while "imperialist bourgeoisie" ruled in the most advanced countries. Nevertheless, the basic task before the Republic was said to be an economic one. The country's military forces therefore had to be reorganized so that "the workers receive the necessary military preparation with the least diversion . . . from productive labor." Only a Workers' and Peasants' Red Militia, built on territorial principles, the resolution affirmed, could do this.

"The essence of the Soviet *militia system*," the resolution of the Ninth Congress declared, "must consist in the army's drawing nearer in all respects to the productive process, so that the live human force of certain economic regions is at the same time the live human force of certain military units." The territorial distribution of the militia would be based on industrial centers and surrounding agricultural areas. This was the derivation of the term "territorial army," used to distinguish the militia from the permanent or cadre army, which was also called the standing or regular army. The militia consisted of workers and peasants whose military units were located in the same territory where they worked. The militia would be organized around the permanent

¹¹*Vsesoiuznaia Kommunisticheskaia Partia (b) v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov Ts K*, Fifth edition (Moscow: Partizdat Ts TsKVKP (b), 1936), I, pp. 304-11.

¹²For an expression of this view on November 22, 1919, see Lenin, *Sochineniia*, *op. cit.*, XXIV, p. 544; for earlier and subsequent variations on this theme, see *ibid.*, VII, p. 48, X, pp. 52-53, XXII, p. 304, XXV, pp. 253, 475-476.

¹³The Polish war began the following month and ended in October 1920; General Wrangel's "White" forces were defeated at the end of 1920; the Japanese evacuated Vladivostok in October 1922.

cadres of the Red Army, which would lead and train the territorial forces, and, when the necessity arose, put them under arms and send them into battle. The transition to the militia, the resolution stated, would be gradual, according to "the military and international-diplomatic situation of the Soviet Republic."

Trotsky told the Congress that a people's militia required a high level of consciousness among the population, of organization and of leadership. The Congress' resolution declared that, as the (permanent) Red Army was demobilized, its best cadres should be settled in territories where, because of local work conditions, the demobilized soldiers would provide a ready administrative apparatus for militia units. The best proletarian elements were to be infused into the commanding staff of the militia. Training courses were to be organized territorially with this end in view.

The training of the militia would consist of pre-induction preparation (in which educational, trade union, Communist Party, Youth League and sport authorities would collaborate with military authorities), of short periods of training in barracks resembling "military-political" schools, and of short, repeated musters to test the fighting ability of the militia. Militia units would be subject to conscription as labor forces. For the present, the resolution concluded, the militia would retain all the characteristics of the dictatorship of the working class.¹⁴

Trotsky did not argue that a militia would be "economical" in the narrow sense of the term. Rather, he told the Congress that to equip and arm the whole people would require a colossal amount of supplies. In the deepest sense, however, the militia would benefit the national economy, because it would not separate the worker from his job.

In order to have an army [Trotsky stated], it is necessary to produce; in order to produce, it is necessary to keep the flower of the working force at the factory and in the field. *Here is why the size of the permanent army must be limited: it maintains itself only at the cost of a permanent army of laborers.* [Emphasis added.]

Strategic considerations were also advanced in favor of a militia. Trotsky declared that no country had been able to win the World War, because no state could quickly mobilize and arm the masses

¹⁴*Deviati S'ezd Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii: Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1920). For key sections of Trotsky's speech, see pp. 350-61; for the resolution, see pp. 394-96. See also articles on "militionsnaia sistema" and "territorial'naia armiiia" in *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, First edition (65 vols.; Moscow: Aktsionernoe obshchestvo "Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia," 1926-1947), XXXIX (1938), pp. 398-99; LIV (1946), p. 178.

of its population. The capitalist powers were enmeshed in the idea of a permanent army. Because of the class struggle, they dared not militarize the whole people in peacetime. Lightning blows were insufficient to win the war. The war's outcome could not be decided by the relatively small, permanent armies of the capitalist states.

The bourgeois states might attack Soviet Russia again in a few years, said Trotsky, or she might have to give support to the revolutionary working class of other countries. Hence the necessity of establishing the conditions which would provide a union of labor and defense, of defense and labor.¹⁵

The transition to the militia was opposed in principle by many Soviet military leaders.¹⁶ And in 1921, it was opposed on practical grounds by the political leadership of the country. The Tenth Party Congress, held in March 1921, at a time of tremendous crisis within the Party and throughout the country, issued a "Decree on the Military Question" which stated: "The agitation of several comrades for the factual liquidation of the present Red Army and immediate transition to a militia is incorrect and, in practice, dangerous." This decree asserted that there was no reason to reconsider the point in the Party program regarding the militia. It asserted: "The forms, methods, and tempos of the transition to the militia depend entirely on the international and domestic situation, on the continuation of the breathing space, on the reciprocal relations of the town and country, and so forth."

In fact, because the regular army was being reduced, the Con-

¹⁵*Deviaty S'ezd Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii Stenograficheskii otchet, op. cit.*, pp. 350-361.

¹⁶Fedotoff White goes so far as to say that "most of the educated professional people were opposed to the militia system for various reasons." Dimitri Daniel Fedotoff White, *The Growth of the Red Army* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 192-93. Tukhachevskii argued that the notion of a militia was not in harmony with that of the dictatorship of the proletariat. A militia, he said, would be a "trap" for a socialist state. The "socialist island will never have a peaceful frontier with a bourgeois state," he said. What might look like a *frontier* would always be a *front*. Because the proletarian state would be continually at war with the bourgeois states, a militia would be impossible to establish until world communism and lasting peace were realized. A militia was ineffective militarily—even for defense. It had no economic advantages. It was politically impossible to create in a society such as Soviet Russia's in 1920-1921, where class conflict continued. M. N. Tukhachevskii, *Voina Klassov: stat'i, 1919-1920 gg.* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1921), pp. 76-77, 138-40; and Wollenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-73; and Fedotoff White, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

Another Soviet military leader, A. Svechin, who had been a major general in the Tsarist Army, took a conservative position on many issues. He supported, for instance, the concept of a national as distinguished from a class army. And he argued for a regular as opposed to a militia-type army. Fedotoff White, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

gress called for the "liberation of the army from labor assignments," in order that its fighting capacity might be raised. For this same end, measures were to be taken to bring back into the Red Army those communists who had left it. Measures were to be taken to equip properly, provide for and train the technical units of the Army—e.g., artillery, armor, aviation. The plan was to reduce the number of older Red Army men and to shift these men to positions of productive labor in the nation's economy. At the same time, the number of proletarians and communists in the Red Army was to be increased.

For the moment it was possible to introduce a partial transition to the militia only in the stronger proletarian areas such as Petrograd, Moscow and the Urals. The nuclei of such militia forces would be: (1) battle-tested cadres; (2) the "Communist Detachments of Special Assignment";¹⁷ and (3) the stronger pre-military service training (*Vseovobuch*) units. Training for the militia would take place at times when workers were freed from factory and extra-factory jobs (such as *subbotniki*, work holidays on which labor is given without pay for state projects). Eventually this system was to spread to other proletarian areas. Regardless of the programs for the militia, the Communist Detachments of Special Assignment were to be strengthened by improved training and equipment, including artillery and machine guns.

Lastly, the decree demanded an end to the agitation for such measures as elections in the army and the subjugation of commissars to their cells. Measures were also to be taken toward eliminating some "armies of labor."¹⁸

A COMPROMISE BETWEEN IDEOLOGY, SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM SECURITY

The Tenth Party Congress was greatly concerned with the reduction in manpower of the Red Army that was taking place. This was a natural concern, for the nation's forces were being cut at great speed from their peak size of over five million in 1920. The Eleventh Party Congress, meeting in March-April 1922, was

¹⁷This title was abbreviated in Russian to *Chonia*.

¹⁸*VKP (b) v rezoliutsiiakh, op. cit.*, I, pp. 401-03.

The first *prikaz* (decree) on demobilization of the Red Army was published on December 11, 1920. A special commission to direct the army's demobilization was established on April 8, 1921 by the Council of Labor and Defense. Lenin was made chairman of the commission. Other members of the body included M. I. Kalinin and E. M. Sklianskii. See *Boevoi put' sovetskikh vooruzhennykh sil* (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1960), p. 180.

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told by the Commissar for War that the reductions of the Red Army had been carried out in spurts, and unsystematically. Trotsky warned that the lack of a well-defined plan, the indefiniteness of organization, and the constant regrouping of personnel were harmful to the Red Army. Therefore he demanded that the Congress support a stable, systematic scheme of troop reductions and a firm military budget.

Trotsky proposed that a reduction in four stages be approved by the Congress. The size of the reductions would depend on whether the Red Army were freed of some of its many non-military assignments, and whether the situation on the Soviet Union's southern and western fronts became less threatening. As soon as these matters were somewhat more clearly defined, the War Commissar wanted a "firm size" to be established for the Red Army.

Say, for example [Trotsky told the Congress], that the Red Army must be reduced by one-half—something which I consider impossible for the present—or by one-third, or one-tenth. But these reductions must be for a more or less protracted period . . . that is, for the next nine months.

Trotsky reported that the Red Army was approaching the size of the pre-World War Russian Army. The active divisions of the Red Army had been reduced to one-third and the forces at the rear to one-eighth of their former size.¹⁹ These reductions had gone so far that the Red Army was smaller than it was intended to be according to government decrees. No more reductions in *Vsevobuch* could be tolerated. Pre-induction training would have to be increased as the size of the Red Army was reduced.

The material position of the army was better than in the previous year, Trotsky affirmed. The number of communists in the army had increased. But, said Trotsky, "the general situation of the country and of the Army (if all other considerations are put aside) excludes the possibility of a striving for war from our

¹⁹A few months earlier, Trotsky had told the Ninth Congress of Soviets, meeting in December 1921, that in reducing the Red Army from its all-time high of 5,300,000 men in 1920 to its present number of 1,370,000 (altogether the Soviet armed forces were said to number 1,595,000 men at that time), there had been an effort to avoid reducing the army's *active* divisions as opposed to its forces at the rear. At present, the War Commissar said, approximately 34 per cent of the army's forces were numbered in central and local bureaus, while 66 per cent of its men were in active divisions. This ratio, he said, was an improvement in favor of the active divisions as compared with the previous year. Lev Trotsky, *Die Rote Armee der Sowjet-Republik auf der Wacht: Rede auf dem IX. Sowjetkongress Moskau am 27. Dezember, 1921* (Hamburg: Verlag der Kommunistischen Internationale, 1922), p. 5.

side." The *defensive* capacity of the country, however, was said to be adequate.²⁰

The Congress' Decree, "On the Strengthening of the Red Army," put Trotsky's demands into effect. The decree said that future Red Army reductions would depend on the success of the Soviet government in establishing peaceful economic relations with other countries. (This was at the time of the Genoa Conference.) The Congress decreed that a "firm size" and a "firm budget" should be established for the Red Army and Red Navy for the rest of the year, and that the army's burden of nonmilitary assignments should be reduced.²¹

On March 1, 1922, according to Trotsky's speech to the Eleventh Party Congress, there were 1,640,000 men in the Soviet armed forces.²² But on March 25, 1922, Mikhail Frunze (who was to replace Trotsky as War Commissar in 1924), stated in an article appearing in the journal *Armii i Revoliutsiia*, that the regular army would soon be reduced in size from 850,000 to 600,000 men. Frunze said that plans were being implemented to effect the transition to a mixed regular-and-militia ("cadre-territorial") army.²³

Part of the discrepancy between Trotsky's and Frunze's data is explained by the fact that the former referred to the total armed forces of the country, the latter to the Red Army alone. Perhaps the figures differed also in including men already discharged or soon to be discharged. As Table II illustrates, Trotsky's data were supported by statistics given in 1923 by Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, then Chairman of the Red Army's Political Administration, and in 1928 by A. A. Geronimus, a Soviet writer on military affairs. In any event, the tendency toward radical reductions in the size of the regular army was recognized by both Trotsky and Frunze. In August 1922, Trotsky himself gave the size of the Red Army as 800,000. He told foreign correspondents that further

²⁰*Rossiiskaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiia (bol'shevikov)*, XI S'ezd: *Stenograficheskiĭ Otchet* (Moscow: 1922), pp. 252-56.

²¹*Ibid.*, pp. 529-30.

²²*Ibid.*, pp. 254-55. If the armed forces were being reduced, this figure is inconsistent with the figure of 1,595,000 men which Trotsky earlier said were in the Soviet armed forces in December 1921. See above, note 19.

²³M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannye Proizvedeniia* (Moscow: Partizdat, 1934), pp. 86-87. For an excellent analysis of Frunze's thought, see Walter D. Jacobs, "Mikhail Vasil'evich Frunze and the Unified Military Doctrine." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1961.

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reductions of Soviet forces would depend on "serious changes in the international situation."²⁴

Trotsky's above remarks may have been made with the then forthcoming Moscow Disarmament Conference in mind. At that Conference the Soviet government, among its other proposals, offered to reduce the size of its standing army from 800,000 to 600,000, the figure which Frunze predicted in March 1922 would soon be reached.²⁵

TABLE II

SIZE OF THE *REGULAR* ARMY OF SOVIET RUSSIA, 1920-1923

Date	Sources: Antonov-Ovseenko*	Geronimus**
December 1920	5,300,000	-----
March 1921	-----	4,400,000
April 1921	4,495,000	-----
September 1921	1,774,000	-----
December 1921	-----	1,430,000
March 1922	1,615,000	-----
September 1922	896,000	-----
December 1922	-----	610,000
February 1923	600,000	-----
[December?] 1923	-----	562,000

*Vladimir A. Antonov-Ovseenko, "The Red Army," *Communist International* (London), No. 24 (1923), p. 35.

**A. A. Geronimus, *Partiia i Krasnaia Armiia* (Moscow, 1928), p. 128, cited in Fedotoff White, *op. cit.*, p. 188. According to *Desiat' let sovetskoi diplomatii: akty i dokumenty* (Moscow: NKID, 1927), p. 6, the Red Army numbered 1,590,000 in January 1922; 703,000 a year later; and 562,000 from January 1924 through 1927.

The reduction of the regular forces of the Red Army from 800,000 to 600,000 men was officially announced on December 27, 1922 by the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in an "Appeal to All Peoples of the World." The appeal reviewed earlier peace projects of the Soviet government. It asserted that in spite of the poverty caused by the World War and the great need for economizing material resources, the bourgeois governments preferred to continue their policy of impoverishing the masses instead of

²⁴Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs, 1917-1929* (2 vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), I, pp. 373-74.

²⁵*Conférence de Moscou pour la limitation des armements* (Moscow: NKID, 1923).

working for peace. Neither at Genoa nor at Moscow would these governments accept the Soviet Union's disarmament proposals. The Congress reaffirmed its "peace policy" and called on all peoples to support this "line." "Let all peoples demand peace from their governments," said the appeal. "The cause of peace is in the hands of the peoples themselves. To avert the danger of future wars the forces of all the workers of the whole world must unite."²⁶

The army toward which the Soviet Union was moving in 1922 was neither a realization of the classic militia nor a traditional standing army. The former was impossible because of immediate problems of internal and external security. The latter was undesirable because it put a brake on the overall development of the resources of the nation, in which lay the actual and the potential power of the Soviet state.

OBJECTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE TRANSITION

The aims underlying the transition to the militia, Frunze wrote in March 1922, were: (1) to preserve the largest possible number of units to serve as the nuclei of future enlargements; (2) to provide military training for those who could not be inducted into the regular army; and (3) to try out in practice the suitability of militia training methods in the present condition of the Soviet Union. He added that the militia was intended to be a first-rate military force which would go into battle simultaneously and on an equal footing with the permanent army.

The prerequisites for a militia, Frunze asserted, were (1) work that engenders comradeship, and (2) organization of the masses by agitation. Discipline and a united will were to result from such work and agitation. Without discipline, a militia would be of little assistance to a regular army. It could even be counterrevolutionary. The opponents of a militia, Frunze stated, said that it could not be adequately trained to meet the demands of war. But these critics were not mindful, Frunze said, of the presently very weak condition of the regular army, which had low morale and was characterized by passivity.

Frunze quoted Engels on the conditions necessary for establishing a militia. Frunze thought that these conditions had not existed earlier in Soviet Russia. But they did exist as of March 1922.

²⁶Iu. V. Kliuchnikov and A. V. Sabanin, editors, *Mezhdunarodnaia Politika Noveishego Vremeni v Dogovorakh, Notakh, i Deklaratsiakh* (3 vols.; Moscow: Litizdat NKID, 1925-1928), III, i, pp. 224-25.

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Hence, the transition to a militia promised as an eventuality by the Eighth and Ninth Party Congresses could begin.

Frunze explained that the transition could begin only in the third year of Soviet Russia's period of peaceful construction. The country had been largely freed from immediate dangers of war by the end of 1920, when its external fronts had been "liquidated." Subsequently, however, the alliance between the nation's working class and peasantry had begun to crack. "Frictions" [*treniia*] had occurred, such as the Kronstadt and Tambov revolts. But by 1922 the internal political situation had changed radically for the better. In economic construction the country had moved forward from a dead point, and it had had some successes in agriculture. There were no obstacles now to a *gradual* shift to a militia, but all characteristics of the proletarian dictatorship had to be preserved in its organization. The feeling of solidarity among the peasants which remained from the old patriarchal system and which would flow from their collectivization also contributed to the proper conditions for a militia.²⁷

That the Bolsheviks were calmly reducing their forces without any thought to their security was, of course, far from the truth. In view of the possibilities and problems facing the Bolshevik regime, the policy of reducing the regular Red Army forces and of introducing certain compensatory measures was intended as the best means to build up the overall strength of the Soviet state. A resolution of the Twelfth All-Russian Conference of the Communist Party in August 1922, declared that the results of the Genoa and Hague Conferences pointed to the necessity of strengthening the economic and especially the *defensive* capacity of the RSFSR.²⁸

²⁷Frunze, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-105; see especially pp. 78-81, 84-87, 92-93. The federal organization of the Soviet state made it expedient to include so-called "national" formations in the Red Army. The development of these formations received greater impetus under Frunze than in Trotsky's years as War Commissar. Frunze admitted the "national" formations had military shortcomings, but believed they were justified by the role they could play in the revolutionary movement of colonial peoples struggling for their independence.

By 1927 the organization of "national" formations had been carried out in the Ukraine, White Russia, Transcaucasia, and—in embryonic form—in Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. Revolutionary considerations became secondary, however, in the face of the Hitler threat, and the "national" formations—together with the whole system of territorial militia—were disbanded in 1939, their personnel being transferred, insofar as possible, into regular units of the Red Army. See Fedotoff White, *op. cit.*, pp. 202, 217, 272, 285, 361. For the context of this problem, see Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

²⁸Resolution on the speech on international affairs by Sokol'nikov in Ia. L. Berman, editor, *Vsesoiuznaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiia (bol'shevikov) i voennoe delo, op. cit.*, p. 98.

In June 1922, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party had issued a letter on the campaign for recruits for the nation's military academies. "Simultaneously with the reduction of the Red Army," the letter declared, "its qualitative strengthening must take place." Although the army was being reduced, it could be strengthened by an infusion of well-educated, communist proletarian-peasant cadres. In August 1922, a large number of these cadres would be graduated. But July 15 would be "The Day of the Red Student [*kursant*]" and a campaign would begin to recruit high-caliber youth for institutions of higher learning, where they would be "on guard for the interests of the Soviet Republic."²⁹ Not only were the cadres of the regular army strengthened, but its equipment was significantly improved.³⁰

A front-page editorial by Steklov in *Izvestiia* on January 21, 1923, asserted that Polish militarists were considering an attack on the Soviet Union as well as on Germany. They were taking into consideration the reduction of the Red Army called for by the Tenth Congress of Soviets. Steklov warned that

the Soviet power, while reducing its armed forces, has not for a moment lost sight of the possibility that its enemies might start a war. The reduction of the army has naturally been accompanied by various measures for mobilizing the required forces at any time. Thus [we have] available a force capable of repulsing any attack.³¹

Part of Steklov's article may have been wishful thinking or bluffing. But a hint as to what measures were being taken to maintain Soviet fighting capabilities in the face of troop reductions was given by the Chairman of the Political Administration of the Red Army, Antonov-Ovseenko. He wrote:

With the reduction of the numerical strength of the standing army, the tasks which the Universal Military Training Board [*Vseovobuch*] has had on its program since April 22, 1918, are coming to the fore. These tasks consist in the physical training of the working-class youth, and also their military and political training, previous to their summoning to the colors. In this field the Young Communist League is playing a very important part.³²

An authoritative Soviet report stated in 1926 that by October 1922, a total of 520,000 young men born in 1902 and 105,000

²⁹*KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soiuz: sbornik dokumentov, 1917-1958* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1958), pp. 237-38.

³⁰Frunze, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

³¹Quoted in Xenia J. Eudin and Harold H. Fisher, editors, *Soviet Russia and the West, 1917-1927* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), pp. 200-01.

³²Antonov-Ovseenko, *loc. cit.*, pp. 33-35.

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men born in 1903 had been trained in *Vsevoluch*. This pre-military service training had taken on a well-planned character about the middle of 1922, when *Vsevoluch* decided to set for itself the goal of providing general military training for young men of eighteen years of age, and a specialized program for those of nineteen.³³ The goals of this pre-military training were to develop in young men of pre-draft age the following: political consciousness; skill in weaponry, tactics, marching; acquaintance with army regulations; and physical development. The program envisaged 210 hours of training for each of two years. The age for the beginning of this program was later fixed at nineteen.³⁴

The relatively short (one and one-half year) term of military duty in the regular army³⁵ was quite possibly more advantageous to Soviet power in 1922 than a longer term would have been, provided that the total size of the army would be the same in either case. A relatively rapid manpower turnover in the army ensured that a large part of the population was exposed to military training and political indoctrination, and learned discipline and other fundamentals. These basic skills could be kept fresh in civilian life by periodic training of various kinds. Thus the basis for a mass army and a rugged homefront could be laid. It was on these skills that the Soviet Union would rely even twenty and twenty-five years after the 1922 Moscow Conference. In an era when the country had little military technology, it was not important that the rank-and-file soldier had little time to absorb technical military skills.³⁶

As Frunze pointed out in 1924, reliance on a militia instead of only a professional, regular army increased the necessity of de-

³³N. Movchin, *Komplektovanie Krasnoi Armii* (Moscow, 1926), pp. 204-05, cited in Fedotoff White, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

³⁴N. V. Piatnitskii, *Krasnaia Armia SSSR* (Paris, 1932), II, p. 69, cited in Fedotoff White, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

³⁵*Conférence de Moscou, op. cit.*, pp. 199-201. According to Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, p. 56, the term of service in the regular army became two to four years, while service in territorial formations lasted from eight to twelve months.

³⁶The regular Red Army soldier in the mid-1920's spent five and one-half hours daily on strictly military training as contrasted with eight and one-half hours of such training for the pre-World War I soldier in the Tsar's army. The Red Army man had four and one-half hours of political indoctrination daily. He had one and one-half hours free time daily, while the Tsarist Army soldier had three and one-half hours free each day. *Desiat' let Krasnoi Armii: al'bum diagram* (Moscow: Voennyi Vestnik, 1928), p. 21. Of 540 hours which a member of the Soviet territorial militia spent in his first year of training, 384 hours were given to technical and tactical training and musketry. Of 420 hours training in the two-year program of an infantryman in *Vsevoluch*, 274 hours were devoted to weapons, chemical warfare, drill and tactics, musketry and military engineering. Piatnitskii, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 69, 79, cited in Fedotoff White, *op. cit.*, p. 267-68.

veloping the total resources of the nation and of training all its citizens in peacetime for wartime.³⁷ In 1923 and 1924, as the transition to a mixed "cadre-territorial" army proceeded at full speed, the activities of *Vsevoluch* became more comprehensive and intensive. Special "voluntary" organizations were set up to provide military training for large numbers of Soviet citizens. There was special emphasis on the techniques of defense against air attack and chemical warfare. Marksmanship and parachuting were widely taught.³⁸

As part of the drive to mobilize—in peacetime—all the human and material forces of the Soviet state for the "inevitable conflict" with the capitalist states, the Soviet government sought to eliminate the technological backwardness which put the Soviet Union at a disadvantage in the power struggle with the European nations. The technological development of the Soviet state would, of course, be important to its military as well as to its overall power position, both in the short and in the long run. The size, the secrecy and the centralization of the Soviet state were exploited for the purpose of accelerating the economic and technological growth of the country. The drive to attain this growth proceeded openly in policies aimed at controlling and planning the national economy. It proceeded covertly as well.

By 1921 the Weimar and the Soviet Republics had begun negotiations which were to lead to agreements to collaborate, as early as 1923 and continuing until 1933, in the clandestine manufacture—deep in Soviet territory—of airplanes, tanks, munitions and instruments of chemical warfare. Although the existence of such agreements was suspected in 1922, in connection with the Rapallo Treaty, conclusive evidence of these arrangements was not available until 1926 when the German Junkers-Werke quarreled with the German War Ministry concerning an agreement for German manufacture of airplanes in Soviet territory. As a result of this incident, many details of the Russo-German collaboration appeared on the pages of the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* and the *Berliner Tageblatt*, and were discussed in bitter Reichstag debates in 1926 and 1928. A *Pravda* article published on December 16, 1926, did not deny the existence of the collaboration, but only the charge that the lion's share of the secret mili-

³⁷Frunze, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

³⁸See *ibid.*, pp. 161-62, 191, 446-49; *Desiat' let Krasnoi Armii*, *op. cit.*, p. 79; and Nikolaus Basseches, *The Unknown Army* (New York: Viking Press, 1943), pp. 160 ff.

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tary production had gone to the German government.³⁹ The Soviets learned much from German technicians and from German military schools (to which Soviet officers were sent), just as it did—overtly—from the Western engineers whom it paid to help industrialize the country.

RESULTS OF THE TRANSITION

By November 1923, Frunze was able to say:

From now on, fundamental disputes on . . . the suitability and possibility of wide application of militia principles in the building of the Red Army must be considered ended. Experience brilliantly confirmed the correctness of our first steps in this direction, and manifested the possibility of future, broader measures, which are already partially realized today.⁴⁰

In 1925, after the "Frunze Reforms" had resulted in a reorganization of the Red Army in many respects,⁴¹ War Commissar Frunze, shortly before his death, reviewed the reasons for the establishment of the army on a "cadre-territorial" basis. The main reasons given were two considerations very similar to those which had motivated Trotsky's appeal to the Party Congress in 1922 to give the Red Army a "firm size" and a "firm budget." The first factor was budgetary. Limited funds had to be used to improve maintenance of the forces and their military command and political staff. The second was the need to give a planned and systematic character to the development of the army.

Frunze asserted that the army had decreased in size but had been

significantly strengthened with respect to basic cadres, number of artillery, technical troops, and automatic infantry fire. The reduction concerned mainly the service and homefront apparatus. The fighting capacity of the army and the navy increased.

Half of the entire Soviet Army in 1925, according to Frunze, consisted of territorial militia.⁴² Table III shows the declining percentage of regular forces in the total makeup of Soviet infantry divisions, especially from the point in late 1923 when the total

³⁹For an excellent bibliography on this subject, with a summary of the content of each entry, see Robert M. Slusser and Jan F. Triska (comps.), *A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 403-12. See also the bibliography on the same subject in Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, *op. cit.*, p. 455. For a summary and some key documents on the Soviet-German collaboration, see Eudin and Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-78, 202-10.

⁴⁰Frunze, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-34.

⁴¹See Fedotoff White, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-276.

⁴²Frunze, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-81.

of Red Army regulars leveled off at somewhat less than 600,000 men.

With regard to the cost factor, it would appear that Trotsky could have made a stronger case for a militia before the Ninth Party Congress in 1920 than his argument that it would allow the nation's soldiers to be producers and fighters simultaneously.⁴³ He might also have argued for the economic utility of a militia in the narrow sense of the term. By 1929, the nation's experience showed that it was much cheaper to maintain a militia man than a regular soldier. The expense of maintaining a militia man for one year was 21.7 per cent of the cost of maintaining a regular soldier for the same time. To maintain a militia man for *five* years cost 54.5 per cent of the bill for a regular soldier over *two* years.⁴⁴

Whether a militia man was as good a fighter as a regular was another question. According to a post-World War II lecture given at a Soviet military academy, Marxism favors a militia, but international pressures no longer permitted the Soviets to place major reliance upon a militia in the late 1930's.⁴⁵

TABLE III
PERCENTAGE OF RED ARMY CADRE AND TERRITORIAL
INFANTRY DIVISIONS*

Date	Cadre	Territorial (Militia)
1923	82.8	17.2
1924	52.4	47.6
1925**	37.2	62.8
1926	34.2	65.8
1936	77.0	23.0
1939	100.0	0

**Desiat' let Krasnoi Armii, op. cit.*, p. 19; Fedotoff White, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-59.

**In early 1925, according to Frunze, half of Soviet forces were "territorial" and half "cadre." See above, note 42.

⁴³See above, note 14.

⁴⁴*Desiat' let Krasnoi Armii, op. cit.*, pp. 17-20.

⁴⁵N. M. Kiriaev, *Partiia bol'shevikov v bor'be za ukreplenie Sovetskoi Armii v gody mirnogo sotsialisticheskogo stroitel'stva, 1921-1940 gody* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda," 1951), p. 15.

By January 1936, the number of divisions in the standing army had been increased so that they made up 77 per cent of all Red Army divisions. In 1939 the logical conclusion of what had become a trend was reached, when, in a speech to the Eighteenth Party Congress, Voroshilov announced that the territorial militia system was abandoned altogether, and the whole Red Army was placed on the footing of a standing army. See Fedotoff White, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-59.

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By 1939, however, the militia had fulfilled many of the purposes for which it was created. It had freed many Soviet men from the regular army, so that they could perform productive labor while they underwent military training. It had enabled the Soviet government to improve, relative to the early 1930's, the development and equipment of its regular cadres.⁴⁶ *And it had facilitated the task of portraying Soviet Russia as the champion of peace and disarmament.*

This last point is illustrated by an argument by Frunze in March 1925, in behalf of enlarging the militia formations of the Red Army. Already, he said, three-fourths of the Red Army consisted of territorial militia. The nation needed more military formations. But they had to be militia—not cadre—formations for two reasons. One was budgetary, the other political. The masses of the world had come to believe in “the peaceful character of [Soviet] military policy.” Frunze asserted that Soviet policy was genuinely peaceful, because peace would allow the Soviet state to overtake the bourgeois states economically and culturally, which would give the most powerful stimulus to the revolutionary movement abroad. Since the bourgeoisie could not be expected to allow the Soviet Union to develop in peace, the Soviet state had to strengthen its military power. To increase its cadre formations would give anti-Soviet forces “the strongest weapon”—grist for propaganda about “the threat of Soviet imperialism.” To avoid such propaganda, the militia formations of the country, *not* its cadre formations, would be further developed.⁴⁷

The cadre-territorial army was not designed primarily with an aim toward facilitating Soviet diplomacy, nor did it reckon on the ability of the Narkomindel (NKID, Foreign Commissariat) to persuade other countries to disarm. While this army marked a partial return to Marxist ideals, its creation reflected more the Kremlin's economic pressures, growing sense of military security, and declining prospects of extending revolution abroad. Reductions in the Red Army, whether planned or implemented, aided

⁴⁶See Fedotoff White, *op. cit.*, pp. 277-430.

⁴⁷Frunze, *op. cit.*, pp. 378-79. A propaganda pamphlet issued *circa* 1931 affirmed that “the Red Army is built mainly on the territorial system, which further confirms the defensive character of the Soviet Union's military policy.” The small Soviet standing army was a defensive necessity, because of the danger of attack along long frontiers. “After the victory of the proletarian revolution in several other countries, the U.S.S.R. will be able to change over to a system of militia pure and simple . . . and after the world victory of the proletarian revolution, to the complete abolition of all armed force. . . .” See A. Alfred, *The Red Army* (New York: Workers Library Publishers, [1931?]), p. 34.

the plausibility of Moscow's proposals for comparable cuts in the forces of other states. Had such reciprocity occurred, Soviet security would have improved accordingly. Even without this *quid pro quo*, however, Moscow seems to have believed its campaign for peace and disarmament would make it more difficult for the capitalist governments to mobilize an attack on the Soviet Union.

PROSPECTS OF THE MILITIA IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

Economics, technology, politics and ideology conspired in 1921 and 1922 to make it expedient for the Soviet Union to cut her regular forces and build up her militia. This orientation in Moscow's military policy, it has been argued, made it both possible and useful for Soviet diplomacy to champion the cause of disarmament.

Is there an argument for a major power's developing a militia system in the age of nuclear and rocket weapons? Khrushchev's 1960 speech quoted above suggests at least the possibility of an affirmative answer, although his remarks could have been a sop to opponents of the 1960 reduction, empty homage to an ideological tradition, or a mild warning to the West.

Among the communist states today, the fondest advocates of a militia are the two youngest and least stable communist regimes—Cuba and China. Peking has attempted to maintain on its communes a militia to supplement its regular army. China's problems, of course, differ substantially from those of the more advanced Soviet state. Peking strives to create a feeling of patriotism against external threats in order to justify the sacrifices required for rapid industrialization and to instill a sense of national loyalty and unity in the face of promised "liberation" from Taiwan. Soviet leaders, in contrast, now seek to demonstrate the feasibility of peaceful coexistence.

As Soviet forces become more automated, the demand for highly trained personnel increases. How large this force must be depends on Soviet expectations of confrontation and conflict abroad—especially in Eastern and Western Europe, in areas of major Chinese interest, and in "national liberation" movements around the globe, as well as in the defense of Soviet frontiers. Engagements abroad, it would seem, call increasingly for mechanized, professional forces, backed up by a reserve which can promptly mobilize to replace or supplement forces sent abroad. Three do-

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mestic contingencies, however, make perhaps higher demands for quantity than for quality: (1) defense and settlement along the Sino-Soviet frontier; (2) internal security, and (3) civil defense, especially in case of an atomic exchange between the great powers. Any of these contingencies could be dealt with in part by a nonprofessional militia. The framework for such a force already exists in the voluntary paramilitary organization *DOSAAB* and the vigilante police *Narodnaia Druzhina*, and the civil defense organization *PVO*.

A combination of professional and militia forces could therefore recommend itself to Soviet leaders concerned with maintaining both the quality and quantity of forces for the flexible response—nuclear or conventional—needed to advance Soviet interests at home, within the communist bloc, in the developing nations, or in the West.⁴⁸ Ideological pressure from China might be countered by even a partial fulfillment of the Marxist ideal of a people's militia, a measure which would also support Moscow's claims of a shrinking in the functions of the Soviet state in its march toward communism. Economic shortcomings also favor—as between the wars—any transfer of men from military to more productive occupations. Finally, a transfer of some forces to militia units could again be used advantageously in a Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaign for general disarmament.

⁴⁸For further discussion of this point, see Jacobs, "Die künftige Sowjetarmee; Elite oder Militz?," *op. cit.*

A NEW STRATEGY FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID*

by Daniel Wit

FOREIGN economic aid has become since 1947 a major instrument of United States foreign policy. As such, it represents a relatively new and revolutionary element in U.S. relations with the rest of the world. Although the U.S. government undertook several limited aid operations prior to World War II—such as the provision of modest technical assistance to Latin America, some aid to China, and various emergency relief projects—a comprehensive and carefully formulated foreign aid program did not exist until 1947. Since then, the program has wrought a near-revolution in U.S. foreign policy in two respects: it has assumed much greater significance as an instrument of foreign policy, and it has as its ultimate purpose to generate vast transformations in the economies and societies of recipient countries so that they may become economically viable and politically stable.

In recent years, and particularly in 1963, the foreign aid program has become the target of severe attacks by domestic critics in the United States and the object of a comprehensive review by a number of Congressional and Presidential committees. The feeling is widespread that a decade and a half of large-scale economic assistance programs, supported by the American taxpayer, has failed to return benefits commensurate to the expenditure of resources and funds. The current debate over foreign aid has raised many pertinent questions, several of which we shall consider in this article: What is the rationale underlying foreign aid as a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy? Has foreign aid outlived its usefulness or can it continue to serve as a vital instrument of policy in the foreseeable future? In retrospect, what has been the nature, magnitude and degree of success of this program? And, with the advantage of hindsight, what should be the purposes of the program and how can it best be tailored to meet the special needs and problems of various underdeveloped countries and the threat of communist imperialism?

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be interpreted as reflecting the official opinion or policy of the Department of Defense or any department or agency of the U.S. government.

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THE RATIONALE OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID

The formulation of a major foreign aid program was prompted by the emergence of the Soviet threat after 1945. Yet the United States would have been drawn into ever more elaborate foreign economic assistance activities regardless of Soviet policies. U.S. aid programs were introduced in part for humanitarian reasons, as the wealthiest nation on the globe responded to the great economic dislocation and human distress in the aftermath of the war. The strains of idealism in American society would not permit the nation to ignore mass misery abroad. American initiative was prompted also, in part, by increasing economic interdependence with the outside world. Since World War II, the U.S. economy, even with its own domestic mass consumption market, needed increasingly the markets of expanding foreign economies. A nation with only some 6 per cent of the world's population but producing approximately 40 per cent of the world's goods cannot maintain its own economic health in isolation from the rest of the world. Certain types of foreign aid, therefore, certainly could and still can be justified as a form of overseas investment capable of providing important economic returns for the United States.

Nevertheless, the basic stimulus for the development of a U.S. aid program for Europe, and subsequently for most of the rest of the globe, was not humanitarianism or the desire to create export markets, but rather the communist challenge to U.S. national security. The United States, faced with Soviet pressures on Turkey and communist guerrilla war in Greece, responded in March 1947 with the Truman Doctrine which provided military and economic aid to these two countries. Meanwhile, communist socio-economic and political warfare throughout Western Europe, backed by the ever-present threat of the Red Army in Central Europe and sparked by periodic resort to local violence, shook American post-war complacency. The American response to Soviet expansionism was the Marshall Plan for massive economic assistance to Europe. In the case of both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the basic assumptions and primary objectives were clear: the American national interest in peace, world order and the continued independence of our allies and other strategically-located countries required the provision to such countries of enough military assistance to safeguard their territorial integrity and to control outbreaks of communist-promoted insurgency, as well as economic assistance sufficient to generate economic recovery. Both

military and economic assistance were essential to the establishment of stronger and more stable noncommunist governments, thereby frustrating Soviet designs to circumvent the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent.

The success in Europe of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, at a cost of some \$13.5 billion from 1948 through 1952, led to the second stage in the development of U.S. foreign aid policy, namely, the creation after 1949 of the current global aid program. For the Soviet challenge, although successfully countered in Western Europe, did not cease. Instead, the contest, essentially one of indirect (unconventional) rather than of regular warfare, was transferred to non-European battlefields, and the communist offensive was considerably enhanced by its victory in China.

The new Cold War battlefields, the underdeveloped lands, provided much better soil than did Europe for communist strategy. Subversion and insurgency could be promoted in the name of "national liberation" through the capture and control of indigenous anti-Western revolutionary movements. Faced with growing communist, especially Chinese, pressures throughout Asia, and active communist efforts to infiltrate the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, U.S. leadership devised programs similar to those which had succeeded so well in Europe. The basic principles of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan seemed sound. The interdependence of a country's economic health, social and political stability, and national security was clear. The policy of fighting communism with programs of foreign economic and military assistance in the non-Western world seemed to have equal if not stronger justification than it had in Western Europe.

THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN AID

If we consider President Truman's "Point Four" proposal of 1949 as the beginning of a concerted U.S. effort to provide aid to the underdeveloped world, this program is now in its sixteenth year. To many Americans the annual appropriations for this aid seem to have become as inevitable and irreducible as the appropriations for agricultural subsidies and veterans' benefits. At least this was generally true until 1963. Today, however, responsible citizens and their representatives in Washington are seeking an answer to the second question posed at the outset, namely, has the

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foreign aid concept outlived its original validity? Have publicized failures in U.S. foreign assistance programs, the discouragingly slow pace of economic development, the frustrations of dealing with neutral countries, the U.S. citizen's desire to reduce his tax burden, and the post-Stalin modifications in Soviet strategy—have all these developments collaborated to reduce the effectiveness and urgency of foreign aid and to make it possible to phase out the already curtailed foreign aid program?

The nature of current communist strategy clearly leads to the conclusion that the area of indirect, unconventional warfare—of which foreign aid is a major part—rather than diminishing in importance, will assume even greater significance during the next two decades. This judgment is based upon several characteristics of the communist world.

1. Communist ideology, communist foreign policy, and communist strategy are all predicated on the belief that political, economic and all other forms of unconventional warfare are inherent elements in the strife between classes and systems which will characterize history until communism's eventual triumph. The communists see all facets of life as interrelated, and their policies are designed to manipulate these factors in the interest of hastening their system's inevitable triumph.

2. Soviet strategists, taking into account the great military power of the United States and its allies and the potentially disastrous results of any general or even limited thermonuclear exchange, appear to have accepted mutual deterrence as the basic fact of East-West relations. Rather than risk everything, including the final inevitable triumph, the Soviet leadership appears to prefer to conduct its operations without the direct and overt commitment of its own military forces. The increasing U.S. capability to wage warfare at any and all levels, from guerrilla to thermonuclear, under the current strategy of flexible response, undoubtedly compels the Soviets to avoid a direct military confrontation.

3. Communists, by tradition and training, excel in unconventional warfare and thus possess advantages in this arena. Up to the present, there is certainly ample evidence to support this statement. The American system of values, the reluctance to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, the absence of world-wide, disciplined "American" parties and controlled front organizations comparable to those of the communists, and the repugnance of Americans for engaging in subversive activity or the support of

insurgency, have all served to restrict the development of any major American capability at this level of warfare.

4. Red China, too, despite its alleged greater willingness to engage in direct military action, is committed fully to unconventional warfare. Mao is the leading exponent of guerrilla warfare, and Chinese communist efforts to subvert and capture nationalist movements have been projected far beyond East Asia to Africa and Latin America.

Both major communist states are committed to prosecute the struggle against the West at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Thus, the United States must have a full range of weapons for fighting back. Foreign military and economic assistance, as one of these weapons, is no less justifiable today than it has been at any time since 1947. In fact, its utility will probably increase during the next decade—provided the balance of nuclear terror is not upset—as all aspects of unconventional war take on added importance.

The fundamental soundness and realism of the concept of a major foreign aid program does not automatically mean that the strategy and methods of the U.S. aid program have been equally sound. Indeed, they have been characterized by conceptual and operational deficiencies. If foreign aid is to continue to receive popular and Congressional support in America, and if it is to be used to its fullest potentiality as an instrument of U.S. foreign and national security policies, strategies must be reformulated, tactics properly adjusted, and operational programming conducted with greater skill and selectivity.

THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID POLICY IN OPERATION: 1947 TO 1963

American foreign aid activities since 1947 can be separated, in terms of programs authorized by Congress, into the following eleven nonmilitary categories:

1. Technical assistance (cooperation) to provide skills to individuals.
2. "Special assistance" to promote economic and political stability and secure U.S. military facilities where no other forms of U.S. aid have been provided in adequate amounts.
3. "Defense support assistance" to countries (two-thirds of it to four countries: Turkey, South Vietnam, Korea and Taiwan) whose own outlay of funds for a military build-up, as our allies, threatens their economic and political stability unless we fill the "hole" in their budgets.

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4. "Agricultural surpluses" assistance, in which U.S. surpluses are sold for foreign currency, which is then loaned back to the recipient country for economic development purposes.

5. "Development loans" to make capital available for economic development at low interest rates and over long periods when regular banking facilities will not provide funds.

6. "Contingency funds" to meet special emergencies and disasters.

7. Miscellaneous contributions to various UN and other international aid programs (the U.S. provides 30 to 40 per cent of such aid). The Export-Import Bank, a purely American institution, also makes medium- and long-term loans to assist countries to buy American products.

8. "Investment guaranties" to encourage U.S. private enterprise to develop foreign economic resources and industries by assuring protection against specified political or other risks.

9. U.S. financing, in cooperation with private enterprise, of up to 50 per cent of the cost of making investment surveys.

10. Development research and evaluation studies to produce new or improved tools and techniques for developing human and natural resources, to adapt available technology to environmental conditions, and to study the effects of economic change on social and political institutions.

11. "Alliance for Progress" to provide technical and financial assistance to the American republics in order to formulate national programs for economic and social development, and thus support the growth of democratic institutions.

In addition to these functional classifications of foreign aid activities, one can list the major characteristics and trends of operational programming since 1947:

1. Although from the last years of the Eisenhower Administration to the present, efforts have been made to emphasize economic assistance, roughly one-third of the approximately \$100 billion expended has been for direct military assistance.

2. Originally, grants of money were the major means by which capital was transferred (e.g., 94 per cent of 1953-1955 expenditures); but this pattern has been reversed in recent years to the point where loans now constitute about 60 per cent of the outflow.

3. Defense support assistance, for most of the period, amounted to about 30 per cent of expenditures for nonmilitary or so-called economic assistance.

4. Probably no more than 4 per cent of the funds expended for economic assistance has been devoted to technical assistance, that is, to teaching new skills to people rather than transferring capital and goods. This percentage is gradually increasing.

5. Only between 5 and 7 per cent of the total funds expended for foreign aid were, to use the words of the former Director of the Agency for International Development (AID), Fowler Hamilton, spent "self-consciously . . . for development."

6. Under current legislation and according to recent policy statements, there is now much greater emphasis on the selective promotion of the economic and social development of friendly countries willing to establish the necessary social and economic preconditions and willing to formulate long-range development plans.

7. Present legislation and policy recognize the need to assist in the promotion of private investment as a foreign aid technique, to facilitate the adaptation of Western production techniques to underdeveloped environments, and to study the social problems of development.

Foreign aid programming, thus, has been characterized by the high percentage of funds and matériel transferred directly to other nations; the high percentage of assistance which has been either military in nature or at least defense-oriented in the form of "defense assistance"; and the limited emphasis that has been given to technical assistance (President Truman's Point Four Program of 1949) and to economic development, as such, in our non-European foreign aid effort at least up to 1961.

How successful has this type of foreign economic aid programming been in carrying out U.S. policy objectives? President Kennedy's message to Congress on March 22, 1961, which followed special committee reviews of foreign aid, provides an authoritative answer: While the programs had "helped to avoid economic chaos and collapse, and assisted many nations to maintain their independence and freedom . . . nevertheless, it is a fact that many of the nations we are helping are not much nearer sustained economic growth than they were when our aid operation began. . . . If foreign aid funds are to be prudently and effectively used, we need a whole new set of basic concepts and principles."

The same evaluation remains valid in 1964 despite efforts by the Kennedy Administration, especially by the new Agency for International Development and its associated Alliance for Prog-

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ress, to take a fresh and hard-headed look at both the administration and programming of aid. The U.S. foreign aid policy is, therefore, still primarily a defensive and "holding" operation rather than developmental. Moreover, even with increased selectivity in its distribution, U.S. aid is currently divided among more than eighty countries, although some 80 per cent of the total goes to twenty nations.

A case can be made for the assertion that U.S. foreign assistance has helped to prevent some countries from falling to the communists and has brought a degree of stability to others. These accomplishments are not insignificant; yet they signify only limited and temporary victories. The time gained by these "holding" programs must be utilized to assist countries of strategic importance and potential viability to move toward the point of independent economic "take-off," social reform, political stability and internal security. Real socio-economic and political development is the only long-term basis for winning in political warfare. Communist efforts at subversion, insurgency and the capturing of legitimate nationalism can only be thwarted by governments which respond to the needs and aspirations of their societies. Weapons *are* important, but they do not assure the loyalty of troops, the active support of a population against guerrillas, and the political isolation of subversive forces. Military aid, like economic aid, is ultimately doomed to failure—although it may be temporarily successful—unless the recipient governments meet popular demands for reforms and development.

The critical test of a foreign aid program is not whether it has succeeded in bribing foreign governments of questionable effectiveness and uncertain local support, but whether it has been able to generate development and thereby to assist a country to achieve self-sustaining growth. This latter criterion, then, should become the basic determinant of American support for these programs. American public opinion in general, and Congressional opinion in particular, will not support indefinitely the perpetuation of an extremely costly foreign aid program which produces minimal results at best, and a variety of publicized failures at worst. Indeed, the program has become so unpopular in the last year that both the conservative and the liberal factions of American politics have called for either the total dismantling of the program or for drastic, mostly downward, revisions of its scope. Congress has become increasingly convinced that it must legislate specific country

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TABLE I

THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN AID

(Based on the March 1963 Clay Committee Report to President Kennedy.
Data covers the period July 1, 1945-June 30, 1962.)

1. Number of countries aided	111		
2. Aid granted by region (in \$ millions):			
	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Military*</i>	<i>Total</i>
Europe	28,872.7	15,939.8	44,812.5
Far East	13,743.2	8,417.3	22,160.5
Middle East, South Asia	12,577.7	5,266.2	17,843.9
Latin America	6,195.5	616.1	6,811.6
Africa	1,664.7	112.0	1,776.6
3. Aid to international organizations:	3,561.4	708.0	4,269.4
TOTALS	66,615.2	31,059.5	97,674.7
4. Leading recipient countries:			
<i>Europe:</i>			
France	5,175.6	4,262.4	9,438.0
United Kingdom	7,668.2	1,045.0	8,713.2
Italy	3,463.3	2,292.5	5,755.8
West Germany	4,047.5	951.9	4,999.4
<i>Far East:</i>			
Korea	3,431.4	2,002.2	5,433.6
Nationalist China	2,051.6	2,376.7	4,428.3
Japan	2,660.7	1,033.1	3,693.8
South Vietnam	1,699.3	742.4	2,441.7
<i>Middle East and South Asia:</i>			
India	3,952.0	—	3,952.0
Turkey	1,581.3	2,288.0	3,869.3
Greece	1,784.8	1,602.8	3,387.6
Pakistan	1,889.6	(Classified)	1,889.6
<i>Latin America:</i>			
Brazil	1,736.8	215.9	1,952.7
Mexico	760.7	6.2	766.9
Chile	675.6	62.2	737.8
Argentina	596.5	44.0	640.5
<i>Africa:</i>			
Morocco	353.0	(Classified)	353.0
Tunisia	293.3	(Classified)	293.3
Libya	187.2	4.5	191.7
Ethiopia	117.8	67.5	185.3

(*Does not include military support and related assistance, estimated as high as 30 per cent of total economic aid.)

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TABLE II

FOREIGN AID APPROPRIATIONS FOR FY 1963

(in millions of dollars)

Military Aid	1,325
Economic Aid	2,604
TOTAL	3,929

ECONOMIC AID APPROPRIATIONS FOR FY 1963

Alliance for Progress	
Grants	100
Loans	425
TOTAL	525
Remainder of Program	
Grants	225
Loans	975
Supporting Assistance	395
Investment Guaranties	30
Contingency Fund	250
International Organizations	149
Other Aid	55
TOTAL	2,604

aid programs because it no longer trusts the judgment of the foreign aid agency's administrators.

These widespread attitudes make it clear that the foreign aid program is in danger of being dropped from the grand design of U.S. foreign policy—to the detriment of the national security. The same tangible evidence of success that rewarded the Marshall Plan must soon be presented to the American public, namely, the actual phasing out and termination of foreign aid to specific countries because they have attained a capacity for future self-sustaining socio-economic and political progress. Foreign aid needs a new strategy which emphasizes, wherever possible, socio-economic development and severely restricts the other forms of non-military aid.

THE GENERATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

If the primary thrust of foreign aid programming must be developmental, and if it is in this area that U.S. aid has had its least success, it becomes essential to inquire into the nature of the development process before discussing the design of a new foreign aid strategy.

The promotion of development (social, economic and political) in the underdeveloped countries of the world is one of the most complex and baffling problems to confront Washington policy-makers. The original success of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe, like the equally great success in promoting Japanese recovery, was comparatively easy, though expensive. Basically, all the United States had to do was to make available an adequate number of dollars so that peoples who already possessed great scientific, technical and managerial skills, and the requisite energy and motivation, could purchase from the United States the equipment needed to refurbish, replace, modernize and add to an existing industrial plant. Dollars, and economic guidelines for the use of those dollars, constituted the essential U.S. contribution. Thereafter, the West Europeans, for example, were willing and able to plan production schedules, engage in comprehensive efforts to solve postwar fiscal and monetary problems, and participate in regional cooperative efforts to lower trade barriers, promote economic growth, pool certain resources and even to allocate the aid funds received. It was this capacity for self-help which was the essence of European and Japanese recovery. Having received American aid, these countries were able to reach new peaks of economic strength and social stability.

When U.S. foreign aid policy turned to the world-at-large, it became increasingly clear that the transfer of funds, equipment and commodities and even the provision of good advice did not produce the same results in other regions of the world. The lessons learned from successful experiences in Western Europe and Japan, and even in semi-European Israel and dependent Formosa, could not be applied automatically to the traditional and semi-traditional societies of the underdeveloped lands. These societies lack not only the economic, scientific, technological, governmental and managerial prerequisites for the effective use of American funds and equipment; they also lack those vital psychological and cultural preconditions of modernization which must precede the necessary institutions and skills.

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U.S. efforts to initiate the process of socio-economic development have been largely unsuccessful because foreign aid programming has not been designed to break down the most formidable obstacles in the way of development in the new countries. As might be expected of a great industrial state whose cultural values and traditions are, in many respects, entirely different from those of the underdeveloped countries, the United States tried to meet the development challenge primarily in economic, administrative and technological terms. But development in traditional and semi-traditional societies cannot be promoted simply by transfers of capital, equipment, institutions and procedures. Even the introduction of technical assistance, which seeks to transfer modern skills and attitudes to many individuals, is not sufficient to generate development in these societies. The inadequacy of U.S. foreign aid efforts to promote socio-economic development, as distinguished from the recovery and rehabilitation of advanced countries, can be traced to a lack of insight into the development process, or, perhaps more accurately, to a failure to apply the available knowledge to the formulation of U.S. aid programs. An understanding of the development process must be based on the following "facts of life" in underdeveloped countries.

1. Socio-economic development in traditional and semi-traditional societies is not primarily an economic problem. What is essential is an almost total transformation of all major sectors of such societies—e.g., economic, social, political, religious—and the cultures in which they are rooted. Before economic "take-off" can occur, much more deep-seated societal breakthroughs must take place.

2. The need for this veritable social revolution as a precondition of economic development stems from the very nature of these societies. Since all societies are systems of human interrelationships which have produced distinctive cultures (socially learned and transmitted behavior patterns such as values, morals, language, artifacts, traditions) as well as institutional sub-systems (structures) designed to perform functions in keeping with culturally shaped needs and aspirations, any significant changes in one component require adjustments throughout the entire system. One cannot, in other words, isolate economics from politics, from the social system, or from the culture any more than one can isolate institutions and institutional procedures from the patterns of behavior prevalent among the people who staff, manage and benefit from them.

Tinkering with the institutional and procedural superstructures of a society may accomplish little more than to create negative tensions, imbalances and malfunctions. An institution or technique which is highly functional in a Western society may actually be inappropriate for a non-Western society, while functionally useful components of an underdeveloped country may be adjudged worthless by a foreign expert. Years of effort to tighten up budget systems, increase agricultural productivity, redesign customs and tariff systems, improve transportation, and the like, while clearly necessary to modernization, do not create the various preconditions under which these efforts can take root and thrive.

3. If development efforts in a certain underdeveloped country are to be given a chance to succeed, the social-psychological foundation of the particular society must be altered. It is at the human and cultural level—the network of shared behavioral patterns characteristic of the members of the society, the human orientations to action and selective adjustments to environment—that one finds the essence of any society; hence, it is at this level that modernization must begin. Socio-economic development is basically a problem of transforming human motivations. To accomplish such transformations in the underdeveloped world requires a significant re-patterning of human interrelationships and interactions which produce the society's culture and condition its particular institutions and procedures.

4. To appreciate that cultures vary, and that institutions and human behavior also vary in ways which reflect their cultures, is essential to the formulation of a foreign aid strategy for development. However, this realization might lead to the conclusion that, since "East is East and West is West . . .," any foreign efforts to promote development in other societies in the long run are hopeless. If this is the case, foreign aid then becomes a program of marginal utility, to be used for limited holding operations and various types of bribery. This conclusion, however, is unwarranted.

Societies and their cultures are never completely and perpetually static. At some point, they must change, adjust, develop or retrogress. They cannot stand still because the environment in which man lives is not static. No permanent leveling-off is possible. This is equally true of both the advanced and the underdeveloped countries. Stability as well as progress, therefore, is achieved by a continuous response to the major forces of change

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which affect both the internal and the international environment of countries.

5. How then do social change and economic development actually occur? They occur, in simplest terms, through the introduction into a society by some of its own members of necessary scientific, technological, managerial and behavioral innovations which often are in direct conflict with prevailing norms. For members of the society to become innovators, however, requires that such innovations "make sense" to them. They must, in other words, derive psychological satisfaction from their creative actions. Social development, therefore, is dependent upon the emergence of individuals within a society who are motivated to become innovators and thus to help promote modernization.

Historically, development in societies, including Western societies, has been initiated by creative people who have been motivated to break with the values and behavioral norms of their times in order to improve their lot and, in so doing, ultimately that of their fellow men. Normally, these innovators are a small minority within their societies since they are social rebels rather than conformers to the prevalent orthodoxy. They become the spearhead for innovation: the new entrepreneurial group willing to risk scorn and persecution in order to learn of, and introduce to their own societies, the latest technological, ideological and managerial advances. Customarily, their deviant behavior stems from their inability to derive adequate satisfaction from the prevailing traditions, values, patterns of interpersonal relationships and institutions. Thus, in the Western world, industrialization and modernization frequently have been spearheaded by dissatisfied groups with strong achievement and innovational drives.

Creative leadership, or at least the presence of would-be leadership groups in a society, is the critical catalytic element needed to spark the development process. Moreover, in order to effect change, this leadership must constitute a reasonably cohesive or at least identifiable group. An underdeveloped country cannot expect to develop without the existence of a spearhead group which will take full advantage of foreign assistance. Once this spearhead group appears, the development process can be initiated by skillful foreign aid programming which assists such a group to take the lead, demonstrate the validity of its attitudes, and thereby provide examples which can serve to convert large

numbers of fellow citizens to the cause of modernization. If this much can be achieved, foreign aid can then help to generate socio-economic development by the provision of equipment and funds to stimulate economic growth where local savings for investment are in short supply, by a program of technical assistance to transfer skills, and by assistance in the building of appropriate institutions and an economic infrastructure.

TOWARD A NEW FOREIGN AID STRATEGY

A sound foreign aid strategy capable of making the most efficient use of America's considerable yet limited resources must be devised within the framework of basic U.S. policy objectives. It must be flexible in operation. Like other elements of national security strategy, it must provide U.S. policymakers with realistic options for the employment of the various instruments of national power. Thus, America's economic arm of policy must be capable of coping with communist efforts at political subversion and the promotion of pro-communist insurgencies throughout the underdeveloped world.

To increase the effectiveness of foreign aid, and thus to revive within the United States Congressional and popular support for foreign aid, a soundly-conceived strategy must provide options which are related to: (a) the importance of a given country to U.S. national security; (b) the internal conditions of that country; and (c) the extent and nature of the communist threat to that country. With these criteria in mind, the following guidelines for a foreign aid strategy are suggested:

(1) *Underdeveloped countries which are of major importance to U.S. security and economic well-being.* When U.S. authorities determine that a certain country falls within this classification, a major program of assistance clearly is in order. Moreover, U.S. assistance, if at all possible, should have socio-economic and political development as its primary objective. Mere "holding" operations will buy time but will not assist a country toward self-sustaining economic growth, socio-economic viability and political stability. The time bought by foreign assistance, which pays salaries, supports and develops armed forces and otherwise keeps a friendly government operating and secure against direct external military attack, must be used to full advantage by promoting long-term internal modernization and development.

Under this category of underdeveloped countries, several particular contingencies should be examined.

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A. If the governing elite of a specific country reveals a commitment to development and modernization and is willing to promote the necessary cultural and social changes (these are to be determined by a thorough research and analysis of the prevailing culture, institutions, manpower characteristics and scientific-technological resources), substantial development assistance should be programmed. Simultaneously, other kinds of economic and military assistance should be provided to maintain the country's basic security and independence.

In these circumstances, entrepreneurial or "spearhead" groups should be identified—presumably the country's governing elite will remain dominant in view of their present position and foresight—and they should be encouraged to devote their energies and creativity to socio-economic development. Such groups must be given appropriate incentives; allowed to benefit from their efforts (except where conflicts of interest might arise in the case of political and governmental leaders); encouraged to apply their energies to those institutional areas of society which contribute most to socio-economic development; and provided with the necessary managerial and technical skills to make the most effective use of their motivations. Their attention also should be turned away from the construction of restrictive family enterprises and pursuit of quick financial returns; they should be encouraged rather to achieve satisfaction in ways which contribute to the broader economic growth of the country.

Under this same set of conditions, foreign aid can be supplied to build the essential economic infrastructure, such as transportation and communications systems and harbor facilities. Assistance can also be provided at an appropriate time to create institutions and procedures—adjusted to the local environment but not antagonistic to balanced development—for capital accumulation in order to channel local savings into investment for economic growth (e.g., banking systems, corporative devices and properly enforced tax systems). Training and educational institutions can be created to promote both modern scientific-technological skills and the requisite value and behavioral changes. In addition, help can be provided to develop effective value and material incentives in order to encourage blue collar workers, white collar employees and farmers to work harder and in more modern ways.

The governing elite should be evaluated primarily in terms of its willingness to support broad development planning rather

than in terms of its immediate willingness to strengthen political democracy. In many underdeveloped countries, some form of "progressive authoritarianism" may be the best government possible at this stage of development. The political test of a government, therefore, should be based upon its demonstrated willingness to prepare the society for economic development and social change as well as its ability to rally popular support for this program. Ultimately, developmental progress is likely to contribute to political modernization and probably will bring increased popular participation in government. It cannot be assumed, however, that political democracy, as defined in the West, must be adopted by non-Western societies before a regime can be considered "popular." Even Western democracy has undergone considerable changes during this century in favor of ever-greater executive leadership, and all Western states had authoritarian characteristics in their early stages of development.

B. If, after a country has been receiving a considerable amount of development aid, it becomes clear that the ruling elite is not fundamentally committed to modernization and is not willing to sponsor the necessary socio-economic reforms, but nevertheless has a large measure of popular support, development aid should be reduced gradually to a level which offers some hope for limited modernization. Foreign aid for "holding" purposes should not be reduced, in view of the country's presumed importance to U.S. national interests. Military assistance should be employed, wherever possible, for civic action purposes and for socio-economic development.

C. If, from the outset, a ruling elite is not committed to development, but the country's long-term importance to U.S. interests is clear, U.S. aid administrators should seek to identify potential "spearhead" elements of the society and design the aid program with an eye to assisting these groups to whatever extent is possible under the existing regime. Where local tensions and subversive forces render the situation increasingly dangerous, efforts must be made to encourage such "spearhead" groups, and pressure should be applied to the country's governing officials to permit the expansion of development efforts. The military assistance program, moreover, should be designed to exploit its potentialities for civic action, for modification of traditional attitudes, and for managerial and technical training which has nonmilitary applications.

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D. If, in a country of major security importance to the U.S., the ruling elite is inflexibly opposed to modernization of any kind and "spearhead" elements do not exist or cannot be identified, but internal security is well established, the U.S. foreign aid program must be drawn up with the realization that significant developmental change may not occur under this generation of leaders. Massive economic aid in these circumstances is wasteful and much less important than providing assistance in the form of educational and training techniques and facilities. This form of assistance may spur elements in the population, basically friendly to the U.S., to question their existing values and behavioral norms and prepare them for eventual modernization. In these circumstances, the transmission of complex modern skills may have to await the development of greater psychological and cultural receptivity. In the meantime, ensuring the survival of the society as an independent entity must be the primary purpose of U.S. aid.

(2) *Underdeveloped countries which are of limited importance to U.S. security.* Where specific foreign countries are judged to be of some limited importance to U.S. security, a measure of economic aid may be in order if it is also clear that the country faces a real threat from communist subversion or communist-sponsored insurgency, or if the country faces some other internal crisis which may have a serious impact upon U.S. national interests. In such circumstances, the United States must evaluate the nature and extent of the threat; the related socio-economic and political conditions which may, in part, be the cause of the unrest; and the willingness and ability of the existing government to ameliorate or eliminate those unhealthy internal conditions.

If the existing government is not willing to take the steps necessary to remedy conditions, then the United States either should not provide foreign aid or it should program limited amounts of aid with the clear recognition that this is a "holding operation." In nonmilitary terms such an operation could involve small grants, or preferably loans, for the purpose of influencing the recipient's domestic and/or foreign policy. Certain technical assistance programs might be financed in areas which hold the promise of socio-economic and political improvements. However, massive aid should not be made available under the guise of promoting development, and the United States should not permit itself to be blackmailed into providing large amounts of aid simply because the local government threatens to turn to the commu-

nists for massive assistance. If the local government carries out such a threat, then a major program of U.S. aid probably would have been useless. If its bluff is called and it does not take the threatened actions, it may thereafter be more willing to negotiate a limited and realistic aid program.

The United States should be willing, when necessary, to reject aid requests from countries in this category. Even under the best possible circumstances, i.e., when the local leadership is both willing and able to eliminate the causes of internal dissension and dissatisfaction upon which subversion feeds, U.S. aid should probably be restricted to gaining limited military and economic objectives without being committed to a vast renovation of the society. It is unwise for the United States to overextend its financial resources and fritter away the valuable time of foreign aid personnel on dozens of countries which have limited bearing on U.S. national interests and little potential for significant development in the foreseeable future.

(3) *Underdeveloped countries which are of no obvious importance to U.S. security.* Although it is possible to argue that every underdeveloped country is important to U.S. security and thus qualified to receive U.S. aid, the national interest is not served by such an indiscriminating policy. It is essential to reduce or eliminate commitments to countries of no demonstrable importance to American welfare. Where political expediency necessitates some aid as a bribe or reward, such aid should be composed chiefly of technical assistance in the hope that this form of aid will lay the groundwork in the recipient society for future cultural and social changes. In short, the strategic conception of a U.S. foreign aid program should be the development of selected positions of strength in critical areas throughout the underdeveloped world rather than the drawing of a "foreign aid line" around the globe.

CONCLUSIONS

The U.S. foreign aid program urgently requires the formulation of a new strategy—a strategy that will enable U.S. policy-makers (1) to avoid an overcommitment of its human, material and financial resources; (2) to employ various types of foreign aid in behalf of major U.S. objectives; and (3) to restore American domestic confidence in the validity of the foreign aid program.

The basic distinction to be made in foreign aid programming is between aid whose primary objective is that of "holding"—of

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preserving a society's independence over the short term—and aid which is designed to promote long-term development and eventually to raise these underdeveloped countries to a self-sustaining level. To some extent, military and economic aid overlap and, to a limited extent, may be employed as alternatives. For example, the promotion of development in a certain country may have to be accompanied by a “holding” operation to maintain a semblance of order and internal security, so that development is not undermined by insecurity and disorder. However, in countries where the necessary moral and cultural preconditions do not exist and the country's official leadership is firmly opposed to modernization, U.S. foreign aid must perforce be restricted to a “holding” operation and development aid should not be given.

When foreign aid is employed to promote development, it should be recognized that it will spark social, cultural and even political revolutions. The transformation of a foreign society can be carried through peacefully and constructively if a united and popular ruling elite, backed by U.S. assistance, manages the revolution. On the other hand, if revolutionary forces pushing for modernization are already at work, with or without U.S. support, and the present ruling elite bitterly and vigorously opposes this movement, the chances are that these revolutionary forces will adopt increasingly violent methods. In very few cases can the United States afford, at this stage of world history, to be aligned indefinitely with traditionalist or unprogressive leadership, for the revolutionary pressures of this century in behalf of change and development eventually will sweep away such leadership. The United States, in terms of its own national interest, cannot afford to provide aid to a country, thereby contributing to the rising tide of human aspirations and pressures for social changes, and simultaneously associate itself with a status quo regime which refuses to provide outlets for the new pressures. Nothing is more illogical than to set in motion revolutions—and to a great extent the United States cannot help but ignite revolutions in the underdeveloped world because Americans represent a revolutionary force by their personal, cultural and national commitment to modernization—which one is then incapable of harnessing. The United States cannot afford to permit the communists to ride the forces of nationalism and development to political victories which completely circumvent U.S. military deterrents.

Foreign aid was devised as a major component of U.S. national

security policies. Its objective, from the outset, was to promote stable and independent countries which would be secure against communization. U.S. wealth, industrial might, and scientific, technical and managerial skills provide Washington policy-makers with vital assets in this form of socio-economic and political warfare. Ever since 1947, the U.S. government has been seeking improved ways of organizing and utilizing these assets as an effective instrument. Yet, the creation of a new strategy is essential if Congress and the American public are not to discard foreign aid programs as expensive and ineffectual instruments of policy. Clearly, one of the most urgent affairs of state is the formulation of a foreign aid strategy which will enable the United States both to meet the increasing communist challenge at the lower end of the conflict spectrum and to promote the economic and political modernization of those underdeveloped countries which are vital to American national security.

STABLE DETERRENCE PROPOSALS: SOME QUESTIONS*

by Herbert O. Horn and John Ponturo

ONE of the interesting political phenomena of the past few years has been the intense preoccupation of physical and social scientists in the U.S. with the problem of arms control, and the increasingly informed discussion which they have succeeded in stimulating on arms control issues. We now have an important body of literature on the subject, and a considerable amount of research activity. More of this country's trained intellect is now committed to the systematic exploration of problems of peace and war than ever before.

It is still much too early to judge the ultimate impact of this effort. Fresh and able minds have focused upon these old issues. We have had a barrage of new ideas, and many refurbished ones. We have also had a substantial reorientation—what some believe to be an “emerging consensus”—directed toward a closer integration of arms control and defense strategy, and there has been a genuine improvement in the sophistication with which the relevant problems are examined and discussed.

In a number of respects, however, the bulk of the recent arms control literature still leaves much to be desired. It has perhaps established the point that the pursuit of international security in part through arms control is worthwhile, but it is still a long way from providing policies. Some of the major weaknesses found in the literature include disarmingly simple views of the world, narrow concepts of military strategy, questionable facts and assumptions, and an unfortunate preoccupation with present-day environmental contexts. Such weaknesses cannot be attributed to all participants in the arms control debate, but they can be attributable to many. Given the recency of the arms control literature and the immensity of the problem, this is hardly surprising. Unfortunately, it limits the potential contribution the literature might make to national policy.

Some of the shortcomings in contemporary arms control writings and some of the problems encountered in seeking arms

*The views expressed in this article are those of the authors, and should not be interpreted as reflecting the official opinion or policy of the Institute for Defense Analyses or of any department or agency of the U.S. government.

control approaches to security, can be illustrated by examining two central ideas in the stable strategic deterrence type of arms control proposal: (a) the idea that numerical restrictions on strategic delivery vehicles are necessarily stabilizing, and (b) the idea that active anti-missile defenses are necessarily destabilizing.

STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES

The stable deterrence type of proposal that is most familiar in arms control writings would limit the number of strategic delivery vehicles in the possession of the U.S. and USSR to some equitable minimum deterrent level. The aim of such a proposal is to provide each side with security against attack by removing symmetrically any rational incentive for a first strike, and at the same time to lessen the potential destructiveness of a general nuclear war if it nonetheless should occur. Assume, for example, that each side were limited to several hundred strategic delivery vehicles, with characteristics such that neither force could simultaneously destroy more than one-quarter or one-half of the other force. In such circumstances, an "all-out" attack by either side would be foolish. The attacker, having expended his strategic vehicles, would be exposed to a severe retaliatory blow against his urban complexes which he would be powerless to prevent. The attacked party, on the other hand, might be relatively undamaged except for the loss of a portion of his strategic force, and his residual strategic force would give him a superior strategic posture, putting him in position to "win" the exchange, at far less cost to himself than to the aggressor. With the odds so strongly against a first strike, both sides should feel far more secure, and mutual deterrence should be much more stable than it appears to be today. Since the existing arsenals and their rate of expansion are already awesome, and since a continuation of the arms race points to ever-increasing levels of destructiveness should general war occur, the assurance of stable deterrence at lower force levels would be highly desirable.

The foregoing rationale centers upon the role of strategic weapons in an all-out nuclear exchange. By discussing the problem within this limited context, we ignore the role of strategic weapons in deterrence and defense against less than all-out attacks. How the latter problem would be affected by numerical parity in strategic delivery vehicles is a largely unresolved question to which we shall not address ourselves here.

STABLE DETERRENCE PROPOSALS: SOME QUESTIONS

A first step in a realistic appraisal of any proposal based on the concept of strategic parity would seem to be the determination of what constitutes a strategic delivery vehicle. There appears to be a tacit assumption in most discussions that a strategic delivery vehicle is an intercontinental missile. From the U.S. view, this assumption seems plausible at first glance. The threat to this nation arises in another hemisphere; thus strategic weapons are those of advanced design which have hemispheric ranges. But if we view the vehicle in relation to its target, it seems more reasonable to accept the definition that it is any weapon which has the capability to penetrate to the strategic interior of the target nation. In attempting to negotiate with the Soviets a proposal restricting strategic weapons, we should recognize that their adherence to the latter definition early in any negotiations might widen the scope of the proposal and greatly complicate the discussion. Because of the internal damage which the Soviets might sustain in a nuclear conflict, they would surely consider missiles and aircraft closely deployed in forward bases to be strategic in nature. This could be an extremely important point in negotiating a strategic limit with no constraints on tactical weapons. The U.S. might find it in its own interest to attempt to retain an effective European "tactical" nuclear force even if it negotiated for a limit on "strategic" forces.

The nature of the weapons themselves complicates the problem. Illustrative of the questions which have to be answered are these: Are missile-launching submarines strategic delivery vehicles even if equipped with relatively short-range missiles? Does a manned bomber carrying multiple air-to-surface missiles count as one or many vehicles? Is an aircraft to be classified on the basis of its nominal radius, its maximum range, or its maximum range if refueled?

A second factor to consider in the proposal to reduce strategic weapons equitably is the level of limitation. The acceptance of lower force levels than currently exist would be an obviously desirable feature; but, while it is true that the weapons deemed necessary by one state are to some extent a function of those possessed by the other, consideration must be given to the actual numbers in question. Too low a level may tend to jeopardize the deterrent posture of one side or the other. For example, let us assume a reduction to 100 strategic delivery vehicles and arbitrarily define such vehicles as those having a range in excess of 1,500 miles. Such a limitation might encourage the deployment

by one nation of increased numbers of the unconstrained "tactical" weapons that could penetrate more than 1,000 miles within the borders of the other state. From forward bases or submarines launching such weapons, the area in jeopardy would encompass the entire United States (assuming submarine penetration into Hudson Bay), and over five-sixths of the Soviet Union. Even a 500-mile penetration would imperil three-fourths of the United States and one-half of the Soviet Union. In addition, the accessible areas are those of densest population and industries. If sufficient numbers of a country's strategic weapons were deployed in this area and if a greatly increased "tactical" capability had been developed, under certain circumstances one side might conclude that it had acquired a counterforce capability since it could then target some or all of the opponent's strategic forces with its "tactical" forces.

At low levels of strategic forces many factors of relative unimportance assume new proportions. These must be evaluated in proper perspective, for they tend to increase the complexity of what appears to be a straightforward proposal. There is, for example, the Polaris submarine. If a low limit is established on the number of strategic vehicles, perhaps 100 to 200, both sides should seek to reduce the vulnerability of their forces. Then the question arises: Does one want to commit 16 missiles per submarine, when these 16 missiles represent a substantial percentage of the strategic force? Another consideration would be that of makeshift delivery vehicles, e.g., long-range transport and tanker aircraft. While these pose no particular problem at current force levels, it might be possible to double or triple intercontinental delivery systems in a short time by modifying civil or military aircraft so as to provide a delayed strike capability. This could free the greater portion of high performance systems for use in a first strike.

It can be argued at this juncture that the preceding questions may be answered to the satisfaction of both parties and that the proposal retains some of its merit. But to a large extent this reflects an uncritical vision of the final state of confrontation at a limited strategic balance. Let us start from the present situation and speculate on the transition to this level of confrontation.

The level of potential violence possessed by both sides today is staggering. But a careful consideration seems to indicate that the great numbers and varieties of weapons currently held are not simply the result of an unchecked desire for destructive power;

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instead they represent responses to rapid changes in armament technology in recent years. With the development of each new offensive weapon, there is pressure to develop a defense, and counterpressure to develop a more effective offensive weapon or greater numbers to compensate for potentially degraded effectiveness. Thus, in view of the more sophisticated defenses they might have to encounter if ever employed, the size of nuclear arsenals today does not necessarily reflect a vastly increased offensive capability over those of a number of years ago.

The most difficult question concerning a proposal based on the concept of parity stems from the actual numbers of strategic weapons in existence. If mutual deterrence does indeed now obtain, as many writers on arms control assert, it appears that equal numbers of weapons are not an index of equal deterrence at the current high level of forces. Widely published reports indicate that the United States has several thousand intercontinental aircraft and missiles, as opposed to only hundreds available to the USSR—if one ignores aircraft which could operate at intercontinental ranges on one-way missions and with adequate refueling. Does this really mean that numerical disparity by a factor of 2 or 3 or more is not crucial, at least at these levels? How do we attempt to make the transition between these levels and a reasonable lower level? Do we negotiate for numerical parity or for a proportionate reduction? In the former case, we may well be sacrificing military effectiveness since our absolute reduction is much greater, while the latter case may be unacceptable to the Soviet Union not only on emotional grounds but due to the more critical disparities which, from a military standpoint, exist between numbers of offensive systems at lower levels. In addition, it appears inevitable that numerical parity at any level must penalize one side. If both sides were free to choose, it is unlikely that mixes or weapon types chosen by either side would correspond identically as to yield, survivability, reliability or penetrability because of variant technologies and military evaluations. Thus, the equality in military effectiveness which many believe to be inherent in numerical parity is illusory; effectiveness is more a function of the characteristics of the weapons than mere numbers.

Even if we assume that such an agreement is somehow negotiated, what would be the impact upon a world so configured in the light of the almost inevitable technological innovations of the future—for example, the development by one side of an

anti-missile system of even limited effectiveness? Faced with this situation, the side lacking an anti-missile system might respond by attempting to renegotiate the agreement to a higher level of strategic delivery vehicles in order to compensate for the now degraded effectiveness of its current inventory. If such an increase favoring one party were agreed upon, it might prove detrimental to the other side when the second nation acquired its own anti-missile capability. If the increase were not negotiated, the previous agreement might have to be abrogated. A second possible response by the side lacking an anti-missile system would be to increase the yield of the retained weapons to as great a degree as possible. Such an increase, coupled with a targeting doctrine against cities (which seems to be the optimal course open at a low numerical level of strategic weapons), tends to offset one of the attractive aspects of the proposal. Another response might be to improve and replace existing weapons with newer, harder or more mobile missiles, together with appropriate countermeasures, which also might tend to invert the balance if combined with an anti-missile capability. A fourth alternative is to respond by increasing the number of less costly tactical missiles deployed close-in, in an effort to cover the same targets.

In short, it appears that a proposal to limit the number of strategic delivery vehicles alone runs the risk of destabilizing the deterrent balance with no clear-cut assurance that the level of destruction and casualties, in the event of a nuclear exchange, would be substantially less. The fundamental flaw is the assumption that equal numbers of intercontinental delivery vehicles imply equal military effectiveness and therefore equal deterrence, and that technological change and interrelated military systems of lesser range are parameters which do not affect national consideration on a strategic level.

Our defensive posture today is complex not only as regards the magnitude of its coverage but also in the interaction between weapons systems whose overlapping and sometimes interdependent capabilities are designed to provide as flexible a response as possible to a broad spectrum of threats. When attempting to evaluate arms control proposals, it seems imperative to consider in detail not only the direct implications which stem from a proposal but also the spill-over effects that may alter the projected effectiveness of systems and postures not always obviously interconnected. Enhanced security should be the inevitable product of a desirable arms control measure; measures which tend to

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threaten the strategic balance may prove undesirable in the long run despite their otherwise commendable features. Furthermore, in the process of determining the merit of proposals, it may be well to question the validity of preconceived criteria. For example, magnitude of destruction potential may not be as important a criterion in evaluating the status quo as is the "threat." The "threat" posed is the product of deliverable potential destruction and the probability that it will be delivered. Decreasing either alone may not reduce the overall threat if in the process the other is increased.

The preceding discussion is not meant to imply that there is no merit in a proposal concerning a limit on strategic capabilities if it is part of a broader program that adequately covers the spectrum of confrontation—including control of tactical systems, sub- and air-launched missiles, forward bases, gross yield, target vulnerability and the employment of new armament. Yet, as Robert E. Osgood has pointed out, if an arms control agreement imposes limits on a whole spectrum of weapons, it may proportionately limit the freedom of both parties to make unilateral adjustments in order to preserve a military balance if political and military circumstances change.¹ It appears that much more careful consideration of the effect such a proposal might have upon the interdependent components of overall defense is warranted. Before seriously considering implementation of a superficially attractive proposal, a host of questions, such as those raised in this brief treatment, should be explored in great detail.

ANTI-MISSILE SYSTEMS

As suggested above, arms control proposals based on the concept of approximate equivalence in strategic retaliatory capability are considered by their proponents to be vulnerable to the development of active anti-missile systems. The rationale is familiar. When there is no effective defense against missiles that have been launched, it is technically feasible for both sides to assure a capability to retaliate merely by designing forces with high survivability. If both sides do this, neither will be able to program an attack that can destroy the great bulk of the opponent's strategic forces prior to launch, yet both will be able to inflict severe damage in a retaliatory blow if attacked. This presumably

¹*NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 192-194.

removes symmetrically any rational motive for all-out attack, thus producing stability at the strategic level.

If there were an active defense against missiles, however, designing forces to survive would not be adequate; it would also be necessary to ensure that the surviving forces could penetrate to their targets after launching. The side which could establish effective obstacles to penetration would upset the balance of mutual deterrence because, by a combination of an offensive first strike and an active defense, it might be able to blunt the opponent's retaliatory blow sufficiently to make a first strike appear attractive. In short, this would deny the other side the capability to deter.

For this reason, advocates of stable deterrence-type measures sometimes suggest that anti-missile defenses be outlawed. Some propose that missile defenses be deployed only by agreement, thus permitting a veto, or the negotiated adjustment of force levels to compensate for the introduction of missile defenses, or even withdrawal from the agreement.

If we examine this problem more closely, it becomes apparent that the potentially destabilizing effect of anti-missile defenses is not a specifically inherent quality but varies with missile-target interactions. It depends, for example, upon (a) the characteristics of the system assumed, (b) types of missiles launched against it, (c) the nature of its deployment, and (d) whether deployment is one-sided or two-sided.

Let us assume a point-defense terminal-type system,² with very powerful radars and very complex components, expensive to build, time-consuming to produce, and likely to be quite scarce in relation to the possible number of points to be defended. Let us also assume for purposes of discussion that the system is fully effective against the type of offensive missiles expected.

If only one party developed such a system, he might deploy it to protect cities or to protect strategic weapon sites—or he could do both. If he wished to maximize his counterforce capabilities (or rather the goal of counterforce action), he should logically optimize his offensive systems for a first strike against the opponent's offensive systems, and optimize his defensive systems for the protection of his cities against the opponent's potential

²A point-defense, terminal-type anti-missile system refers to a system designed to defend a specific, limited area, e.g., a city or military installation, by use of AICBM's launched to intercept incoming missiles during the terminal phase of their trajectories.

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(residual) retaliatory strike. On the other hand, if he wished to maximize his retaliatory capabilities, he should logically optimize his offensive systems for a second strike, principally by making them highly survivable, and deploy ballistic missile defenses to protect strategic weapon sites in order to enhance their survivability.

Theoretically, there would be an advantage in doing both—by siting offensive weapons near metropolitan areas in such a way that dual coverage could be obtained. This step might be psychologically objectionable, but it would simultaneously improve one's counterforce and retaliatory capabilities. Thus, it is the choice one should make (a) if he wished to keep available the option to attack, but (b) also had a requirement to deter attack. Unless he was confident that he would never be required to attack, or unless he was confident that he would never be attacked, the rational policy would be to protect (some of) both cities and strategic weapon sites. Within this course of action, he could emphasize one or the other, depending upon whether he accorded greater priority to his option to attack or to the necessity to deter his opponent.

Thus, in the context of one-sided possession of effective missile defenses, the situation could be either stable or unstable. Stability would not be jeopardized if missile defenses were deployed only around strategic weapon sites, and strategic weapon sites were deployed away from cities. In such a deployment, the role of anti-missile defenses would be comparable to that of any move to improve stability by reducing the vulnerability of forces, e.g., through mobility or hardening. Stability would only be jeopardized, in principle, if missile defenses were able to protect cities.

The foregoing discussion has focused upon the risk of one-sided development of ballistic missile defenses, because this is the risk most generally mentioned as potentially destabilizing. One question not really discussed in the arms control literature is whether this is a likely contingency. There are good reasons for believing that it may not be.

Neither side should be able to surprise the other with an operational, extensively deployed missile defense, at least of the conspicuous and expensive type under discussion. Either side should be able to monitor the other's missile defense testing, and either should be able to detect the start of deployment. Even if deployment were to proceed on a crash basis, extensive deploy-

ment would take years. Under the circumstances, the other side should have time to react. Moreover, it would probably have an opportunity to recover from any technological lag, if one had developed, and to uncover any technological breakthrough the opponent had made. After all, both sides can be expected to continue a high-level research and development effort; a technological lead of a year or two may not be decisive because of the production and deployment lead-times involved; and technological potential on both sides appears similar enough to make it probable that if one side succeeded in developing a really effective anti-missile defense the other side would do likewise. Thus, a two-sided situation may well be the more normal one.

If one side began to deploy anti-missile defenses, what would the other be likely to do? If A started deploying defenses to protect cities on a scale large enough to endanger the deterrent balance, B should suspect an intention to prepare for aggression. Aside from taking measures to improve the penetrability of his offensive missiles—by using decoys or multiple warheads, for example—B could restructure his forces to emphasize short-range, short-flight-time missiles not apt to be as vulnerable to missile defenses. B could also still maintain a substantial retaliatory threat by retargeting his forces to strike unprotected cities, at least up to the point at which A had protected the great bulk of them. Unless A had an excellent shelter program, B could also retarget his forces to deliver fall-out on protected cities. If B cared to join the anti-missile race, which he would logically do if he thought missile defenses effective enough to degrade his own retaliatory potential, he could counter by deploying missile defenses to increase the protection of vulnerable strategic weapon sites. Until B had exhausted such options for offsetting the destabilizing effect of A's missile defenses, he would not be in critical danger (particularly if the deterrent balance in such an arrangement were not so delicate that a small change would destroy it). In short, there would be no immediate need to withdraw from an agreement or to renegotiate strategic force levels. Of course, B could always withdraw if he foresaw that his security might really be jeopardized.

If A started to deploy missile defenses to protect his strategic weapon sites rather than his cities, B should treat this as a further step to stabilize deterrence. In this case, B could either take no action, or imitate A, without upsetting the agreement.

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If A attempted to protect both cities and strategic weapon sites, B's safest assumption would be that A was improving his counterforce capabilities. Then B's wisest course would be to respond in the same manner as previously outlined for the case where A defends cities only, and if those options were exhausted, to renegotiate or withdraw.

One might draw the conclusion, therefore, that under some circumstances there might be no major risk involved in the introduction of missile defenses; and that, under circumstances in which a serious risk might develop, the span of time and the options available should obviate the necessity of greatly emphasizing the problem in advance.

It should be noted, however, that the entire argument is extremely sensitive to the assumptions posited about the type of anti-missile system, particularly as to its size, complexity and cost. The argument might well be invalid if we assumed a radically different system—for example, a system that was not a point-defense terminal-type system or a system that was not likely to be detectable in time by the other side. This being the case, the analyst of the missile defense issue would have to examine alternative systems which were technologically feasible, in order to determine their potential for destabilizing mutual deterrence. In order to do this, he would have to probe many still unresolved and perhaps unresolvable technological uncertainties.

This is a critical point, which illustrates a major problem in the evaluation of arms control measures, and a major weakness in the arms control literature. Such measures cannot be appraised without reference to specific weapons systems, defense postures and strategies. These relationships are most complex, by the very nature of the subject, and are as replete with uncertainties as the question of a technologically feasible anti-missile defense. To return to the example, if the arms control strategist does not or cannot resolve the uncertainties, can he really provide any basis for deciding whether a stable deterrence type of arms control measure should be acceptable?

BASIC SHORTCOMINGS

This discussion has dealt at some length with examples of contemporary thinking on the subject of arms control in order to accent some of the weaknesses in current literature. Broadly speaking, the major shortcomings appear to stem from a failure

to consider military problems in sufficient detail or within a sufficiently accurate and comprehensive contextual framework; and from inadequate recognition of the problems of weapons systems and the mechanics of defense. A perusal of current literature leads one to the conclusion that many in the academic world who concern themselves with arms control do not yet fully appreciate the complexities of military problems.

In this respect it is unfortunate that so much of the published material about arms control involves the more philosophical issues, issues of national motives, national behavior, international trust and integrity, sources of tension, and the like. Such questions are, of course, important, but so long as their consideration occupies the bulk of the time and talent expended on the subject, the more difficult detailed discussions which are a prerequisite to developing measures of operational significance suffer from neglect. This tends to retard the accumulation of a body of disciplined studies which could evolve into a mature understanding of the subject.

Arms control critics in general are also at fault. Too often they fail to examine arms control ideas on their merits. As a result, arms control proponents have seldom received the type of criticism which would force them to do the careful, painstaking analyses that are urgently required if they are to contribute to the formulation of U.S. policy. Considering the growth of interest in the field and the impressive array of talent now focused upon the subject, it seems that improved direction and cogent criticism might produce an environment which could yield significant dividends. The creation of such an environment seems to be a goal truly worth striving for, since the potential rewards are of immeasurable value.

ON THE INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

by Alexander J. Groth

IN foreign relations, no less than in other policy areas, accurate and continuous appraisal of facts and events is a prerequisite of success. Obviously, the policymaker must have knowledge of the environment within which he works and of such changes and developments as require an adjustment of his methods, expectations and even purposes or objectives.

Traditionally, diplomatic missions abroad have served as the "eyes and ears" of policymakers at home with respect to information bearing on the capabilities, attitudes and activities of foreign powers. In the twentieth century, with the transition to the so-called "new diplomacy," a good deal of this informative function of diplomacy has been shifted from the foreign service professionals to the high-level policymakers themselves—foreign ministers, heads of states and occasionally special envoys.

These individuals gather information directly, through personal contact with their opposite numbers, and "feed it" into the policy-making process at a higher level and with less sifting-out than is the case with ambassadors and officials of lesser rank who report through a bureaucratic chain-of-command. Frequently, the information obtained by the policymaker through personal contact may be not strictly "hard facts" but rather overall impressions, such as a feeling or an image. The policymaker may leave a conference with the conviction, not easily reducible to concrete evidence, that the other side is strong or weak, resolute or vacillating, sincere or disingenuous. In fact, the desire of policymakers to obtain firsthand impressions and to bypass the cumbersome and impersonal "usual channels" is a powerful incentive to the practice of personal diplomacy.¹ Also, the preference for negotiating settlements of difficult problems through a man-to-man approach is often strengthened by the temptation of curiosity. The modern statesman possessed of the facilities of speedy communication and travel finds it difficult to resist the lure of "seeing it all for himself." Physical impediments have been all but removed. The attractions of meeting the great—or perhaps the notorious—figures

¹Lord Hankey, *Diplomacy By Conference* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), pp. 35-36. Cf. Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939), p. 158.

of one's age are naturally formidable. There is evidence that President Roosevelt, for example, felt genuine excitement in the prospect of meeting Stalin at Teheran in 1943, a feeling not altogether attributable to considerations of simply expediting business.²

Personal diplomacy on the summit level has been frequently criticized on the grounds that it may involve careless, ill-considered decisions made on the spur of the moment;³ that it may lead to unwarranted public expectations of progress or agreement among the powers;⁴ that it may introduce harmful influences into the relations between states through personal likes or dislikes of their leaders.⁵ It is also asserted that summitry often provides the participants with a great deal of "misinformation" about each other and the issues examined. This last aspect of personal diplomacy is also its central paradox. After all, what is most often alleged to be the one compelling reason for the personal approach, even by those who concede serious disadvantages, is the opportunity to make firsthand appraisals, presumably of politically relevant factors.⁶ In practice, however, information gathered through personal contacts has been so often and so seriously misleading that the alleged advantages should not be accepted uncritically.

It is understandable that the policymaker will want to know the men with whom he deals. Personal meetings may offer him clues as to the intentions, attitudes and actions of others; unquestionably, the policymaker always does learn *something* from personal exposure to other statesmen. For a variety of reasons, however, this "something" is often likely to be either politically irrelevant or misleading; and if the resultant impressions are given a disproportionately high "weight" among the factors considered in any overall appraisal, policy is sure to suffer.

²*The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. II (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 1313.

³See, e.g., Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1933), pp. 68-72. Cf. his *Diplomacy*, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁴E.g., Lester B. Pearson, *Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 8-10.

⁵E.g., Sisley Huddleston, *Popular Diplomacy and War* (Rindge, New Hampshire: R. R. Smith, 1954), pp. 230-31. Both Nicolson and Huddleston stress the problem of decisions being reached for the "wrong reasons," i.e., to please or placate those with whom one negotiates, or because of physical exhaustion and other "incidental" reasons.

⁶Pearson, *loc. cit.*, p. 8: Personal diplomacy "bring(s) the makers of policy face to face and gives them the opportunity to get to know each other. . . . The road to understanding can at times be made easier; roadblocks to such understanding can be cleared or at least exposed." Cf. A. Appadorai in *Diplomacy in a Changing World*, edited by S. D. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimons (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 284.

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The problem of "knowing" others is always more difficult than it superficially appears. Statesmen having access to other statesmen are not likely to be expert psychologists, psychiatrists and anthropologists able to evaluate properly the various facets of individual behavior and personality. The common sense and "knowledge of people" which politicians are reputed to possess can be, and often have been, vastly overestimated. Although political-diplomatic contacts are likely to open up certain opportunities for personal insights, these insights are not usually the kind of intelligence on which to base policy decisions.

The diplomats who met Hitler and Goering in the surroundings of their chanceries and villas in the 1930's never really knew these personalities as participants in the Roehm Purge of 1934. The impressions—and the grounds for them—of men like Sir John Simon who had conversed with Hitler for an hour, or of Sir Nevile Henderson who had known Goering for many months as a devoted family man and a genial host, are highly instructive. In most of these contacts, the "exposure" of the Nazi leaders was confined to the performance of a small number of specific roles over relatively short periods of time. What a visiting statesman saw and heard was limited by the context of the situation in which the meeting occurred.⁷ Did John Simon in 1935 or Kurt Schuschnigg in 1938 meet the real Hitler?⁸

One advantage of observation through the established channels of traditional diplomacy is that the policymaker's views about foreign leaders can be based upon reasonably extensive and many-sided observations—provided, of course, that resident diplomats have a measure both of access and of ability. Yet, even this approach does not solve the policymaker's problem since the leader-opposite is not a mere private individual freely following his own whims and predilections. However autocratic the formal trappings of his power, he is inevitably exposed to a variety of pressures and counterpressures, claims and demands, the results of which may

⁷Viscount Simon, *Retrospect* (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1952), p. 202. Nevile Henderson, *Failure of a Mission* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), pp. 74, 82-83. Henderson, who knew Goering better than other Nazi leaders, and who had been his sometime guest and hunting companion, remembered the Reichsmarshal for his many agreeable personal qualities, and even after the outbreak of the war believed him to be "the man who intervened decisively in favor of peace in 1938." (p. 85.) Cf. W. L. Shirer's account of Lord Halifax's mission to Hitler in 1937 in *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), pp. 302-3.

⁸See Kurt von Schuschnigg, *Austrian Requiem* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), pp. 12-27, for a harrowing account of Hitler's verbal brutality.

be difficult to evaluate and predict. The qualities and predilections of statesmen are but one of the elements which shape the making of state policies. To "know" the leaders is not enough.

In summity, an overemphasis on the purely personal element can easily lead to misconceptions. Trivial and transitory factors may assume an inordinate importance in the eyes of the participants. The policymaker may succumb to the more vivid and immediate impressions of a personal nature, displacing or blurring the more important and permanent background factors. Such impressions may render the policymaker at least temporarily impervious to interpretations (of the other side and its position) which differ from his own and may even lead to his imposing a grudging silence upon subordinate officials. Munich and the Second World War furnish particularly striking illustrations of the "misinformation" collected through personal diplomacy.

II

In 1938 Hitler had convinced Chamberlain, contrary to considerable evidence at the latter's disposal, that Nazi Germany was not an irrevocably aggressive and insatiable power. Between 1941 and 1945, Stalin conveyed a like impression about the Soviet Union to Churchill and Roosevelt and to many lesser Allied officials. In both instances the effect of personal contact, so far as the Western Powers were concerned, was the relegation of ideological considerations to the background and the enhancement of various short-term factors including Stalin's (or Hitler's) "sincerity," "frankness," and "good will." In both cases, i.e., negotiations with Germany in 1938 and with the USSR 1941-45, the elements of vague hope, wishful thinking and circumstantial evidence tending to establish the "reasonableness" of the aggressor were invariably strengthened by personal diplomacy. The attitudes of doubt and suspicion—certainly warranted by the past actions if not always by the personal behavior of these dictators—were largely forgotten in the hope of a peaceful world.

In the case of Chamberlain a very short personal exposure was sufficient to create, or at least strongly confirm, a misinterpretation of Hitler's policy. Chamberlain, a declared enthusiast for the personal approach,⁹ told the House of Commons that in foreign policy ". . . everything depends upon there being sincerity and good will on both sides. I believe that there is sincerity and good

⁹Neville Chamberlain, *In Search of Peace* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 210.

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will on both sides. . . .”¹⁰ He assured the House that, having established personal contact with the Fuehrer, he was in a position to state that Hitler “means what he says.”¹¹ For those who might have entertained doubts of an ideological nature, Chamberlain added this reassurance:

History teaches us that no form of government ever remains the same. The change may come by slow degrees or it may come suddenly like an explosion. But change in one form or another is inevitable and it would seem to follow, therefore, that we should be careful not to shut ourselves off from contact with any country on account of a system which in the course of time may well undergo such modifications as to render it very different from what it is today.¹²

The above opinion was unimpeachable. But after the first meeting with Hitler on September 19, 1938, the Prime Minister wrote to his sister:

I had established a certain confidence which was my aim . . . in spite of the hardness and ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face, I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word. . . .¹³

This was hardly an impression which Chamberlain would have received from a perusal of *Mein Kampf*, particularly those sections dealing with political methods. To the extent that personal impressions played a part in Chamberlain's policy, he would have been better served by remaining at home. On the other hand, Hitler did not altogether profit from his own venture into personal diplomacy because his impressions of Chamberlain appear to have suggested to him the opinion that Britain would never fight, no matter how provoked.¹⁴

III

In the case of Soviet-Allied relations, the misconceptions were nurtured more slowly, subtly and involved a greater number of exchanges. The initial significant contact was Anthony Eden's trip to Moscow in the spring of 1935. Eden met Stalin and was greatly impressed with Stalin's “abilities,” “personality” and “natural good manners.” Through a perspective of nearly thirty years, Eden has given this highly interesting account of the late dictator:

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 211. Speech to the House of Commons of October 3, 1938.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 197. Speech to the House of Commons of September 28, 1938.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 243. Speech to the Foreign Press Association of December 13, 1938.

¹³Keith Feiling, *The Life of Neville Chamberlain* (London: Macmillan, 1947), p. 367.

¹⁴Cf., e.g., Alan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (New York: Harper, 1953), pp. 478, 483.

Though I knew the man to be without mercy, I . . . felt a sympathy which I have never been able entirely to analyze. Perhaps this was because of Stalin's pragmatic approach. It was easy to forget that I was talking to a Party man, certainly no one could have been less doctrinaire. I cannot believe that Stalin ever had any affinity with Marx, he never spoke of him as if he did.¹⁵

This image of Stalin, the pragmatic, conventional statesman, as conveyed to Eden, was not without influence on the Western Powers both before¹⁶ and particularly after 1941 when Stalin began to make further, successful efforts to portray himself as a "tough but reasonable" "nationalist" leader.

During the Second World War, Stalin was applying his talents to a formidable task. One of the crucial problems facing British and American leadership was that of understanding the motives and aspirations of Soviet policy.

The defeat of Nazi Germany was obviously furthered by Soviet participation in the war and this, in turn, had its price. The Soviets demanded a second front, large quantities of supplies and territorial concessions to the west. Failing substantial support from Britain and the United States, Moscow hinted at separate terms with Germany and predicted dire consequences for the common cause.¹⁷ But beyond the defeat of Hitler lay the uncertain prospects of the peace, with the most vital issues at stake. Whether perceived from the standpoint of British or American national interests or even the interests of an abstract humanity, the defeat of Hitlerism should not have been an end in itself, but presumably a means to other ends, such as the survival and security of Hitler's foes and victims or, indeed, the preservation of Western civilization and the institutions of representative government.

In view of well-known communist doctrines of international class warfare, legitimate fears existed as to whether the Soviet Union might replace Hitler's Germany as the violent disturber of the postwar era. If the Soviet leadership was in fact irrevocably

¹⁵Anthony Eden, *Facing the Dictators* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), p. 171.

¹⁶Writing in 1937, Winston Churchill expressed this view of Soviet developments: "Russia is regaining strength as the virulence of communism abates in her blood. The process may be cruel but it is not morbid. It is a need of self-preservation which impels the Soviet Government to extrude Trotsky and his fresh distilled poisons." *Great Contemporaries* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937), p. 173. At this time and apparently as late as May 1944, Churchill regarded Trotskyism as "Bolshevik orthodoxy," and identified it with the "doctrine of world revolution." Presumably Stalinism was not "contagious" or at least much less so. Undoubtedly Eden's impressions served to strengthen and confirm such views in British opinion.

¹⁷See, e.g., Winston Churchill, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 457-460.

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committed to a course of world-wide expansionism, any appeasement of its appetites and any strengthening of its position, over and beyond minimum cooperation required for the defeat of the Axis, were clearly imprudent. Similarly, any hopes for a postwar order based on Soviet cooperation and good will were naïve and unrealistic, if not dangerous.

If, on the other hand, the Soviet leadership was no longer motivated by global revolutionary aspirations but by more limited goals of national security and well-being, different Western policies might be pursued.¹⁸ Limited concessions to the Soviet government might very well procure its benevolent assistance in securing world peace on the basis of a status quo essentially favorable to itself. The task of Western leadership was to evaluate the intentions of the Soviet leadership and arrive at the appropriate policy.

Clearly, it was to Stalin's advantage to foster an image of Soviet "reasonableness" in the minds of the Western Allies, since this approach could gain him maximum aid and at the same time minimize resistance to his claims.

Had the Western leaders realized that the operational code of Marxism-Leninism could be applied against the West—something which should not have required hindsight in either 1941 or 1945—they would have been distrustful of Soviet promises and unsurprised by Soviet interpretations of such terms as "freedom," "democracy," and "free elections." Presumably, the Western leaders would also have exercised far more caution in building up the postwar expectations of their respective publics. Yet, on March 8, 1944, President Roosevelt told an Advertising War Council Conference:

. . . We are now working, since the last meeting in Teheran, in really good cooperation with the Russians. And I think the Russians are perfectly friendly; they aren't trying to gobble up all the rest of Europe or the world. They didn't know us, that's the really fundamental difference. . . . They haven't got any crazy ideas of conquest. . . . And all these fears that have been expressed by a lot of people here—with some reason—that the Russians are going to try to dominate Europe, I personally don't think there's anything in it. They have got a large enough "hunk of bread" right in Russia to keep them busy for a great many years to come without taking on any more headaches.¹⁹

Similar views were repeatedly expressed publicly by the British

¹⁸Cf. William H. McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia, 1941-1946* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 64, for a discussion of the alternative interpretations.

¹⁹*The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-45* Volume (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), p. 99.

leaders.²⁰ Many warning signals of the Soviet's true designs—including significant public statements by Stalin himself—were disregarded.²¹

IV

While it is impossible to determine precisely the importance of various factors to the Allied appraisal of Russia, personal diplomacy appears to have had a major role. Both Churchill and Roosevelt attached overwhelming importance to this technique. In 1944 Churchill stated his view of it as follows:

There would be very few differences between the three great Powers if their chief representatives could meet once a month. At such meetings, both formal and informal, all difficulties could be brought out freely and frankly, and the most delicate matters could be approached without the risk of jars or misunderstandings, such as too often arise when written communications are the only channel.

. . . if the heads of the three Governments could meet once a month, there would be no problems between us which could not be swiftly and I trust sensibly solved.²²

In a speech to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in August 1944, Roosevelt, citing Alfred E. Smith, said:

. . . if you can get the parties into one room with a big table and make them take their coats off and put their feet upon the table, and give each one of them a good cigar, you can always make them agree. Well, there was something in the idea. . . .

I think that often it comes down to personalities. When, back in 1941, at the time of the Atlantic Charter, just for example, I did not know Mr. Churchill at all well. I had met him once or twice very informally during the first World War. I did not know Mr. Eden. But up there in the North Atlantic—three or four days together—we got awfully fond of each other. I got to know him, and he got to know me. In other words, we met, and you cannot hate a man that you know well. Later on Mr. Molotov came here and we had a grand time together. Then during the following year, at Teheran, the Marshal and I got to know each other. We got on beautifully. We cracked the ice, if there ever was any ice; and since then there has been no ice.²³

Understandably, the Western leaders were psychologically predisposed to view every evidence of Soviet behavior in an optimistic light. As Churchill once put it: "I have only one purpose, the

²⁰*The War Speeches of Winston S. Churchill*, compiled by Charles Eade, Volume III (London: Cassel & Company, 1952), pp. 150, 196.

²¹See particularly his statements on the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943 and in November on the victories of the Red Army. J. Stalin, *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1944), pp. 108-109.

²²*The War Speeches of Winston S. Churchill*, *op. cit.*, p. 89 (February 22, 1944).

²³*The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-33. *Ibid.*, p. 198 (August 2, 1944).

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destruction of Hitler, and my life is much simplified thereby.”²⁴ It was naturally easier to carry the burden of the war in the comforting belief that Hitler was not only the villain to beat but that once this was accomplished, the participants could relax and enjoy the fruits of victory. Stalin’s smiles were more likely to be remembered than his frowns.

Given these initial advantages, Stalin exploited the opportunities of personal diplomacy to the hilt. His technique was as skillful as it was successful. In no single instance of high-level contact between the Soviet dictator and political representatives of Britain and America was the image of Soviet “reasonableness” undermined or shattered. To be sure, Stalin drove hard bargains and he could be gruff, blunt and even insulting, but he carefully couched both his taunts and his objectives.²⁵ He succeeded in conveying the impression to his Western Allies that his method was his temper. Stalin’s shifting moods in dealing with Churchill, for instance, gave an impression of spontaneity and frankness, the image of a man who “says what he means” even if it is unpleasant and perhaps rough. Simultaneously, however, the Soviet dictator was calm and composed, never loud or hysterical, always impressively knowledgeable and at the conclusion of every conference unfailingly cordial.²⁶

All of these techniques the Soviet dictator combined with a rare skill for employing terminology particularly suited to the mentality of his diplomatic “victims.” His conversations with Western statesmen were singularly devoid of serious references to communist doctrine, however slight, or to the Communist Party which, according to the Stalin Constitution of 1936, was, after all, the leading force in the Soviet state. Stalin merely spoke of the “Soviet government,” of his “colleagues,” and sometimes even of “Soviet public opinion.”²⁷ He spoke as often of “Russia” as of the “Soviet Union” and made references to the Deity which left his interlocutors wondering if the Soviet dictator did not, after all, retain some religious beliefs—which they might be likely to attribute to his early theological training.²⁸

²⁴*The Grand Alliance*, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

²⁵Cf. John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance* (New York: The Viking Press, 1947), p. 44.

²⁶Cf., e.g., Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York: Harper, 1948), pp. 343-44.

²⁷Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-1945* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), e.g., pp. 60, 112, 117, 132.

²⁸Cf., e.g., Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 481, 493.

Stalin contradicted the stereotyped image of the boastful, chest-thumping, strutting dictator with a coolly unassuming manner and flashes of humor.²⁹ All of these techniques tended to impress Western visitors because they engendered an element of surprise and relief. The bloody, oriental despot was, "in real life," an engaging and even urbane personality.

Admiral Leahy pointed out one of the basic sources of Stalin's diplomatic successes when he wrote:

Most of us, before we met him, thought he was a bandit leader who had pushed himself up to the top of his government. That impression was wrong. We knew at once that we were dealing with a highly intelligent man who spoke well and was determined to get what he wanted for Russia. No professional soldier or sailor could find fault with that. The Marshal's approach to our mutual problems was direct, agreeable, and considerate of the viewpoints of his two colleagues—until one of them advanced some point that Stalin thought was detrimental to Soviet interests. Then he could be brutally blunt to the point of rudeness.³⁰

By 1941, Stalin had met with Hopkins, Eden (for the second time), Harriman and Beaverbrook. The purpose of these meetings was not merely to arrange for supplies for the Red Army and to exchange official views: important background impressions were conveyed by Stalin to his visitors which, in effect, however gradually, misled them about the nature of Soviet aims and designs. Thus, Harriman, for instance, reported at the time to Washington that:

I left feeling that he had been frank with us and if we came through as had been promised and if personal relations were retained with Stalin, the suspicion that has existed between the Soviet Government and our two governments might well be eradicated.³¹

During the course of the war, Harriman saw Stalin many times and, from published evidence, convinced himself that the designs of the Soviet ruler were not, at least then, infinitely expansionist and aggressive. Even in 1951, with the benefit of hindsight, Harriman stated his views to a Joint Senate Committee as follows:

The most difficult question to answer is why Stalin took so many commitments which he subsequently failed to honor. There can be no clear answer to this question. I believe that the Kremlin had two approaches to their postwar policies, and in my many talks with Stalin I felt that he himself was of two minds. One approach emphasized reconstruction and development of Russia, and the other external expansion.

. . . The Kremlin chose the second course. It is my belief that Stalin was

²⁹Stalin once even called Molotov a gangster for Churchill's amusement. *Ibid.*, p. 497.

³⁰William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 205.

³¹Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

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influenced by the hostile attitude of the peoples of Eastern Europe toward the Red Army, and that he recognized that governments established by free election would not be "friendly" to the Soviet Union. In addition, I believe he became increasingly aware of the great opportunities for Soviet expansion in the postwar economic chaos.³²

Of the possibility that Stalin might have been of "one mind" all along, not a word!

Churchill's visit to Moscow in April of 1942 was a milestone in Big Three relationships and it was also illustrative of the techniques and problems of personal diplomacy. Since Churchill's mission was to tell Stalin that no second front would be forthcoming soon in Europe, he did not look forward to his meeting with the Soviet dictator. In addition, Churchill's well-known anti-Bolshevik reputation was something he was apparently uncomfortable about.³³ Yet the result of the trip was, in Churchill's mind, thoroughly successful. He "made allowances" for Stalin's disappointment over the second front issue and, as a result of the talks, felt the alliance was strengthened. Stalin's gruffness was excused; his cordiality and "sensibleness" had made their mark.

On the whole, I am definitely encouraged by my visit to Moscow. I am sure that the disappointing news I brought could not have been imparted except by me personally without leading to really serious drifting apart. It was my duty to go. Now they know the worst, and having made their protest are entirely friendly; this in spite of the fact that this is their most anxious and agonizing time.³⁴

Thus, Churchill left Moscow with a feeling of personal appreciation, if not gratitude, toward his Soviet hosts. The Western Allies were well launched on their venture in "personalized politics."

A view widely shared by Western officials during the war pictured Stalin as reasonable and businesslike. The difficulties and disappointments in dealing with the Soviets were attributed to the powerful influence of Stalin's mysterious associates; he was obviously constrained by the wishes of others.³⁵ That the Stalin "image" and the behavior of the Soviet government did not jibe was never ascribed (by the visiting statesmen) to the dictator's deception. Recent evidence, particularly since Khrushchev's report to the Party's Twentieth Congress, indicates how naïve was the view of Stalin as a sort of "chairman of the board." Unfortunately Churchill and Roosevelt had no real opportunity to observe

³²W. Averell Harriman, *Our Wartime Relations with the Soviet Union*, Statement submitted to a Joint Senate Committee, August 17, 1951, pp. 52-53.

³³See *Hinge of Fate*, *op. cit.*, p. 493.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 502.

³⁵Cf. *ibid.*, p. 489; *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 238; Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 870. References to this point are legion.

the relationship between Stalin and his Politbureau "colleagues" (save for Molotov), and were clearly misled by the deceptive representations of Stalin.

One of the tangible and striking effects of Stalin's personal diplomacy was illustrated in the talks between Eden and U.S. officials in March 1943 in Washington. At that time, Eden assured Roosevelt that the Soviets did not, in his view, intend to dominate Europe after the war,³⁶ and presented, as recalled by Hopkins, a rather optimistic estimate of Soviet intentions:

Eden . . . thought Russia . . . undoubtedly had two different plans up her sleeve—one based on British-American cooperation with Russia and the other on the assumption that the United States would withdraw from all interest in European affairs after the war. Eden said he believed that Russia preferred and hoped for the former because Stalin was not prepared to face the implications of Russia's control over European affairs. . . .

Eden said he believed that one of the reasons Stalin wanted a second front in Europe was political; that if Germany collapsed he had no desire, in Germany, to take the full responsibility for what would happen in Germany or the rest of Europe, and he believed it was a fixed matter of Russian policy to have both British and United States troops heavily in Europe when the collapse comes. Eden expressed this purely as his private opinion and said that he was sure that in Russia a different view was held in some quarters (sic!) but, nevertheless, he thought he had stated Stalin's position.³⁷

Given the qualities of Stalin's "best behavior," it was not surprising for Cordell Hull to have written, after meeting the Soviet dictator in 1943: "I thought to myself that any American having Stalin's personality and approach might well reach high public office in my country."³⁸

After his October 1943 visit, Hull left Moscow convinced that Stalin was dedicated to the principle of postwar cooperation with the West "one hundred percent."³⁹ Apparently he felt that he had accomplished the purpose which he had disclosed to Churchill in May 1943, namely, that the Western Powers should:

. . . through carefully selected persons . . . talk Mr. Stalin out of his shell . . . away from his secretiveness and suspiciousness until he broadens his views, visualizes a more practical international cooperation in the future and indicates Russia's intentions both in the East and in the West.⁴⁰

Obviously, no objectives were considered unrealistic or over-

³⁶Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 122.

³⁷Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 708-9.

³⁸*The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, op. cit.*, p. 1311.

³⁹*Ibid.*

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 1248.

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ambitious by Allied proponents of personal diplomacy. Yet, in describing the concrete results of his visit, Hull admitted that he could not obtain satisfaction on the question of Polish frontiers, or even get Stalin to go any farther than Teheran to meet with Roosevelt and Churchill. What he did obtain was a Soviet pledge to participate in a world organization after the war and in joint formulation of broad policies with respect to postwar treatment of Italy, Austria, Germany and France. He concluded his account, nevertheless, optimistically: "As I boarded the plane for home I felt very strongly that great things had been accomplished at Moscow."⁴¹ The real, underlying accomplishment was, undoubtedly, the conveying to Hull by the Soviet leadership, particularly Stalin, of a feeling of trust and hope in Soviet intentions. Not in vain did these two talk of wheat planting and rafting in Tennessee.

On his return, Hull was queried by Roosevelt, himself on the way to Teheran now, about Hull's "personal impressions" of Stalin, whom Roosevelt journeyed to meet "with the enthusiasm of a boy."⁴² When the President in turn came back from the Teheran Conference he felt sure that Stalin was "get-at-able." He was sometimes tougher and more discourteous than Roosevelt had expected, but above all, he was apparently not a hypocrite.⁴³ Roosevelt believed that a personal friendship was established between himself and Stalin at Teheran and, whatever the correctness of that view, expected this new friendship to strengthen political cooperation between the two Powers. He believed that Stalin worked toward objectives very similar to his own.⁴⁴

For Churchill the high point of his agreeable wartime relationship with Stalin was the October 1944 visit to Moscow.⁴⁵ But since the Prime Minister was unable to make any headway with the Soviet dictator on the Polish issue, the apparent intimacy did not seem to yield the expected practical results. In his memoirs, Churchill typically resolved this paradox of the personal approach as follows:

There is no doubt that in our narrow circle we talked with an ease, freedom and cordiality never before obtained between our two countries (sic!). Stalin made several expressions of personal regard which I feel sure were sincere. But I became even more convinced that he was by no means alone. As I said to my colleagues at home, "Behind the horse-man sits black care."⁴⁶

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 1313.

⁴²*Ibid.*

⁴³Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 798-99.

⁴⁴*The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, op. cit.*, p. 1317.

⁴⁵*Triumph and Tragedy, op. cit.*, p. 239.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 238.

Stalin cultivated Churchill's illusions by intimating that he, Stalin, and Molotov were the only two high Soviet officials who favored dealing 'softly' with Mikolajczyk, the pro-Western Polish leader.

At Yalta the mood of the Western Allies, particularly toward the conclusion of the Conference, amidst banquets and toasts, approached exultation. Roosevelt declared in a toast on February 10, 1945, marking the final dinner meeting of the Conference, that "he felt the atmosphere at this dinner was as that of a family, and it was in those words that he liked to characterize the relation that existed between our three countries."⁴⁸ Churchill was hardly less effusive. Upon his return to Britain, the Prime Minister defended his faith in the pledges of the Soviet government in these words:

I feel that their word is their bond. I know of no government which stands to its obligations even in its own despite, more solidly than the Russian government. I decline absolutely to embark upon a discussion about Russian good faith. It is quite evident that these matters touch the whole future of the world.⁴⁹

One of Churchill's biographers, Lewis Broad, described the Churchill-Stalin war relationship as follows:

. . . for all his knowledge of the Soviet past, Winston was prepared to give Stalin the benefit of the doubt and to trust to his intentions. It was difficult for him to do other than believe in the essential probity of those in high station with whom he did business. Great men in great places did not, in his conception, fall below the standards of greatness.⁵⁰

But Stalin's view of his relations with the two Western statesmen was harsh and cynical, even many months before Yalta.⁵¹ Roosevelt did not succeed in conveying to him an impression of idealism and good intentions.⁵²

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 237.

⁴⁸Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 869-70.

⁴⁹Lewis Broad, *The War that Churchill Waged* (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1960), p. 356.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 358.

⁵¹Cf. Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), p. 73. Djilas quotes Stalin as saying in June of 1944: "Perhaps you think that just because we are the allies of the English that we have forgotten who they are and who Churchill is. They find nothing sweeter than to trick their allies . . . Churchill is the kind who, if you don't watch him, will slip a Kopeck out of your pocket . . . and Roosevelt? Roosevelt is not like that. He dips in his hand for bigger coins. But Churchill—Churchill even for a Kopeck." The Prime Minister, however, believed even in 1950 that Stalin sincerely held him in high regard. Cf. *Triumph and Tragedy*, *loc. cit.*, p. 238.

⁵²See R. H. McNeal, "Roosevelt Through Stalin's Eyes," *International Journal*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Spring 1963, pp. 194-206.

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When in 1945 the Soviets began increasingly to "play another tune," the Western Powers were taken by surprise, while Roosevelt still clung to the hope that through his personal diplomacy he would be able to iron out the difficulties.⁵³ A full and candid appraisal of postwar Soviet strategy was slow in coming. In the spring of 1945, Anglo-American leadership had no plans to halt, or deal with, Soviet expansionism.

V

Wartime high-level personal diplomacy contributed to the Allies' failure to realize that the Soviets were planning to embark on a postwar policy of expansionism. From the standpoint of "understanding the Soviet Union" politically, Allied summitry of 1941-1945 was as much a failure as Chamberlain's analogous efforts in 1938.

The "personal approach" is not without grave risks. The chance to see and hear and speak is simultaneously the chance to misrepresent and deceive. If one side chooses to be deceitful and is skillful at it, the other may be unable to distinguish truth from falsehood, real from pretended intentions, firm promises from useless pledges. Heads of states and foreign ministers frequently lack the elementary skills of negotiation and communication or the background information, for instance, which would enable them to make competent appraisals of their adversaries.⁵⁴ Even professional diplomats are not safe from the many hazards which inevitably beset personal dealings at any level. The temptation to equate "private" with "public" friendship is frequently strong,⁵⁵ and the statesman may forget or confuse the public and impersonal aspects of his role.⁵⁶

⁵³See, e.g., his letter of January 16, 1945 to Harold Laski, in *The Roosevelt Letters*, Volume III, edited by Elliot Roosevelt (London: George G. Harrap, 1952), p. 523. Cf. Churchill's letter to Roosevelt of March 13, 1945 suggesting a "breakdown" of the Yalta agreements. *Triumph and Tragedy*, *op. cit.*, p. 426.

⁵⁴See Stephen D. Kertesz on "American and Soviet Negotiating Behavior," pp. 159-161 in *Diplomacy in a Changing World*, *op. cit.*

⁵⁵See, e.g., Robert Regala, *The Trends in Modern Diplomatic Practice* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1959). The author writes that in conference diplomacy "the development of real intimacy and friendship among the participating states (sic!) is great. . . ." (p. 90.)

⁵⁶For a revealing account of a distinguished master of diplomacy, Prince von Metternich, who knew how to focus single-mindedly on impersonal objectives in personal dealings, cf. Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1957). Observing that the Emperor Alexander was said to trust only him, Metternich wrote: "Do you want to know what impression that makes on me? A smile and nothing else." (p. 309.)

Assuming that negotiators are capable of discounting such phenomena as the pageantry of official receptions, banquets and ceremonies (probably an over-optimistic assumption), the conference table with its "atmosphere" is surrounded by still other pitfalls. The tasks of divining the attitude, intentions and sincerity of the other side are crucial to any estimate of policy; in conference they may appear deceptively easy. The "sincerity" and "resolution" of the other side, for example, may be judged by the negotiator in an unreliable fashion on the basis of his own personal predilections and sociocultural background.⁵⁷ Are loud and fluent talkers resolute and courageous? Are shifty-eyed men insincere? Consciously and subconsciously the judgments of participants are affected by such considerations, as well as by a whole spectrum of sympathies and antipathies which may be purely personal, subconscious and, above all, quite irrelevant to the issues.

To the extent that conclusions established through personal experience are given priority in policy formulation over other more objectively ascertainable intelligence data, the risks of grave and perhaps disastrous miscalculations multiply.

The predilections of British and American statesmen, in particular, for the "personal approach" may be a source of weakness if they should result in the unwarranted relegation to the background of more permanent policy determinants—geography, resources, population, national tradition and ideology. Also, personal impressions are likely to be most misleading in proportion as the gap, political, ideological, social and cultural, between the participants increases. For this reason the relations between the West and the Nazis or the communists are particularly instructive. Despite Stalin's successes, the Soviets are no more immune to failure in this area than others. If the 1961 Vienna meeting with President Kennedy encouraged Khrushchev to risk a missile build-up in Cuba, it is but one further instance of the pitfalls of personal diplomacy.

From the standpoint of intelligence gathering, personal diplomacy, like a dangerous tool, may under some circumstances serve a useful purpose. Its usefulness, however, depends in large measure upon the resolve of statesmen not to consider information thus obtained more important or reliable than other relevant intelligence data.

⁵⁷Cf., e.g., Sisley Huddleton, *op. cit.*, p. 230; Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (London: Macmillan, 1955), p. 101.

AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

by Gerhard Rosegger

POSTWAR international developments have not dealt kindly with the traditional institutions of the law of nations. One of the concepts which has undergone radical transformation under the stresses of the East-West conflict is "neutrality." Thus it is all the more interesting that the international law of neutrality was revived in 1955 to settle the status of newly independent Austria in the community of nations.

It is the purpose of this paper to examine Austria's commitment to permanent neutrality in the light of the country's international economic situation. Specifically, we shall investigate the extent to which Austria's status as a neutral affects, or is compatible with, her attitudes toward the process of European integration. This requires, first, a clarification of Austria's economic interests, which can be accomplished by applying certain—albeit incomplete—criteria of "trade dependence." On the basis of these data, an attempt will be made to establish a rationale for Austrian policy toward European economic integration.

THE PROBLEM OF TRADE DEPENDENCE

In order to assess the extent to which economic interests play a role in Austrian neutrality policy, these have to be expressed in quantitative terms. The notion of "trade dependence" is applied in a twofold sense: it is used, first, to determine the extent to which the Austrian economy is dependent on international trade in the aggregate; and it is also used to examine the geographic distribution of Austrian foreign trade and thus identify Austria's dependence on specific foreign markets.

Table I shows Austrian national income, imports and exports (all in current Austrian schillings), and imports and exports as percentages of national income for the years 1952 through 1961. While these percentages constitute a crude measure of trade dependence, the fact of Austria's strong international economic ties nevertheless emerges clearly.

The imbalance in trade is normally compensated for on service account, where tourist trade provides the major share of foreign

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TABLE I
AUSTRIAN NATIONAL INCOME, IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

Year	National Income	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
		in billions of Austrian schillings		as percentage of National Income	
1952	63.8	13.96	10.80	21.9	16.9
1953	63.2	13.26	13.19	21.0	20.9
1954	71.1	16.99	15.85	23.9	22.3
1955	81.1	23.06	18.17	28.4	22.4
1956	89.6	25.32	22.08	28.3	24.6
1957	98.5	29.34	25.44	29.8	25.8
1958	101.9	27.91	23.87	27.4	23.4
1959	107.6	29.76	25.16	27.7	23.4
1960	118.3	36.82	29.12	31.1	24.6
1961	128.7	38.60	31.26	30.0	24.3

Source: Computed from international trade statistics in *Monatsberichte* (Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung), various issues.

exchange income. The bulk of Austrian exports consists traditionally of manufactures, various categories of which amount to over 70 per cent of total exports. It is a further indication of Austria's trade dependence that the Index of Industrial Production rose by 87 per cent between 1953 and 1961, while exports of industrial products increased approximately 160 per cent in the same period. In the aggregate, national income expanded 102 per cent between 1952 and 1961, while imports rose by 177 per cent and exports by 189 per cent.

If we observe next the geographic distribution of Austria's foreign trade for the years 1958—when the European Economic Community became operative—and 1961 (see Table II), several facts become apparent. (1) Austria is heavily dependent upon trade with Western Europe, and within this area it is the EEC countries which account for the bulk of imports and exports. The most important EEC partner is Western Germany, which alone accounts for 42.8 per cent of total imports and 27.5 per cent of total exports. Austria's trade with the EEC expanded considerably during this three-year period; thus far, neither imports nor exports have been seriously affected by the trade diversion that might result as tariffs within the EEC are abolished and economic

TABLE II
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF AUSTRIAN FOREIGN TRADE, 1958 AND 1961
(in billions of Austrian schillings, and as percentages of
total trade and percentage change, 1958-1961)

	1958				1961				Change, 1958-1961	
	Imports		Exports		Imports		Exports		Imports	Exports
	Bill. Sch.	%	Bill. Sch.	%	Bill. Sch.	%	Bill. Sch.	%	%	%
Western Europe	18.654	66.8	14.924	62.5	28.475	73.8	20.792	66.5	52.6	39.3
of this:										
E.E.C.	15.169	54.3	11.845	49.6	22.980	59.5	15.488	49.5	51.5	30.8
E.F.T.A.	3.140	11.3	2.489	10.4	4.890	12.7	4.494	14.4	55.7	80.5
Eastern Europe*	3.464	12.4	3.647	15.3	4.624	12.0	5.479	17.5	33.5	50.2
U.S.A.	2.818	10.1	1.177	4.9	2.287	5.9	1.200	3.8	-18.9	1.9
Other Countries	2.974	10.7	4.122	17.3	3.218	8.3	3.791	12.2	8.2	-8.1
Total	27.910		23.870		38.604		31.262		38.3	31.0

*Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia

Source: Computed from *Statistisches Handbuch für die Republik Österreich 1960* (Wien, Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt, 1960), p. 111; *Monatsberichte* (Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung), Vol. XXXV, No. 3, March 1962, p. 146.

ties among member countries are strengthened. (2) Austrian membership in the European Free Trade Association is reflected in the substantial expansion of trade, especially of exports, with the other countries of this group; however, in absolute figures this still represents a share no greater than that of Austria's third major trading partner, Eastern Europe. (3) Although commercial relations with the Soviet bloc have been beset by a variety of problems,¹ the communist countries' share in total trade has remained remarkably steady. (4) Overseas trade has fluctuated widely throughout the postwar era; the period under study reflects the fact that Austria has never succeeded in gaining a firm and stable foothold in markets outside Europe.

Austria's economic dependence upon trade with the European Economic Community is the most important factor which Vienna must take into account as it seeks to reconcile the commitments of neutrality with economic realities. To argue the reverse, as the Soviet Union and the Austrian Communist Party have done on occasion—that the geographic structure of trade ought to be a dependent variable of a policy of "economic neutrality"—is clearly an impossible demand upon an economy such as Austria's, which is oriented so considerably toward foreign trade. In today's highly competitive world markets, a small country has to trade wherever it can find partners. To state this is not to deny the importance of a consistent trade policy, but to emphasize that there is little room for purely political considerations in the shaping of this policy.

AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY: ITS ORIGIN AND IMPLICATIONS

Austria's commitment to permanent neutrality arose directly from the protracted efforts to conclude a State Treaty. In negotiations which stretched from 1947 to 1954, the representatives of the four Great Powers failed to find an acceptable *modus* for an independent Austria. Soviet obstructionism, which was primarily responsible for these delays, can be traced to several factors. Most important was a desire to assure Austria's non-involvement in the military framework of the Western Alliance and to prevent any resurgence of German political and economic influence in Austria. In connection with this latter objective the problem of former German assets in Austria, which had been taken over by the Soviets in their Zone of Occupation, proved especially difficult.

¹Cf. Gerhard Rosegger, "East-West Trade: The Austrian Example, 1945-1958," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (April 1962), pp. 79-95.

AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Since the Western Powers had renounced all claims to German assets located in their respective zones, the opposing views on the future disposition of these properties seemed irreconcilable.

The apparently stalemated negotiations were given a new turn when Austria proposed, at the Berlin Foreign Ministers' meeting in 1954, a formal neutrality declaration as a means of allaying Soviet anxiety about Austria's status in Europe. To pursue this line further, an Austrian delegation was invited to Moscow in April 1955. With the major objective, Austria's effective separation from NATO, assured, the Soviet government showed itself willing to arrive at a workable solution to the German assets problem. The outcome of these negotiations was the Moscow Memorandum of April 15, 1955. In it, Austria undertook to commit itself "to practice a neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland."² The Soviet Union declared its readiness, on this basis, to sign the Austrian State Treaty without further delay. The treaty, signed in Vienna on May 15, 1955, contains no reference to Austrian neutrality; however, Article 2 assures and guarantees the "independence and territorial integrity of Austria," and Article 4 specifically prohibits a "political or economic union between Austria and Germany."

Austria fulfilled its part of the bargain with the USSR on October 26, 1955, when Parliament passed a Constitutional Federal Statute (*Bundesverfassungsgesetz*) containing a formal declaration of neutrality. Under international law, this act of "municipal legislation" did not in itself create a status of neutrality. This was attained only after official recognition of the declaration had been received from the Great Powers.

Thus Austria became the only "permanent neutral" besides Switzerland. While Swiss experience and practices might be expected to provide a model for Austrian policy, the Swiss example was mentioned only in the Moscow Declaration; since then it has become apparent that the economic and political dissimilarities between the two countries are so great as to render that example almost meaningless. As a matter of fact, shortly after making the neutrality declaration Austria deviated from the Swiss model by applying for membership in the United Nations.

While the Neutrality Statute was careful to assert that the declaration was made of Austria's own free will ("*aus freien Stücken*"), there can be little doubt that the political origin of

²H. Siegler, editor, *Österreichs Weg zur Souveränität, Neutralität, Prosperität 1945-1959* (Wien: Siegler and Co. KG, 1959), p. 62.

the declaration places Austria in the awkward position not only of having to follow its own interpretation of international law and neutrality, but also of having to listen to Moscow's frequently given advice in the matter. The country's geographic position and its substantial economic ties with the Soviet bloc clearly compound the problems of finding a workable neutrality policy. The Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Bruno Kreisky, hinted at these problems in a Parliamentary debate on relations with the EEC: "Whether international lawyers discuss a question like this [Austria's membership in the EEC] or whether the Austrian Federal Government discusses it with one of the great powers, are two different things."³

Thus, while Austria had gained independence and had assumed a clearly defined international *legal* status, it was left with the task of reconciling this status with the fast-evolving economic and political realities of European economic integration. Had Austrian hopes with regard to EFTA been fulfilled, these questions might have been answered within the broader framework of multilateral negotiations between the Six and the Seven. The then Austrian Chancellor, Ing. Julius Raab, left little doubt about the country's interest in joining the Free Trade Association:

The real reason for the Free Trade Association must be to find an appropriate basis for negotiations for multilateral cooperation with the EEC and to strengthen the bargaining position of the individual non-members of the EEC through their membership in an organized group.⁴

These hopes were of course not fulfilled. It was then expected that Britain, the *primus inter pares* of EFTA, would serve as a wedge, if not as a precedent, for coming to terms with the EEC. With the collapse of these efforts, the members of the Outer Seven found renewed unity and decided to strengthen the organization for a prolonged life. Austria, however, made it perfectly clear that, because of its especially heavy dependence upon trade with the EEC, it would have to seek some sort of accommodation with the Community and could not afford to participate in what pessimists fear might become a trade war between the Six and the Seven.

An examination of the implications of Austrian neutrality shows that the October 1955 statute specifies only three duties for neutral Austria: not to join alliances, not to permit foreign military

³"Austria's European Choice," *Economist* (London), January 30, 1960, pp. 437-38.

⁴*Austrian Information* (New York), December 5, 1959.

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bases on Austrian territory, and to defend the country's independence. These particular duties conform to the traditional concept of neutrality which becomes a guide to action only in the event of an armed conflict between third parties. In addition, the economic obligations of neutrals in wartime are stipulated by the Hague Convention of 1907 and by a body of precedent, to which Switzerland and the United States have contributed a great deal.

But in Austria's case we are dealing with a further obligation, implicit in the legal process by which neutrality was established, namely the obligation to permanent neutrality. This permanent status involves duties which are to be performed in time of peace as well as war. The Swiss interpretation is unequivocal: As a general rule, the neutral state must not undertake any obligations vis-à-vis other states which may force it into behavior contrary to neutrality in time of war, i.e., into behavior not consistent with the traditional law of neutrality, which is operative only in a war.

Austria's views have deviated from the Swiss in many instances. However, in the case of economic integration the commitment to permanent neutrality has been taken to mean that Austria cannot become a member of any regional organization if such membership requires Austria to yield sovereignty and independence in decision-making to the organization. The criterion which has guided Switzerland and Austria lies in the voting arrangements of such organizations: Wherever decisions binding for all members are arrived at through majority vote, there occurs an impairment of sovereignty incompatible with the commitment to permanent neutrality.

When we apply this yardstick to the problem of Austrian membership in the EEC, even as it is presently constituted, it becomes evident that Austria could not join the Community as a full member without violating its legal commitment to permanent neutrality. In addition, the EEC has made it clear that political integration in yet more intensive form is its ultimate objective, although no specific plans have been spelled out. For Austria to become a full member and thus implicitly to accept "political implications" not yet spelled out would seem to be illegal in the face of undertakings voluntarily assumed.

This conclusion raises the question of whether such legal obligations are overriding in the face of economic reality. The basic obligation under international law still leaves considerable room

for the formulation of a realistic neutrality policy. Austrian spokesmen have made it clear on repeated occasions that they feel in no way obligated to pursue the kind of ideological and economic neutrality the Soviet Union appears to have in mind for the country. It would appear that the *law* of permanent neutrality, the basic constraint placed upon any Austrian policy, is in no way directly relevant to economic policy questions. The obligation to maintain an independence in peacetime which will assure neutrality in the eventuality of war is difficult to translate into economic terms.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTEGRATION POLICY

Austria's dependence on trade with the EEC and its exclusion from full membership in the Community are the two basic premises upon which any long-range policy has to be built. The specific shape of this policy has been the subject of a prolonged debate in Austria. The vagaries of international politics and the peculiarities of government by a socialist-conservative coalition have so far prevented the development of a clear-cut concept for integration policy.

While it is an oversimplification to distinguish Austrian views on integration along party lines (both major parties have on occasion split ranks in the integration debate), it is probably fair to say that it has taken the Socialists longer to accept the success of the EEC as a fact of life. But economic interest has generally prevailed over party doctrine, and calls for *Realpolitik* have meant different things to different groups. Austrian policy to date has been characterized more by a pragmatic adaptation to the needs of the day, national and international, than by any consistent approach to the problem of integration. Meanwhile, there are signs of growing disenchantment with this *Politik des Weiterwurstelns* (the policy of muddling through). More and more voices have been raised in favor of an unequivocal statement of the bases upon which the Austrian government proposes to formulate its integration policy. Such an approach, it is hoped, would prevent a repeat of the predicament in which Austria found itself after the collapse of the British-EEC negotiations.

In the initial stages of the European integration movement, Austria adopted a narrow interpretation of the obligations of neutrality which severely circumscribed its policies toward integration. In 1959, the then Socialist Secretary of State in the

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Foreign Ministry (now the Foreign Minister), Kreisky, stated: "A neutral country must not accept any obligations—political, economic, or other—which would tend to impair its neutrality in wartime."⁵ This view did not go unchallenged at the time, and since then it has undergone considerable revision.

There are several policies which Austria, in view of its legal obligations and economic realities, cannot pursue. Clearly, a policy of autarky as a form of "economic independence" is out of the question. Similarly, the mere maintenance of the present geographic distribution of trade cannot assure independence of the kind enjoyed today; on the contrary, this may lead to economic and political subservience in a continually changing world market structure. We have already considered the impossibility of the Soviet interpretation, which aims at a "more even distribution of trade," i.e., more trade with the Soviet bloc. Finally, independence may be taken to mean the absence of any kind of formal commitment in any framework of international economic cooperation. But isolation does not assure independence; besides, Austria has already abandoned this alternative by joining EFTA and a number of other economic bodies.

Having ruled out these possibilities, we are left with the question: In what form, and by what procedures, can Austria come to terms with its major trading partner, the EEC, without violating its commitment to permanent neutrality?

The solution to this question may have been easier to find while there was still hope for an early accommodation between the EEC and Great Britain. Austria had indicated, in its memorandum to the EEC of July 28, 1962, its desire for an "economic arrangement with the European Economic Community . . . which takes cognizance of the maintenance of its permanent neutrality and its international obligation . . . but on the other hand does not encroach upon the integrity of the EEC." So stated, this was no more than an indication of basic intent, while the settlement of details could be conveniently postponed until British entry was arranged. But as the Belgian Foreign Minister, Henri Fayat, pointed out in a speech to the Austrian Foreign Policy Association in March 1962, this general statement hardly constituted a solid basis for actual negotiations: ". . . it is first of all the

⁵B. Kreisky, "Austria Draws the Balance," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2 (January 1959), p. 275. For a discussion of the political background of the integration debate, cf. A. Vodopivec, *Wer regiert in Österreich?* (Vienna, 1960), p. 202 ff.

obligation of the Austrian government to define exactly the form and content of an association. . . ."⁶ In using the term "association" he had actually gone farther than the Austrian memorandum.

In the present situation, there is no real precedent upon which an association with the EEC could be based. There was, of course, no assurance that a British-EEC arrangement would have provided an exact pattern for Austrian terms with the Community, but there seemed to exist a consensus among Austrian government officials that the Brussels negotiations would provide at least some more time, if not guidance, for arriving at an understanding for talks with the EEC. The one existing case of an association under Article 238 of the Rome Treaty, that of Greece, is of no assistance to Austria. This association agreement expresses a clear intent to lay the groundwork for the eventual full membership of Greece. These are exactly the terms on which an association of a permanent neutral would be impossible.

Thus it remains the task of Austria to find terms upon which its participation in the process of integration would be possible. The decision of the three European neutrals, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden—following the collapse of multilateral efforts through EFTA—to proceed separately in coming to an arrangement with the EEC reflects the fact that their basic economic interests differ greatly. Neither Sweden nor Switzerland depends as heavily upon trade with the EEC as does Austria. Sweden is not committed to neutrality under international law, but follows a policy of neutrality based on its own national interests. Switzerland views its tradition of neutrality much more narrowly than Austria and would probably find Austrian terms for association unacceptable. Finally, both Switzerland and Sweden currently have tariff levels considerably lower than Austria's, so for them time is not as important a factor. Austria can minimize the disruptions which will undoubtedly result from an association with the EEC only if an agreement is reached in the near future, before EEC tariff levels get too far out of line with Austrian tariff levels.

Austria could tie itself to the EEC, at a minimum, by some loose "arrangement" of commercial policy within the structure of GATT, and subject to the most-favored-nation clause; or, at the most, by an association restricted only by reservations

⁶H. Fayat, "Die Entwicklung der Europäischen Integration," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik*, Vol. II, No. 4 (June 1962), pp. 195-205.

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concerning the purely military-political implications of neutrality. Austrian interests seem to dictate a form of association which would maximize its economic links to the EEC. This is not to say that the present members of the EEC will welcome the neutrals with open arms and be ready to grant a wide range of concessions. Both Professor Walter Hallstein and M. Paul-Henri Spaak, as spokesmen for the Community, have on occasion expressed considerable impatience with the whole concept of neutrality; Spaak, especially, has questioned whether the provisions for association in the Rome Treaty were really designed for countries which would have to be granted permanent exemptions from the "political ideal" of the EEC. The following statement, however, probably reflects the attitude which would greet Austria's application for association:

We must guard against a feeling of unreasonable resentment arising from the suspicions that the neutral States may be trying to get something for nothing; that neutrality somehow is unfair in the modern world. This might be so were neutrality a policy whose adoption is being discussed. But it is not: it is an existing status—a fact that cannot be changed but which might be overcome. This assessment of neutrality, as a status rather than a policy, can only be sustained provided that the neutral States seek neither to give it too narrow an interpretation nor to include within it points of policy on matters other than neutrality.⁷

From the foregoing remarks, one can conclude that, while Austria may gain political dispensations in order to reconcile an association agreement with its neutrality status, any hopes for economic exceptions because of Austria's special position may well be misplaced. The tenor of the current Austrian debate leads one to suspect that this point is not recognized with full clarity in Vienna.

The fears that Austria may be trying to get "something for nothing" will be overcome only if Austria seeks a form of EEC association in which it accepts all the economic obligations and privileges compatible with a broad interpretation of neutrality. Only on this basis can Austria expect to be able to participate in the formulation of EEC economic and trade policies, instead of being presented by the full members with one *fait accompli* after another—which Vienna may or may not find acceptable. Such an "association with a right of co-determination," with its

⁷Part II, "The Problems of Neutrality," Report of the Political Commission of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, given by Mr. Maurice Macmillan, May 9, 1962. Reprinted in *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik*, Vol II, No. 4 (June 1962), pp. 239-246.

basic features outlined by Austria before negotiations begin, may provide a workable frame of reference for an association agreement. With these terms clearly spelled out in detail, and with Austria's participation in the councils of the EEC assured, that country's inability to submit to majority decisions of an international body which are contrary to its interpretation of neutrality may prove not to be an insuperable political problem. In any case, only if Austria were assured of some voice in the decision-making processes of the EEC could it defend itself against Soviet accusations of a sellout to Western economic and political interests.

Once these political problems are solved, there remains the equally difficult task of adjusting Austrian economic policies to the realities of integration. Time would seem to be of the essence. A critical "growing apart" of the structure of the Austrian economy from that of the EEC is a possibility.

What Austria seems to need most is some decisive action by its government—action based on a clearly-stated concept of the Austrian position. Austrian statesmen might act on the words of M. Jean Rey, Belgian member of the EEC Commission: "One likes to argue about tariffs and quotas, while, as experience shows, one can soon reach agreement about vehicles and whiskey. Instead of debating *ad infinitum* about the theory of association, would it not be much more reasonable to start dealing with hard facts?"⁸

⁸J. Rey, "Die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und ihre Beziehungen zu Drittländern," *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. XV, No. 13-14 (July 1960), pp. 433-441.

Reviews

WHEN BRITAIN BESTRODE
THE MIDDLE EAST*

by Ferdinand Kuhn

It is now fifty years since Britain first stood as the paramount power from the eastern Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea. In Middle Eastern history, fifty years is but a flick of time; yet against the background of our fast-changing century, Britain's period of dominance was a long one.

At the height of her power in the region, Britain ruled Egypt in all but name; she also controlled Arabia, Palestine and Mesopotamia. There was even a British flotilla on the Caspian, and for a short time in 1919 travelers from Teheran to Constantinople by way of the Caucasus could sleep in a British Army mess each night. Now Britain's presence is reduced to the pinpoints of Bahrein and Aden. The landscape remains, but the political landmarks have gone. How Britain established its power, used it, and lost it—this is the subject-matter of Elizabeth Monroe's penetrating study, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956*.

Miss Monroe roamed the Middle East as a correspondent of *The Economist* from 1945 to 1958. Had she not been writing for a journal that gives no by-lines, her name

**Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956*. By Elizabeth Monroe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. 254 pp. \$5.00.

would be better known to American readers. As an *Economist* reviewer wrote, she "sprinkled stardust" over its pages through those years. There is hardly a corner of the Middle East which she does not know except, perhaps, the Empty Quarter of Arabia and one or two sheikdoms where a woman correspondent is not yet welcome. Since 1958 she has been studying at Oxford as a graduate Fellow at St. Antony's Centre of Middle Eastern Studies.

Her scholarly training has enabled her to make intelligent use of the public and private memoirs about her "moment"; she knows who is telling the truth and who is not. As a good journalist, she strips away the irrelevancies and keeps her story moving. In only one chapter does her narrative bog down in research: a twenty-page section on "The Role of Oil in British Government Policy," a paper originally written for St. Antony's. Otherwise her method is straightforward and, for the most part, chronological.

Starting with World War I and its immediate aftermath—the years when Britain planted the grapes of wrath in the Middle East—she covers "the years of good management" from 1922 to 1945; the rise of nationalist resistance and the ebb of British self-confidence; the "years of impotence" from 1945 to 1954; and, finally, the Suez adventure and the collapse of British influence that followed. The history ranges widely from the Sudan to the edge

of India; but through it, at all stages, runs one persistent theme, the Palestine problem. Suez was only the incident that brought Britain's reign in the Middle East to an end. Palestine was the cancer that slowly, fatally, undermined British control.

Ever since "man's first disobedience," few lapses have brought such continuing punishment as Britain's conflicting promises to Arabs and Zionists, Arabs and French, in the heat of World War I. Britain, unlike Adam and Eve, had at least an excuse: she had to win a life-or-death war. To stir up Arab revolt against the Turks, Sir Henry McMahon loosely promised independence in an area which the Arabs thought would include Palestine. To rally Jews in Russia and the United States, Mr. Balfour in 1917 promised a Jewish National Home.

According to Monroe, who has dug deeply into the source materials, only one man saw clearly in 1917 that these contradictions would haunt the British in future years. He happened to be an American, William Yale. A former Standard Oil agent in Cairo, Yale had moved by 1917 to State Department employ. In his reports from Cairo he predicted eventual trouble over the respective numbers of Arabs and Jews in the Holy Land. "No one whose words have yet come to light," says Monroe, "showed the prescience of William Yale." The Yale papers are open for research in the State Department archives. (Would the authors of *The Ugly American* please consult them!) They show that about

the Middle East, at any rate, the United States government was not as uninformed or misinformed as it was, for example, about Russia in those critical years. The British seem to have had no official reporter comparable to William Yale; British leaders themselves showed no public or private awareness of the gathering storm.

In unraveling the Palestine tangle, Monroe separates a good many strands of fact and folklore. Thus she reminds us that the Sherif Hussein of Mecca originally did not oppose international control of Palestine or Jewish settlement there. What kindled Arab anger against Britain was not the promise to the Zionists but the secret commitments about Syria made to and with the French in the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1915. If Hussein had known that the French were to control the interior of Syria, says Monroe, he might never have joined the Allies. Then there might have been no revolt in the desert and, alas, no *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*.

It was Hitler who finally made Britain's problem in Palestine unmanageable—and he, Monroe tells us, did not intend to. He wanted only to rid his thousand-year Reich of the Jews. He did not foresee that his escaping victims would flock to Palestine, collide with the Arabs there, and produce two armed rebellions at once against British rule.

Monroe writes of people as well as policies; this adds fascination to her story. Especially during World War I and the upheavals that followed, the Britons in the Middle East were a galaxy of talents. In

Cairo they included D. G. Hogarth with his scholarship, Ronald Storrs with his wit and brilliance, and Lawrence himself; in Basra, the wisest of the lot, Sir Percy Cox, and his flashing satellite, Gertrude Bell. Reading their letters and memoirs, leafing through Eric Kennington's portraits of the Cairo group in *Seven Pillars*, watching the film, "Lawrence of Arabia," one thinks of these Britons almost as demigods. It is one of the many virtues of Monroe's book that it brings the demigods down to earth.

All were honorable men. At the same time all were infected with what General George C. Marshall used to call local-itis. The Cairo group promoted the Arab revolt under Hussein's leadership; the Basra group objected, and built up Ibn Saud as a leader; the Foreign Office in London stood by the secret pledges to the French; a young brain trust under Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian), working in huts in the garden of 10 Downing Street, championed the Zionists. And far off the stage the Government of India, an empire in its own right, dragged its feet in the war against Turkey for fear of antagonizing India's Moslems. "I see five governments," said the Sherif Hussein. Who could blame him?

Historians do not usually write of parallels and precedents — unless they are Dr. Toynbee and his imitators, of whom Monroe is not one. Only occasionally does she suggest an analogy or discuss a might-have-been—as when she hints at the dire results had the British and French had to make good their secret

pledge to give Constantinople to Russia after 1918. But this American reader cannot help seeing certain parallels with the position of his own country in heathen parts today. Britain, let it be remembered, exerted her power in the Middle East through subsidies—economic and military aid—to local leaders. Walter Lippmann would call them "clients": Feisal on the throne of Iraq, his brother Abdullah in Jordan, and Ibn Saud, who became reasonably friendly. Turkey and Iran were in the hands of energetic dictators who did not threaten the British route to India, and therefore could be tolerated. By "a serene combination" of power and flexibility, the British kept other powers out and kept the Middle East more or less at peace.

Then they lost it. What went wrong? One of the British errors, already mentioned, was local-itis. (Is it too much to hope that American ambassadors and generals abroad might read this book and profit from it?) Another British error was favoritism: according to Monroe, "The Englishman felt at home with Iraqis, and indeed with all Arabs untouched by the Sorbonne, in a way that he seldom did with any of their neighbors except the Turks." Toward Egyptians in particular the Englishman — and Englishwoman—in the Middle East felt disdain and dislike. Substitute the Americans who feel "at home" with Pakistanis but not with Indians, with Thais but not with Cambodians, and the moral is plain.

Still another British mistake,

with present-day American relevance, was to choose the wrong informants and friends. Those Middle Easterners who appreciated the British and what they stood for, says Monroe, "were the older men with vested interests, who feared the birth of left-wing ideas that might lead to encroachment on privilege, and who counted on British conservatism to retard the pace of change." In return, "Britain relied on these kings and pashas and rich merchants." Can anyone honestly contend that the United States has avoided the same error, in Latin America or in Asia?

Sitting on the sidelines, it is easy to say that ambassadors should cultivate the younger nationalists and revolutionaries. An ambassador, after all, is accredited to a government; and governments in the Middle East during "Britain's moment" consisted of older men with a built-in resistance to change. But an ambassador should at least appraise correctly. This is what British diplomats, in Monroe's account, too often failed to do. (Again one thinks, ruefully, of the American ambassadors who were surprised by the Iraqi revolution of 1958 and the Turkish of 1960.) Consider Monroe: "Though an ambassador cannot himself hobnob with resistance movements, he has ample access to information about them. Members of his staff . . . all meet every shade of opinion in the ordinary course of their duties. But their estimates vary widely, and at some point in the process of policy-making their information has to pass through the filter of one man's

mind. For exactly one generation, a succession of such British representatives weighed the evidence, but . . . usually saw the Middle East through the spectacles of convention, of British authority, and—in the case of the Arabs—of friendship with loyal but ageing men."

Monroe makes a brave attempt to describe and explain what she calls "the decline of British nerve." She is not the first writer to have tried. The late John Strachey brooded about the dissolution of the modern empires, and found his most satisfying clue in economics: the empires were not worth what they cost.¹ In seeking her own clue, Monroe gives much credit to the Liberal and Laborite anti-imperialists in the first and second decades of the century: to J. A. Hobson, Graham Wallas, E. D. Morel and the rest. It was they who pricked the conscience of the British Establishment. It was they who dared to challenge what had been Holy Writ in the late Victorian years.

In the period of exhaustion after World War I, we read, anti-imperialism gained a hold on the British voting public. The mandates system of the League of Nations "suggested to many onlookers that all talk of liberating small nations from oppression was so much cant." The massacre at Amritsar in 1919 left the British people "sickened at the prospect of shooting more Asians"—in the Middle East as in India. The Irish troubles at Britain's back door led to "a loss of imperial nerve

¹*The End of Empire* (New York: Random House, 1960).

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greater than most people dared to admit."

All this was true—but was it the whole truth? Does Monroe seriously believe that a volley into a crowd in the Punjab, or a series of murders and counter-murders in Ireland, was enough to change the thinking of the British people? Surely it must have been some shattering experience in their own lives that shook their old ideas about the Empire. As one who lived in England between the two wars, I would say that the traumatic experience was World War I—in particular, the trench warfare of France and Flanders. The carnage on the Western Front, the casualty lists week after week, month after month, the daily departures of the leave trains from Victoria Station to the furnace across the Channel—these were without precedent in British history. British attitudes toward war and bloodshed were never the same again.

By the time Kipling died in 1936, Englishmen had lost their zest for fighting in the Middle East or anywhere—so long as their own survival was not at stake. Hitler represented a threat to life itself. But when it came to Egyptians, Zionists, Arabs or Cypriots, more and more Britons felt that no quarrel was worth the death of a single Grenadier Guard. It was therefore pacifism even more than anti-imperialism which hastened the British departure from the Middle East.

If proof were needed, it came during the Suez crisis of 1956. Perhaps half the British public, according to a Gallup poll at the time,

refused to support their Prime Minister's military adventure. The account of Suez in this book will not give Lord Avon (Anthony Eden) much pleasure. The Eden plan of action, Monroe says, embodied "three of the worst mistakes a government can make—miscalculation of world opinion, bad military timing, and the choice of an inconvenient ally." Contrary to official British contentions, U.S. statesmen had made it plain repeatedly in 1956 that they opposed and would oppose the use of force. The Prime Minister went ahead anyway, and in secret—perhaps, Monroe suggests, because illness and surgery had overstrained his powers.

For all its criticisms of those in authority, this is not a querulous book. It is worthy of its theme. Teachers and students will thank Miss Monroe for a chapter-by-chapter annotated bibliography that is a model of its kind. They will thank her even more for the compression, the style and the insight of her work. When someone dares to write the history of the British Empire, *Britain's Moment* can serve as a pattern for the section on the Decline and Fall.

POLAND CONTESTED*

by *Hans Kohn*

From the middle of the eighteenth century on, Poland, an ancient kingdom in eastern Europe, was contested, divided and fought

**Poland Between East and West. Soviet and German Diplomacy Toward Poland, 1919-1933.* By Josef Korbel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 321 pp. \$6.50.

over by Prussia (where Frederick II took the initiative for Poland's first partition) and Russia (where Catherine II wished to open the road to the West by the destruction of the Polish barrier). By the end of the eighteenth century Russia and Prussia had a common frontier as a result of Poland's partition. Common interests and common political ideologies maintained for one hundred years a close Prussian-Russian friendship. This ended with the approach of World War I, which found the two nations in opposite camps. The unexpected outcome of the war—the simultaneous defeat of Russia and of Prussia which meanwhile had incorporated the rest of Germany—made possible the rise of an independent Poland after 150 years of partition.

This turn of events did not change geographic realities. Poland found herself again between Russia and Germany; as soon as the two defeated nations regained some of their power, the by now historical pattern of maneuvering and unrest reappeared. Both the Soviet Union and Germany opposed the acquisition by Poland of its eastern and western borderlands. An exciting diplomatic game began, in which the three countries were involved but which also had wide European repercussions, and became the immediate cause of the war of 1939. Josef Korbel, director of the Social Science Foundation at the University of Denver and formerly a Czechoslovak diplomat, has performed a masterly job in his effort to unravel this diplomatic

tangle. In his book, *Poland Between East and West*, he has made good use of the files of the German Foreign Office and the private papers of leading Germans which have recently become available. Until the improbable opening of the Soviet archives, his book will remain the definitive study of German and Soviet diplomacy toward Poland after the First World War.

Korbel does not concentrate on Polish foreign policy. The Poles based their policy upon an exalted overestimation of their strength and importance and disregarded the possibility that the 1919 power relationship in central eastern Europe, so uniquely favorable to Poland, might change as time went on. The new Poland was not the result of Polish strength but of the international system built on the treaties of 1919 and the League of Nations. In a fatal misunderstanding of changing political realities, Poland's rulers did their share in undermining the system on which their national existence rested. The Germans and the Soviets understandably had rejected this system from the beginning. Their policy was directed toward undermining it and thereby Poland's foundation. Korbel's book deals primarily with Soviet and German diplomacy in their complex relationship with Poland and with each other.

The two powers played an involved diplomatic contest, sometimes taking concerted action, though with different emphasis, sometimes viewing each other as rivals and competitors. The one at-

titude they shared throughout was expressed by the German Foreign Minister, Gustav Stresemann, in his directive to the major German embassies on March 21, 1927: "It was not in Germany's interest to have the Western powers participate as arbitrators and guarantors in the settlement of East European questions, which, as far as big powers were concerned, interested only Russia and Germany." The same point of view was held by Hitler and Stalin. It was this German and Soviet "Monroe doctrine" against "raumfremde Mächte," as Hitler called it, which twenty years after the peace treaties of 1919 doomed the short-lived independence of the central eastern European nations, a result to which they had contributed by their disunity and frontier disputes.

The diplomatic game played by Germany and the Soviet Union between the two wars was made even more complex by the controversies within the leadership of each of these two powers. On the Soviet side, George V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs from 1918 to 1930, and on the German side, Count Ulrich Brockdorff-Rantzau, German ambassador to Moscow, and General Hans von Seeckt, commander of the Reichswehr, were convinced of the necessity for close German-Soviet co-operation in an "aggressive diplomacy" toward Poland. But in both countries advocates of an opposite policy were also to be found. On one point the Germans were, however, united: on the rejection of their 1920 boundaries with Poland.

The question dividing German politicians in the Weimar period was whether to change these boundaries with the help of the West or of Moscow. It is interesting to note that some Germans today seek the restoration of the 1920-1937 borders with Poland, borders deemed entirely unacceptable to German public opinion then. At present the Germans rely on Western support to regain those territories which, as the result of the war started by Germany against Poland in 1939, have been recovered by Poland.

Such reflections carry us, however, beyond the period with which Korbel deals. He concludes his narrative, which is highlighted by brilliant character sketches of the leading personalities, with the advent of Hitler to power and the Declaration of Non-Aggression and Friendship between fascist Germany and semi-fascist Poland of January 26, 1934. A new period in Polish-German, Polish-Soviet, and German-Soviet relations began, which ended surprisingly with the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression of August 23, 1939 between fascist Germany and communist Russia. One week later, Germany invaded Poland. As a result, the country was once more partitioned between Germany and the Soviet Union.

It is to be hoped that the story of these turbulent six years, 1934-1939, during which Poland closely cooperated with Nazi Germany, will soon be told, in continuation of the present book, by Professor Korbel. The objectivity and fair-

ness of his presentation, the clarity of his style, and his understanding of the methods and purposes of diplomacy make him highly qualified for telling a story which even under today's changed circumstances may help to throw new light on present political moves and motives.

STEWARD OF THE GERMAN
ECONOMY*

by Robert Strausz-Hupé

In his recent book, *The Economics of Success*, Dr. Ludwig Erhard addresses himself to a great variety of issues, some ephemeral and some abiding. The first entry is an article published in the *Neue Zeitung* on December 31, 1945; the last, a speech on January 15, 1962 in which Dr. Erhard, having completed his talks with the late President Kennedy, discusses United States plans for closer Atlantic economic cooperation. These two statements bracket the history of Germany's rise from the ruins of the Second World War to its position of economic leadership in Western Europe today. In this book, published originally in German before he became Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, Erhard records the fabulous development which, at home and abroad, has been hailed as the German "economic miracle." Erhard does not relish this term, nor does he, as a less modest man might, claim the credit for an achievement which most of his countrymen have come

to view as being virtually synonymous with his uninterrupted stewardship of German economic policy.

Speaking in 1954, to a foreign audience, Erhard said: "There is talk in the world—and I do not like it at all—about a German miracle. I do not accept this term because what has happened in Germany in the past six years is anything but a miracle. It is no more than the fruits of the honest efforts of a whole people, who were given the chance, under liberal principles, to apply human initiative, human freedom and human energies. But if this German example is to have significance abroad, then it can only be by demonstrating to the world at large the blessings of human freedom and economic freedom of action." This passage contains the gist of the principles which guided Erhard throughout his remarkable progress from an obscure professorship to the highest office. Erhard has never tired of expounding the virtues of the "social market economy."

According to Erhard, an economic policy can only be called "social" if it sees to it that economic progress and higher productivity largely benefit the consumer. Free competition, which keeps down profits or unearned income and preserves the dynamism of the economy, protects the consumer's interests. Unswervingly, Erhard, throughout the years of Germany's economic resurgence, "stuck to his guns." Their fire has been directed particularly against cartels. Cartels, as Erhard sees it, give artificial pro-

**The Economics of Success*. By Ludwig Erhard. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1963. 412 pp. \$6.50.

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tection to jobs that are, for the most part, unproductive. He writes: "If you want to create more and better opportunities for employment, if you want to achieve a dynamic expansion of trade, then you must oppose cartels. If you favor protection, then you will support them." Perhaps in no other European country were cartels as vast and powerful as in prewar Germany. It is Erhard's singular achievement to have carried forth the work of decartelization begun by the Occupation authorities into the era of the sovereign West German Republic, equal partner of the Common Market and NATO alliance countries.

No less fervent than Erhard's opposition to entrepreneurial monopolies has been his rejection of trade union monopoly and what, at the time, he deemed the excessive demands of organized labor. Although Erhard played an important role in the reforms which raised not only the income but also the social status of the industrial workers—especially the enactment of the Right of Codetermination Legislation, giving labor a place on the board of directors of large enterprises—he has sought to maintain a sensible balance between just return on capital and fair wages. In brief, at the heart of his economic policies has been the idea of partnership between entrepreneur and worker, profitable investment and social security.

Erhard, so it seems from his tireless rounds of public forums, considers himself first and foremost an educator, calling upon the German

people to abide by the principles of the free market and to exercise those self-restraints without which free institutions cannot endure. In him, the Welfare State has found its most formidable opponent and, by virtue of the demonstrable success of German economic policy, its most persuasive one. Rejecting a proposal for compulsory insurance against social risks, Erhard writes: "The drift towards a welfare and collective state with all its economic and social consequences would become irresistible if we begin to include all gainfully employed people, regardless of whether they are wage earners . . . or are self-employed, in one welfare scheme. . . . At the end of this perilous road stands the 'social serf,' whose material security is guaranteed by an almighty state while economic progress under freedom becomes a thing of the past."

No one can tell how strong are the political and ethical foundations upon which rests the new German society. Erhard has been one of the first of Germany's leaders to point to the dangers of over-expansion at home and of protectionism in the guise of an inward-looking European Common Market. The resurgence of nationalism, and international developments which Germany cannot control, may thwart Erhard's purpose, namely to insure Germany the just rewards of her people's intelligence and industry under a system of social and international responsibility. Yet, his philosophy and the immense success of its practical application challenge those various

statist and "dirigist" schools of thought which have gained ascendancy in many Western countries, including the United States. It is just possible that the makers of our economic policies could derive from Erhard's achievement insights more valuable than those vouchsafed by various fashionable statist, "dirigist" and neo-Keynsian schools of thought.

GUERRILLA WARFARE: THE GAP
IN WESTERN DEFENSES*

by George K. Tanham

One might reasonably ask, since there have been so many in the past few years, why do we need another book on guerrilla warfare? James Cross gives the reason, and a valid one, in the preface to his book, *Conflict in the Shadows*: "Still there seem to have been relatively few Western efforts to review modern unconventional warfare as a whole; to examine, even in general terms, the political, economic and military context in which most guerrilla warfare takes place." His book is an effort to fill that need.

Despite this rather ambitious undertaking, Cross' effort is largely successful. He touches on the causes of unrest and insurgency, the types of unconventional war, including a good chapter on urban insurrection, the impact of technology on guerrilla warfare, and the problems facing governments grappling with insurgency. The last chapters of the book deal with the international

aspects of the problem—how other nations foster and assist insurgency or try to suppress it and what, if anything, international organizations can contribute to the resolution of such problems.

Cross has an excellent background for writing this book. During World War II, he served in the OSS and has been a serious student of guerrilla warfare ever since. His pertinent allusions to past guerrilla wars testify to the breadth of his knowledge and his understanding of the problems of this kind of warfare. His reference to Crane Brinton's classic, *The Anatomy of Revolution*,¹ a work which should be recommended reading for all counterinsurgency students, is most appropriate.

Cross begins by surveying the causes of unrest and potential insurgency in underdeveloped countries. He even goes so far as to suggest the kinds of people who will force the issues. "Those in the population who feel themselves forced into unwelcome transitions and those who feel frustrated and limited by the form and rate of change create strands of tension within the body politic. These men are the potential rebels, the men who may become guerrillas, and the men who, short of that, may openly or secretly support others in insurrection against a government which they feel has failed to understand their needs and protect their interests in a strange, new and bewildering world." Space apparently did not permit Cross the opportunity to probe more deeply the nature

**Conflict in the Shadows*. By James Eliot Cross. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1963. 180 pp. \$3.95.

¹New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952.

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and goals of these frustrated, discontented groups and persons, but he has touched the heart of the matter.

Much has been written on economic underdevelopment as a cause of unrest, but much more needs to be done to explore the psychological problems of emerging peoples. The felt desires and real needs of these people for certain intangibles, e.g., respect, opportunity for advancement (not necessarily financial) and new social relationships and security, are often more important to them than the erection of a new factory or dam, though these are also essential. Some balance in our own assistance efforts must be struck between satisfaction of tangible and intangible needs.

Cross provides a good description of the material difficulties of guerrillas, noting that food, weapons and medical supplies and care are usually scarce and hard to acquire. Mention is also made of the guerrilla's need for support equipment, particularly radios, which would assist their cause, although an overabundance would deprive them of one of their key advantages—mobility. Little is said about the organizational, financial and morale problems of guerrillas, the intangibles which are so difficult to come to grips with.

The question of how much and what kind of weapons and equipment guerrillas should ideally have leads to another question: When does a guerrilla cease to be a guerrilla and become a regular soldier? While the type and amount of

equipment as well as degree of training are important factors, they are not decisive. The significant test is tactics. When guerrillas cease their hit-and-run raids and no longer cautiously select when and where they want to fight, but decide to dig in and hold ground, they become regular soldiers fighting a conventional war. Counter tactics have to be adjusted accordingly.

In communist revolutionary theory, all guerrilla movements strive to reach the final stage when they can overwhelm the opposition in a conventional war. Postwar guerrilla movements have almost never been able to do this, with the possible exception of the Vietminh in Indochina. Some noncommunist ones, e.g., in Cyprus and Algeria, have won before they completed their evolution, and almost all the communist ones, Greece, Malaya and the Philippines, have been defeated. This last fact is contrary to the popular belief that communist guerrillas are everywhere successful.

Most rebels know the guerrilla's path is a long, dangerous and uncertain one, and they are often tempted to take short cuts. Unable, for a variety of reasons, to stage coups or obtain adequate external help for an open take-over, they become impatient and normally resort to the use of terror. Why was terror successful in Cyprus and also in Algeria, and why did it alienate the people in Malaya and force the Red Chinese to issue instructions to halt it? Are some societies more prone to accept terror or are griev-

ances sometimes so strong that the people will accept terror as a means to an end? A foreign occupation force may be less squeamish about the use of terror than the indigenous government, though this is by no means always the case. Why is it that the rebels seem in many cases to "get away" with the use of terror more successfully than legal governments? Is this a real advantage? If so, how much of an advantage is it and what means can be used to counter it? These and other questions on the use and implications of terror are only briefly treated by Cross and deserve to be explored at greater length.

Modern technology is finally being put to use to combat the guerrilla. Helicopters, whose introduction into anti-guerrilla operations was so slow, are now widely used in Vietnam. It was as recently as 1961 that this reviewer, upon asking why more helicopters were not being used, was told they could not be serviced! Efforts are now underway to develop better means of detecting guerrillas and peasants together with their cooking fires, gardens and huts. Defoliation, of which Cross disapproves, may have uses which are not yet fully understood. Light aircraft and helicopters can be used even more effectively than they are now to reduce the guerrilla's advantages of mobility and surprise. They could be used to put mounting pressure on guerrillas so that they tire, use up scarce supplies and become demoralized as harried and hunted men. Imagination, unfettered by conven-

tional tactics, must be employed in order to put to the best use the equipment already available.

However, it would be folly indeed to think that we can suppress insurgency with weapons alone. Ideas, and dedication to them, are absolutely necessary. Guerrillas often have an important advantage, scarcely mentioned in this book, which is difficult to overcome. The hard-core guerrillas are usually highly motivated people who want to bring change to a world impatient for reform and improvement. Uninspired defense of the status quo or the reluctant, half-hearted sponsorship of change are not adequate counters to this challenge. This seems to be the crux of the problem: how to meet the highly motivated challengers, whether their inspiration is hate or love, personal gain, patriotism or a new ideology. In addition to its great material strength, the West must devise ideological and spiritual responses to the challenge of insurgent forces.

The last portion of the book explores nearly virgin territory—the relationship of outside nations to insurgency in a given country. The value of foreign bases or sanctuaries is rightly stressed, although it is not clear whether these bases are merely useful, or indeed an essential requirement, for a successful insurgent movement. The decisive role played by Yugoslavia in closing her borders in 1948 during the Greek civil strife is used to illustrate the value of external bases. The lack of an external base for the terrorists in Malaya is also cited in

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this regard. On the other hand, efficient French control of the borders in Algeria did not dictate the outcome of the Algerian insurgency.

The United States, according to Cross, does not encourage insurgent movements behind the Iron or Bamboo curtains in large part for moral reasons—we simply do not engage in that sort of thing. The lack of a specific program or set of ideas is clearly another cause for Washington's reluctance. Moreover, if we are not certain that a considerable number of people can be aroused to join or aid an insurgent movement, we are reluctant to support such a risky undertaking. One might also argue that, for this same reason, the United States is not doing as well as it should in counterinsurgency. Lastly, he suggests that police states are very efficient in crushing rebellious groups.

Cross' chapter on the international community and unconventional war is disappointing. It does not really address itself to the subject, but discusses the problems of economic aid and other forms of assistance to underdeveloped countries. There is no discussion of the role of the United Nations or regional organizations at this level of conflict, e.g., what are the legal problems of intervention and in what practical ways can these organizations deal with insurgency situations.

In general, however, Cross' admirable survey of the various aspects of guerrilla warfare contributes not only to our understand-

ing of the nature of this kind of conflict and its attendant problems, but also reveals the weaknesses or gaps in our knowledge of the subject. In summary, these shortcomings include a lack of understanding of the real causes of insurgency; inadequate knowledge about the persons and groups who take the lead in forceful and violent change and how to satisfy their nonmaterial needs; and finally, an apparent reluctance to face the problem of the role of terror in society, particularly in an insurgency situation.

These gaps in our knowledge are by no means filled by Cross' book, yet this is an excellent and much needed review of the nature of insurgency by one who is thoroughly familiar with the subject. As the author suggests, guerrilla warfare, where it is difficult to determine whether one is winning or not, is not the kind of situation in which America is most comfortable. Nevertheless, this type of conflict will be with us for some time. *Conflict in the Shadows* provides many insights into the nature of our predicament.

CAN THE WEST WIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM?*

by John F. Melby

Professor Bernard Fall's important and timely book, *The Two Viet-Nams*, is essential reading for anyone who wants to know the facts about the war in Vietnam. It is timely because the crisis in South

**The Two Viet-Nams*. By Bernard Fall. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. 493 pp. \$7.95.

Vietnam has become in recent months more serious and urgent than at any time since 1954. It is an important book because South Vietnam is the only crisis area where U.S. troops are actively engaged in hostilities—notwithstanding official semantics concerning their role.

Dr. Fall, an American citizen teaching at Howard University, was born a Frenchman, served in the French Army in Indochina, and is one of the few qualified Western observers to have traveled recently in North, as well as South, Vietnam. He writes understandingly of the French and American positions and attitudes, and he has a deep affection and respect for the long suffering Vietnamese people, the victims of an international quarrel not of their own making.

Many of Fall's interpretations and conclusions are bound to stir up controversy in various quarters. Fall is understandably sensitive about French colonial rule and its accomplishments in the face of the prevailing hostile American view of that rule. This defensiveness applies with particular force to President Roosevelt who roundly condemned French colonial policy in Indochina. (Indochina, incidentally, was not the only Asian problem about which Roosevelt thought he knew more than he did.) Even granting that French rule was not all black, this reviewer believes that Fall has tended to gloss over some of its less pleasant aspects. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say simply that neither the United

States nor France has had an outstanding record as far as the Indo-chinese peninsula is concerned.

The account of U.S. policy toward Indochina between 1950, when the first military aid program—in which this reviewer was intimately involved—was set up, and the Geneva accords of 1954 is depressing. If the French command during this period demonstrated tragically that it knew nothing about how to fight a guerrilla war, U.S. failure to develop a coherent and consistent policy was not exactly helpful, especially since Washington had made commitments without really understanding all their implications. For those who went through the China debacle to the bitter end, the Indochina story is painfully reminiscent of what happened in China and cannot but raise the question as to how much the United States learned from its China experience.

There is one factor in U.S. policy during the 1950-1954 period to which Fall does not give adequate weight. Without attempting to excuse American vacillation, there was a limit beyond which Washington could not go. As the crisis at Dien Bien Phu mounted, Vice President Nixon launched a trial balloon regarding the use of U.S. military power. The public reaction left no doubt that American disillusionment over our *guerre sale* in Korea ruled out any public support for action which might lead to a comparable involvement in the jungles of Vietnam. It is highly doubtful that even much stronger leadership than existed in

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Washington at that time could have overcome this resistance.

Today we find ourselves committed to giving precisely that kind of assistance to a Vietnamese government which we had refused to France. How are we making out? The answer, according to Fall, is badly, although it should be remembered that *The Two Viet-Nams* appeared in print just before President Diem's assassination. At the time he finished writing, Fall was inclined to think Diem would not be overthrown and would probably muddle through somehow, but he warned that the outcome was at best doubtful unless Diem changed his ways.

Fall's main argument, however, is still valid, and if he were writing today he might express greater hope for success—provided the new military regime has learned something from the mistakes Diem made. His argument is that the new approach to guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency is militarily correct in contrast to the French strategy based on classical warfare. But Fall asserts that these new military tactics are not enough, and events certainly support him. A military solution is vital, but it does not go to the heart of the matter. Nor is economic aid the crucial element, because Vietnamese standards of living, however marginal, are in no sense desperate, nor is starvation in prospect.

What neither Washington nor the Diem government seemed to understand is that this is a political and revolutionary struggle. Presumably the authors of the strategic

hamlet program had this in mind, but they ignored the deep resentment of the Vietnamese peasant at being moved forcibly from the piece of earth which he and his ancestors had tilled for many generations. His resentment was deepened when the move often failed to provide the security he had been promised.

In brief, no government in Vietnam has yet succeeded in attracting the unreserved loyalty of the people, without which the best military tactics are foredoomed to failure. Not all Viet Cong insurgents are infiltrators from North Vietnam; a substantial proportion are nationals of South Vietnam who are dissatisfied with their life. There is little evidence that Diem, despite American advice and criticism, ever understood the importance of gaining the loyalty of his people. The fate of the new rulers will hinge on this same factor.

Fall is particularly concerned that the war in South Vietnam is going so poorly when circumstances could hardly be more favorable to Saigon. North Vietnam either has not learned, or for some reason feels it cannot apply, one of Mao Tse-tung's cardinal principles on guerrilla warfare: the guerrillas are the fish, the people are the sea in which they swim. The Chinese communists won in large measure because they wooed the peasants. The Viet Cong, on the other hand, seem to operate on the basis of ruthless terrorism, brutality and murder. Hence they swim in hostile waters. No guerrilla force can long survive in this milieu—pro-

vided there is a reasonable alternative. Thus far, there is none. Unless such an alternative is forthcoming in the near future, the outcome of the struggle will be a communist victory with dangerous implications for the rest of Southeast Asia.

The solution in Vietnam must in the end be made by the Vietnamese. The United States can advise and assist, but even this help will eventually be considered foreign intervention by the Vietnamese if their own government cannot gain their full support. This was an obstacle France could never surmount; it is the real dilemma of American policy. The United States cannot do for the Vietnamese what they will not do for themselves. Will the new South Vietnamese government launch a meaningful political program? If so, the military aspect of the problem should be relatively simple to solve. If not, what then? At best, the U.S. position would be embarrassing. It could become much more embarrassing should Hanoi decide to step up the pace of guerrilla warfare. In this respect one of the greatest mysteries is why North Vietnam has been so self-restrained in waging the conflict. Assuredly, it could do more. Fall's eyewitness account of conditions in North Vietnam, incidentally, is one of the most interesting parts of the book.

Fall's book causes one to reflect on the thesis expounded so brilliantly by Dr. Tang Tsou in his recent book, *America's Failure in*

China.¹ In China, Tsou asserts, the United States was unwilling or unable to commit the necessary force—this does not mean military force alone—to secure its stated objectives, yet it still refused to modify its unattainable objectives. The repeatedly stated U.S. objective in Vietnam is to prevent a communist take-over. Have we realistically and honestly explored our purpose and capabilities? Or are we blindly hoping that we will not have to face up to the ultimate decision?

President de Gaulle may have reached his own answer—and he has been right often enough that one cannot simply dismiss him as a willful, uncooperative French nationalist. He is almost certainly correct in insisting that there can be no lasting solution to any of the problems around the periphery of China until China itself has been brought into a more normal relationship with the rest of the world. Whether this is possible before a catastrophe overtakes the border areas is unpredictable. Nor can we know unless there is at least some willingness to explore matters. Undoubtedly, the fatal flaw in U.S. policy on China and Vietnam has been its adamant refusal to consider alternatives to the existing position no matter how remote the prospects for working out acceptable solutions. Recent indications that we will keep an "open door" toward Peking—whatever that may mean—are encouraging.

¹Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.

Books Received

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

The Age of Magnificence: Memoirs of the Court of Louis XIV. By the Duc de Saint-Simon; selected, edited and translated by Sanche de Gramont. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963. 315 pp. \$5.95.

The editor has selected and translated passages from the twenty volumes of memoirs written by a member of the Court of Louis XIV. This study presents a vivid account of royal life at Versailles as well as a unique portrait of the French monarchy between 1675 and 1715.

The Approach to Self-Government. By Sir W. Ivor Jennings. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963. 204 pp. \$1.75 (paper).

This short volume is based on a series of BBC talks given in 1955 in which the author sought "to apply the experience of the Asian countries of the Commonwealth to the general problem of converting dependent territories into independent countries." Among the topics he discusses are the problem of finding men and women capable of running the machinery of government, communalism in politics, assuring free elections, the respective powers of the legislature and executive, and the dilemma of representative government in new countries.

Challenges to Democracy: The Next Ten Years. Edited by Edward Reed. New York: Praeger (for the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions), 1963. 245 pp. \$5.00 (cloth); \$1.95 (paper).

A series of seven essays by well-known political and social commentators. Among the papers are "The Role of Government in the Economy" by Gunnar Myrdal, "Technology and Democracy" by Lewis Mumford, and "The Elite and the Electorate: Is Government by the People Possible?" by J. William Fulbright.

The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. By Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 562 pp. \$8.50.

In this volume, the authors are concerned with such themes as "civic virtue and its consequences for the effectiveness and stability of the democratic polity; and with the kind of community life, social organization, and upbringing of children that fosters civic virtue." They contend that there exist in Britain and the United States, to a greater extent than in Germany, Italy and Mexico, a pattern of political attitudes and a basic set of social attitudes that support a stable democratic process.

Free Men and Free Markets. By Robert Theobald. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1963. 203 pp. \$5.00.

Concerned with the problems resulting from the increased use of automation, Mr. Theobald suggests that the United States adopt a policy that will provide everyone with an income whether he can find work or not. He also suggests what form the new social structure should take.

The Future of Political Science. By Harold D. Lasswell. New York: Atherton Press, 1963. 256 pp. \$6.50.

A provocative study of the problems and prospects of the political science

profession. Professor Lasswell argues the need for the establishment of "Centers for Advanced Political Science" to overcome the limitations of the fragmented intellectual and professional outlook which he feels presently inhibits the effectiveness of political scientists in meeting the requirements of society at large.

Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power. By Cora Bell. New York: Knopf, 1963. 248 pp. \$4.95.

This study, written while the author was a Rockefeller Fellow at Columbia University, examines the circumstances in which the phrase "negotiation from strength" has been used to describe Western policy toward the Soviet Union and the degree to which the substance of policy has corresponded to the phrase. She also discusses the various definitions given to this phrase and the reasons for the relative ineffectiveness of the Western effort both to build situations of strength and to pressure the Soviets toward negotiation.

The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy. By Arnold Kramish. New York: Harper & Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1963. 276 pp. \$5.50.

A well-informed treatment of the applications of nuclear science to the generation of electrical power, medical uses, peaceful projects of the "Plowshare" type, and propulsion problems. The author, a leading authority in his field, calls attention to certain facts which bear distinctly—and not too optimistically—upon the solution to the Nth country problem, notwithstanding the partial nuclear test ban.

The Planning and Execution of Economic Development: A Nontechnical Guide for Policy Makers and Administrators. By Louis J. Walinsky. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963. 248 pp. \$7.50.

It is the author's aim to increase the understanding between those government leaders who are responsible for making policy decisions regarding economic programs and the experts and technicians who advise them and carry out the programs. Mr. Walinsky believes the ultimate success or failure of development will depend upon the realism and consistency of the goals, plans, programs and policies adopted; on the effective use of resources; and on a realistic appreciation of the intricacies of the task.

The Popes and World Government. By Emile Guerry. Baltimore: Helicon, 1964. 254 pp. \$5.50.

The Archbishop of Cambrai presents a carefully documented study of those papal teachings—from Leo XIII to Pius XII—on the international order which form the background for the idea of the "world public authority" found in John XXIII's encyclical, *Pacem in Terris*.

The Population Dilemma. Edited by Philip M. Hauser. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall (for the American Assembly), 1963. 187 pp. \$1.95 (paper).

Eight essays on various aspects of the population problem which were used as the basis for discussion at the Twenty-third American Assembly at Arden House in May 1963. Consideration is given to such issues as family planning and the relevance of the population explosion to contemporary social problems, for example juvenile delinquency, urban renewal and increased educational opportunities.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Portraits of Power: An Introduction to Twentieth Century History through the Lives of Seventeen Great Political Leaders. Edited by S. E. Ayling. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1963. 432 pp. \$6.50 (cloth); \$2.50 (paper).

In a collection of excerpts from biographical works, Mr. Ayling presents in capsule form principal events in the lives of De Gaulle, Kemal Ataturk, Churchill, Nasser, Franco, Roosevelt, Khrushchev, Stalin, Tito, Gandhi, Lenin, Nehru, Mao Tse-tung, Lloyd George, Mussolini, Salazar and Hitler.

Power and International Relations. By Inis L. Claude, Jr. New York: Random House, 1962. 310 pp. \$6.75.

The author compares and evaluates three theoretical approaches to the problem of managing power in international relations: the balance of power, collective security and world government. The study contains Professor Claude's critique of traditional and contemporary literature about these three concepts, as well as his appraisal of the usefulness of each in the existing nation-state system.

Propaganda and International Relations. Compiled and edited by Urban G. Whitaker, Jr. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962. 246 pp. \$2.25 (paper).

This is a timely book of readings on propaganda as an instrument of policy. The editor has selected materials on the nature and role of propaganda, the propaganda activities and agencies of the major powers, proposals for U.S. government action in this field, and two case studies: the moratorium on nuclear testing and The Peace Corps.

Reflections on Modern History. By Hans Kohn. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963. 360 pp. \$8.75.

A collection of Professor Kohn's writings which reflects thirty years of thought as a historian, educator and interpreter of past and present events. The author sets forth his views of liberalism, nationalism, democracy, the United Nations, the Atlantic Community and the Cold War. Included also are essays on leading political philosophers such as Walter Bagehot, Lord Acton and James Bryce, and an examination of the ideas of nationalist thinkers in Europe.

The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community. By William H. McNeill. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963. 829 pp. \$12.50.

A new interpretation of world history by Professor McNeill, Chairman of the Department of History at the University of Chicago. The author argues that the cultures of mankind have had important interrelations with each other and that major social changes have usually been triggered by foreign stimuli. The book is divided into three main sections: The Era of Middle East Dominance to 500 B.C., the Eurasian Cultural Balance, 500 B.C.-1500 A.D., and The Era of Western Dominance, 1500 A.D. to the Present.

The Rulers. By Renzo Sereno. New York: Praeger, 1962. 186 pp. \$6.75.

In an analysis of the relationship between the rulers and the governed, the author offers a critique of existing elitist theories and presents his insights into the problem of political rule. Included is an evaluation of the writings of Tocqueville, Paine, Rousseau, Marx, Michels, Pareto, Mosca and Mannheim.

Shaping the World Economy: Suggestions for an International Economic Policy. By Jan Tinbergen. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962. 330 pp. \$4.00.

A leading Dutch economist examines the international economic problems confronting industrial and underdeveloped nations. He assesses the nature of changes in economic relationships during the last decade and offers proposals for achieving a more rational distribution of foreign aid and private overseas investment. Included are Professor Tinbergen's suggestions for stabilizing the revenues of countries producing primary commodities, for increasing world trade, and for arriving at a consensus between the leaders of advanced and underdeveloped countries about economic systems.

Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing. By J. A. C. Brown. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963. 325 pp. \$1.25 (paper).

In an examination of modern methods of thought control, the author evaluates the use of propaganda, psychological warfare and political warfare by the democracies as well as by totalitarian states; considers the nature of religious conversion and the efforts of modern industry to influence mass consumption; and assesses the impact of Pavlovian psychology upon communist techniques of persuasion.

The United Nations Emergency Force. By Gabriella Rosner. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. 294 pp. \$6.75.

In this comprehensive study of the United Nations Emergency Force, Miss Rosner treats such issues as its functions and powers, its composition, organization and control as well as its constitutional basis, legal status and financial situation. This volume is the second of the Columbia University Studies in International Organization.

Walter Lippmann's Philosophy of International Politics. By Anwar Hussain Syed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press (for the Foreign Policy Research Institute), 1963. 358 pp. \$6.00.

Dr. Syed, a Pakistani citizen now resident in the United States and teaching political science at the University of Massachusetts, seeks to trace the development of Walter Lippmann's philosophy of international politics during the past half century. He examines Lippmann's thinking on such topics as the nation-state system, national interest and power, collective security, world government, alliances, the balance of power, the Atlantic Community, European integration and the "public philosophy." Also presented are Lippmann's views on such topical subjects as De Gaulle, the Cuban crisis, the place of Germany in Europe, and the problems of Vietnam and Formosa.

World Revolution and Family Patterns. By William J. Goode. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. 432 pp. \$9.95.

The author, a Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, "seeks to describe and interpret the main changes in family patterns that have occurred over the past half-century in Japan, China, India, the West, sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab countries, and to relate them to various alterations in other institutional areas."

II. MILITARY AFFAIRS, ARMS CONTROL, TECHNOLOGY

American Military Forces Abroad: Their Impact on the Western State

BOOKS RECEIVED

System. By George Stambuk. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963. 252 pp. \$6.75.

Professor Stambuk of George Washington University examines the conditions under which the right to penetrate foreign territory or to build a base is acquired, as well as the status of the American soldier on foreign bases.

Arms and Stability in Europe. By Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for Strategic Studies), 1963. 236 pp. \$5.00.

A timely study of the relationship between new political and strategic developments within Europe and the effort to reach East-West arms agreements. This work analyzes such subjects as Europe in the world balance, problems of nuclear sharing and control of nuclear strategy within NATO, proposals for disengagement and denuclearization, the linkage between military postures and such political questions as German reunification, and the prospects for various arms control and disarmament measures currently under consideration.

The Coming Age of Solar Energy. By D. S. Halacy, Jr. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 241 pp. \$4.95.

As the earth's supply of coal, oil and gas decreases, the author feels that more attention should be given to efforts to utilize the tremendous power potential of the sun as a free source of energy.

The Fail-Safe Fallacy. By Sidney Hook. New York: Stein and Day, 1963. 32 pp. \$1.50.

Professor Hook, Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at New York University, writes a sharp critique of the Burdick-Wheeler best-selling novel, *Fail-Safe*. He sets out to prove that this book is a piece of unscientific science-fiction, based on non-facts, which tends to mislead the public into believing that "it is our system of defense and not the avowed design of a hostile totalitarian government that is the chief enemy to our survival."

Outer Space in World Politics. Edited by Joseph M. Goldsen. New York: Praeger, 1963. 180 pp. \$1.95 (paper).

A collection of seven papers on the military and political implications of man's effort to explore and utilize outer space. The papers include: "The Soviet Union and the Political Uses of Outer Space" by Arnold L. Horelick; "The Military Use of Outer Space: Bombardment Satellites" by Thomas C. Schelling; and "The International Implications of Outer-Space Activities" by Klaus Knorr.

The Strategy of Conflict. By Thomas C. Schelling. New York: Oxford University Press, A Galaxy Book, 1963. 309 pp. \$1.85 (paper).

A group of essays, originally published in 1960, on the theory of bargaining, conflict and strategy. The author states that "the philosophy of the book is that in the strategy of conflict there are . . . similarities between, say, maneuvering in limited war and jockeying in a traffic jam, between deterring the Russians and deterring one's own children, or between the modern balance of terror and the ancient institution of hostages." Professor Schelling's topics include: The Retarded Science of International Strategy; Bargaining, Communication and Limited War; The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack; and Surprise Attack and Disarmament.

ORBIS

War, Politics, and Power. Translated and edited by Edward M. Collins. Chicago: Henry Regnery, A Gateway Edition, 1962. 304 pp. \$1.95 (paper).

The editor has selected portions of Clausewitz's volumes, *On War* and *I Believe and Profess*, which remain applicable to contemporary problems of war and conflict strategy, and has written an informative introductory essay on Clausewitz's life and his contribution to military thought.

III. UNITED STATES

America as a Mass Society. Edited by Philip Olson. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. 576 pp. \$7.95.

Several social scientists examine the impact of the growth of corporations, the proliferation of urban centers, the development of governmental bureaucracy, and the increase in mass communications upon the American national character. The anthology contains contrasting essays which attempt to define and describe the term mass society. Other contributors consider in detail the major institutions of modern America and discuss the likely characteristics of U.S. political, economic and cultural life in the years ahead. The volume includes writings by such commentators as Thurman Arnold, Erich Fromm, Lewis Mumford, David Riesman, Edward Shils and William H. Whyte, Jr.

An Autobiography of the Supreme Court. Edited by Alan F. Westin. New York: Macmillan, 1963. 475 pp. \$7.50.

In a collection of excerpts from the memoirs, letters and speeches of Justices, the editor presents an account of the evolution of the Supreme Court from 1790 to 1961. Included are writings of John Jay, Joseph Story, John Marshall, Robert Jackson, Harlan F. Stone, William J. Brennan, Jr., Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, Earl Warren and Felix Frankfurter.

The Craft of Intelligence. By Allen Dulles. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 277 pp. \$4.95.

An absorbing account of the overt and clandestine sides of intelligence. Mr. Dulles sums up what he has learned from nearly a half-century of experience in foreign affairs, including some twenty years during which he was engaged directly and at the highest levels in intelligence activities. He briefly traces the history of espionage and the evolution of U.S. intelligence activities; reveals how intelligence is collected and processed and how it contributes to national policy and security; examines Soviet espionage techniques; and defends the practice of secret intelligence in a free country.

The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in America. By James MacGregor Burns. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963. 388 pp. \$5.95.

Professor Burns asserts that the American people have lost control of their political institutions and processes, that they have a government which operates by fits and starts and which cannot supply the steady leadership needed to conduct successfully their national and international affairs. This condition exists because "we face a four-party system [both Republicans and Democrats are split into a presidential and congressional party] that compels government by consensus and

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coalition rather than a two-party system that allows the winning party to govern and the losers to oppose." He supports his arguments by tracing the splintered and deadlocked U.S. government back to the framing of the Constitution, examines the political parties as they have developed, and concludes with bold proposals for changes in the U.S. political system.

Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1962. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 550 pp. \$7.50.

Another in the series of annual documentary volumes published under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, this edition contains a comprehensive selection of the major treaties, international agreements, diplomatic notes, policy statements and UN resolutions bearing upon United States diplomatic relations. Included are a complete coverage of the Cuban crisis, the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, and the texts of the major disarmament proposals.

The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective. By Seymour Martin Lipset. New York: Basic Books, 1963. 366 pp. \$5.95.

The author undertakes, through comparative sociological analysis, to explain why American democracy differs from political practices in such countries as Australia, Britain and Canada. Professor Lipset examines the impact of the distinctive American values of equality and achievement upon attitudes toward such phenomena as crime, church attendance, politics, education, civil liberties, family life, trade unions and the arts. The volume contains an assessment, based upon the American experience, of the general conditions of democratic stability and progress in newly independent countries.

From the New Freedom to the New Frontier: A History of the United States from 1912 to the Present. By Andre Maurois; translated by Patrick O'Brian. New York: David McKay, 1963. 365 pp. \$5.00.

A member of the Academie Française who has lived for extended periods in the United States examines the forces which have molded this country in the twentieth century. Tracing relationships between economic and political movements, the author has as his objective to organize and interpret existing knowledge about American history, rather than to introduce new materials. He analyzes the state of the Union on the eve of World War I, the evolution of Wilson's New Freedom, the factors causing the boom of the Twenties and the Great Depression, the social and economic programs of the New Deal, and the record of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.

George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939. By Forrest C. Pogue, with the editorial assistance of Gordon Harrison. New York: The Viking Press, 1963. 421 pp. \$7.50.

Drawing upon General Marshall's personal papers as well as interviews and previously classified governmental files, the author traces the career of the wartime Chief of Staff from his earliest years to the outbreak of World War II. This study includes an evaluation of Marshall's activities during the Spanish-American and First World Wars, and an examination of his attributes as a soldier. Several chapters present valuable insights into American foreign policy in a period when the United States achieved the status of Great Power.

The Illusion of Neutrality. By Robert A. Divine. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962. 370 pp. \$6.50.

Tracing the course of U.S. foreign policy during the 1930's, the author focuses his analysis upon the debate between isolationists and internationalists on the issue of American neutrality. The study examines the impact upon U.S. neutrality legislation of such events as the Japanese invasion of China, the rise of Hitler, and the Spanish Civil War. Professor Divine evaluates President Roosevelt's part in molding American attitudes toward isolationism and internationalism.

Mandate for Change: 1953-1956. By Dwight D. Eisenhower. New York: Doubleday, 1963. 650 pp. \$6.95.

A candid, personal account of the domestic and international policies of the first three Eisenhower years, ending with the President's decision in February 1956 to run for a second term. For the student of foreign affairs, there are particularly informative sections on the termination of hostilities in Korea, the French debacle in Indochina, the military "new look," the Formosan Doctrine of the winter of 1954-55, and the July 1955 Geneva Summit Meeting.

A Nation of States: Essays on the American Federal System. Edited by Robert A. Goldwin. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963. 148 pp. \$1.25 (paper).

Several students of American government examine the nature and problems of federalism in the United States. Included are essays on the Founding Fathers' conception of federalism, the meaning of the Tenth Amendment, and the struggle between proponents of "states rights" and "big government" in the American political system.

IV. WESTERN EUROPE

Britain and the U.S.A. By Herbert Nicholas. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. 192 pp. \$5.00.

In a published version of the Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, delivered in 1961 at Johns Hopkins University, the author traces the course of Anglo-American relations since 1938. The study evaluates Britain's effort to adjust her international commitments to her reduced national capabilities. Included in the volume are chapters on British relations with communist powers and governments in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. Professor Nicholas assesses the future of Britain's "special relationship" with the United States and her links with the Commonwealth.

Burgess and Maclean. By Anthony Purdy and Douglas Sutherland. New York: Doubleday, 1963. 182 pp. \$3.95.

The authors trace the activities of two British diplomats who defected to the Soviet Union in 1951. The backgrounds of Burgess and Maclean, their political affiliations, and the nature of the information taken by them to Moscow form the principal topics of investigation.

Cabinet Reform in Britain, 1914-1963. By Hans Daalder. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. 381 pp. \$8.00.

A study of the evolution of the British Cabinet since 1914, especially the impact which the world wars and the extension of social services have had upon the executive in Britain. The study contains an evaluation of proposals for cabinet reform put forward by leading British statesmen and academicians. Professor

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Daalder discusses in a postscript the immediate implications for cabinet organization of the replacement of Prime Minister Macmillan by Lord Home, as well as recent changes in Britain's machinery for economic planning and defense.

The Common Market—Today and Tomorrow. By Michael Shanks and John Lambert. New York: Praeger, 1962. 253 pp. \$2.25 (paper).

Two British journalists discuss the structure of the European Economic Community, consider the problems confronting Britain in applying for membership, and examine the Community's likely course of evolution. Their study traces the history of Britain's relations with Europe since 1945, and assesses the prospects for an Atlantic Partnership and a strengthened NATO.

Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century. By Bruce M. Russett. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963. 252 pp. \$7.00.

In a study which has as its objective to develop a body of theory for analyzing relations between two nations, the author assesses the impact of such phenomena as international communications and mutual interests upon Anglo-American relations. Mr. Russett concludes that the "special relationship" between Britain and America is less close today than formerly and makes recommendations for reversing this trend.

The Fall of the House of Habsburg. By Edward Crankshaw. New York: The Viking Press, 1963. 459 pp. \$7.50.

In a narrative of the long reign of Emperor Franz Josef, the author examines the causes of the disintegration of the Austrian Empire. He traces developments within the empire as well as shifts in the balance of power in Europe between 1848 and the outbreak of World War I. Drawing upon new documentation from the Austrian State Archives, Mr. Crankshaw offers a unique interpretation of the events preceding the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo.

The Genesis of the Common Market. By W. O. Henderson. London: Frank Cass & Company, 1962. 202 pp. 28/-.

The author considers efforts during the past two centuries to liberalize trade in Western Europe by bilateral commercial treaties, customs unions and agreements to facilitate transport across frontiers. Emphasis is placed upon the Anglo-French economic treaties of 1786 and 1860, upon the German customs union of 1834-70, and upon associations for regulating particular branches of industry. The study assesses the relationship between the Coal and Steel Community and Common Market, and earlier efforts to remove trade barriers in Europe.

The German Phoenix. By William Henry Chamberlin. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1963. 309 pp. \$5.95.

A leading American journalist traces the course of German political life, economic development, foreign relations and cultural activities since the end of World War II. Included in the author's account are assessments of Konrad Adenauer's contribution to the Federal Republic, the durability of democratic political institutions, and the prospects for continuity in German policies toward NATO and the United States. Mr. Chamberlin's findings are based upon interviews with leading West German personalities and contacts with students, businessmen, military figures and farmers in all parts of the Federal Republic.

The Last Day of the Old World. By Adrian Ball. New York: Doubleday, 1963. 278 pp. \$4.95.

An account of the events of September 3, 1939, the day on which World War II began. The author describes diplomatic conversations among major European powers, final peace moves by both sides, and the last-minute war preparations of Britain and France as they responded to Nazi Germany's attack against Poland. The volume contains many photographs depicting popular and official activities in European capitals on that historic day.

Modern Political Systems: Europe. Edited by Roy C. Macridis and Robert E. Ward. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963. 575 pp. \$8.50.

Retaining the traditional "country-by-country" format, the authors make use of a common framework of exposition and analysis in an effort to introduce, in an undergraduate text, recent theorizing in the field of comparative politics. Each contributor considers a European political system in the context of the larger social order in which it operates. Included are chapters on Britain by Samuel Finer; France, by Roy C. Macridis; the German Federal Republic, by Karl W. Deutsch; and the Soviet Union, by Vernon V. Aspaturian.

The Origin of the West German Republic. By Peter H. Merkl. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. 269 pp. \$2.75.

The author examines relationships between the Allied occupying powers and German leaders in the formation of the Bonn Constitution. The study emphasizes the part played by the German "founders" of the new state and considers the nature of postwar German federalism with its provision for strong local administrations.

Stalin and the French Communist Party, 1941-1947. By Alfred J. Rieber. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. 395 pp. \$7.50.

In a study of relations during the Second World War and the immediate postwar years between the Soviet Union and the French Communist Party, the author examines Soviet strategy and tactics with respect to one of Moscow's most loyal groups of followers in the Free World. Professor Rieber assesses the contribution of the French Communist Party to the Resistance and reveals how support for the shifts in Soviet policy helped frustrate the achievement of communist objectives in France. Sources include interviews with French officials, former members of the French Communist Party, Resistance leaders, and official archives in the Soviet Union and France.

A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity: The Italian National Society in the Risorgimento. By Raymond Grew. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 500 pp. \$10.00.

An interesting and documented study of the role of the Italian National Society during the period of the struggle for Italian unification. The author examines also the social, political and intellectual climate of the time as well as how the ideals and values of the Society interlocked with the movement.

West Indian Migrants: Social and Economic Facts of Migration from the West Indies. By R. B. Davison. London: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1962. 87 pp. \$1.75 (paper).

Mr. Davison is concerned with the reasons for West Indian migration to Great

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Britain, its fluctuations and its organization, as well as its effect upon the economic and social structure of the societies of the islands.

Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles. By Trumbull Higgins. New York: Macmillan, 1963. 308 pp. \$6.95.

Rather than concentrating upon descriptions of the military operation itself, the author traces the origins, planning and direction of the abortive assault at Gallipoli during World War I. Portraying the roles of British leaders who favored and opposed the Gallipoli venture, the study draws upon new historical documentation, including the unpublished papers of Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Herbert Asquith.

V. SOVIET BLOC

Ideology in Conflict: Communist Political Theory. Edited by Dieter Dux. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963. 198 pp. \$1.50 (paper).

A collection of documents on the Sino-Soviet controversy from the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 to the 22nd Congress in October-November 1961.

The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking. By Edward Crankshaw. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963. 167 pp. \$.65 (paper).

An account, written in a popular style, of the Sino-Soviet rift. The author provides background data on the emergence of China, the seeds of conflict between the two communist giants, and "the Khrushchev line." He then traces the development of the rift from 1956 to 1963, and concludes that "the world Communist movement, as a monolithic phenomenon controlled from a single center, whether Moscow or Peking, is finished. . . . China will survive, an independent power of colossal size, proclaiming a revolutionary creed, at least for decades to come, and creating problems on a scale to match her size and her contempt of the West, including Russia."

Patterns of Soviet Politics. By Richard C. Gripp. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1963. 366 pp. \$9.35.

Following discussion of Tsarist and Soviet history and an outline of the theoretical foundations of modern communism, Professor Gripp describes and explains the Soviet governmental-political body in its organization, operation, and in some of its achievements and failures. In a final section the author treats the subject of Soviet foreign policy.

The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky 1929-1940. By Isaac Deutscher. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. 543 pp. \$9.50.

Drawing extensively upon archives and interviews, the author, in the third volume of his study of Trotsky, examines the life of Stalin's arch communist critic from his banishment from the Soviet Union to his murder by Soviet agents in Mexico. Mr. Deutscher provides a comprehensive account of Soviet history in the 1930's, including efforts toward industrialization and collectivization, the great purges, and the outbreak of the Second World War.

Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917-1957. By Robert S. Sullivant. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. 438 pp. \$8.50.

In a detailed analysis of the programs adopted by Soviet leaders toward the Ukraine, the author presents a case study of communist nationality policy. Professor Sullivant examines the Bolshevik approach to Ukrainian nationalism,

elaborates on Soviet efforts to achieve centralization and uniformity during the Stalinist period, and considers the attempts of Stalin's successors to Russianize the Ukraine.

The Two Faces of TASS. By Theodore E. Kruglak. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963. 263 pp. \$2.45 (paper).

The author describes the organization of the communist news agency and evaluates its methods for the dissemination of information in the Soviet Union, the satellites and the Free World. The study includes an examination of images of the United States and the Soviet Union projected by TASS, as well as an assessment of the Soviets' use of their news-gathering machinery for espionage and propaganda.

VI. MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

Environment and Policies in West Africa. By R. J. Harrison Church. Princeton: Van Nostrand, A Searchlight Original, 1963. 135 pp. \$1.45 (paper).

An introduction to the countries and territories of West Africa, from Spanish Sahara and Mauritania to Niger and Nigeria. After briefly describing each political entity, the author discusses political ties and rivalries among the West African states, their economic problems, and their relations with the outside world.

Middle East Oil Crises and Western Europe's Energy Supplies. By Harold Lubell. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. 233 pp. \$8.75.

This RAND Corporation study analyzes Western Europe's dependence upon oil from a politically volatile region and the way in which future international crises may affect the energy problem. The author concludes that Western Europe can be protected against subsequent emergencies provided that proper policies are developed to take advantage of indigenous resources, non-Middle East supplies, transport capabilities and new sources of energy beyond oil. More than 50 pages of appendices and tables form a useful supplement.

The Modern Middle East. Edited by Richard H. Nolte. New York: Atherton Press, 1963. 218 pp. \$5.95.

A series of interpretive essays about the problems of Westernization in the Arab world. Contributors examine such topics as patterns of government at the local level, the nature of national political systems, the decline of Western influence, the role of women in Arabic society, the crisis of the intelligentsia, and the rule of law in the Middle East.

The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa. By Manfred Halpern. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 431 pp. \$8.50.

In an effort to probe beneath the revolutions of nationalism and rising expectations, a consultant to the RAND Corporation examines the social, ideological and political transformation of Islamic society as it undergoes modernization. Attention is focused upon the role of the peasants, workers, political parties, emerging middle class, and the army and civil bureaucracy in the process of change.

Power and Stability in Nigeria: The Politics of Decolonization. By Henry L. Bretton. New York: Praeger, 1962. 208 pp. \$6.00.

Using Nigeria as a case study, Professor Bretton examines the problems of adaptation in countries where Western political institutions have been super-

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imposed upon societies differing markedly from those of their former colonial rulers. He analyzes Nigerian politics since independence, and suggests a model for the systematic investigation of governmental problems in other developing countries.

Turkey Today—And Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization. By Nuri Eren. New York: Praeger, 1963. 276 pp. \$6.50.

The author, a Turkish diplomat and scholar, believes a study of Turkey's experience in developing her economy and institutions is of particular importance since it can provide valuable information for all those nations which are faced with the difficult choice of achieving growth through individual orientation or by authoritarian regimentation. He discusses and analyzes the present parliamentary democracy and the 1961 Constitution as well as the political parties, leaders and the prospects for a democratic system in Turkey.

The United States and Israel. By Nadav Safran. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 341 pp. \$5.95.

A member of the Harvard faculty, writing in the American Foreign Policy Library series, traces the historical origins of modern Israel; the role played by the United States in the birth of the state; the physical, human and political environment and dynamics of Israel's life; the pressing problems of economic survival and national defense; Israel's position vis-à-vis the Arab states; and the pattern of her relations with the great powers, especially the United States.

The United States and the Middle East. Edited by Georgiana G. Stevens. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964. 182 pp. \$3.95 (cloth) ; \$1.95 (paper).

This latest in the series of regional surveys prepared for the American Assembly contains essays by six specialists who deal with the background of the Middle East, social and economic modernization, international politics in the area, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and U.S. policy in the Middle East.

VII. EAST ASIA

Americans and Chinese: A Historical Essay and a Bibliography. By Kwang-Ching Liu. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 211 pp. \$4.50.

In order to stimulate research into Chinese-American relations, the author and a group of scholars at Harvard University here present a thorough survey of archival and published resources in the United States relating to this subject.

Britain and South-East Asia. By Saul Rose. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. 208 pp. \$5.00.

A general history of the expansion and contraction of British dominion in Southeast Asia. One half of the book is devoted to the post-1945 period, with sections on Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Borneo, aid and trade, and strategy and politics. Although completed in February 1962, this volume provides useful material for an understanding of the current crisis over Malaysia.

China's Cultural Diplomacy. By Herbert Passin. New York: Praeger, 1963. 133 pp. \$4.50.

Dr. Passin, Professor of Sociology at Columbia University, discusses China's efforts to promote its policies and position through the use of foreign visitors,

international meetings, drama and film festivals, musical contests, exhibits and other forms of cultural exchange. He examines the experiences of nine countries that have participated in cultural exchanges with China and explores the political factors which regulate these exchanges.

The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. By Herbert Feith. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962. 618 pp. \$8.75.

A thorough political history of Indonesia from 1949 to 1957, the period during which Indonesia attempted to govern itself under transplanted Western democratic institutions. Dr. Feith, an Australian political scientist, traces the efforts of seven cabinets to wrestle with Indonesia's vast political, economic and social problems and to maintain themselves in power. His major concern throughout is to determine why this attempt to utilize democratic institutions failed and was abandoned.

Far Eastern Affairs: Number Three. Edited by G. F. Hudson. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963. 143 pp. \$4.25.

This 14th volume of St. Antony's Papers contains seven essays on such topics as "Tibet and Ladakh: A History," "The Chinese Communes," and "Interviews with Indonesian Communist Leaders."

The Himalayan Kingdoms: Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal. By Pradyumna P. Karan and William M. Jenkins, Jr. 144 pp.

Indonesia: The Crisis of the Millstones. By Benjamin Higgins with Jean Higgins. 144 pp.

Japan: Industrial Power of Asia. By Robert B. Hall, Jr. 127 pp.

The Lower Mekong: Challenge to Cooperation in Southeast Asia. By C. Hart Schaaf and Russell H. Fifield. 136 pp.

Pakistan: Emerging Democracy. By Robert D. Campbell. 144 pp.

Princeton: Van Nostrand, Searchlight Originals, 1963. \$1.45 each (paper).

These five books provide essential background information on three important East Asian countries, three small Himalayan kingdoms, and the strategic region of the lower Mekong River. They are volumes in the Van Nostrand Searchlight Books series, original paperbacks focusing on specific nations, regions and problems of international significance.

Indians in Fiji. By Adrian Mayer. London: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1963. 142 pp. \$1.75 (paper).

This book presents a history of the Indo-Fijian community in Fiji. It analyzes Indo-Fijian relations with the Fijian and European communities, and the significance of these for the social, economic and political problems now facing Fiji.

Major Governments of Asia. Edited by George McT. Kahin. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963. 719 pp. \$10.00.

The second edition, revised and enlarged, of a comparative government text which treats the five major Asian nations, China, Japan, India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Each author—Harold C. Hinton, Nobutaka Ike, Norman D. Palmer, George McT. Kahin, and Keith Callard and Richard S. Wheeler—provides a brief historical introduction to the subject country, describes the nation's governmental institutions, constitution and political parties, and discusses such matters

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as the domestic power structure, political dynamics, socio-economic forces, and contemporary domestic and foreign affairs.

North Korea Today. Edited by Robert A. Scalapino. New York. Praeger, 1963. 141 pp. \$4.00.

This volume, based on a portion of the April-June 1963 issue of *The China Quarterly*, contains articles on the political situation in North Korea before and after the Korean War, foreign policy, industrial and agricultural development, land reform and collectivization, political leadership, the army and the communist party, the judicial and administrative structure, and the educational system.

Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power. By Karl Wittfogel. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. 556 pp. \$2.95 (paper).

This is the paperback edition of Professor Wittfogel's comprehensive and scholarly study of man's "hydraulic" response to arid, semi-arid and particular humid environments, and an examination of why "in such a [hydraulic] society supreme autocratic leadership is the rule." The author has made a few additions and corrections to his original text published in 1957.

The Red Army of China: A Short History. By Edgar O'Ballance. New York: Praeger, 1963. 231 pp. \$6.00.

A British Army major, author of two previous books on *The Arab-Israeli War 1948* and *The Sinai Campaign of 1956*, examines the development of the Chinese Red Army from its birth in 1927 to the present. He devotes separate chapters to the efforts of the Chinese Nationalists to exterminate the Red Army after 1928; the Long March to the northwest; the North Shensi Soviet period; the Red Army's operations against the Japanese; the Civil War against the Nationalists; the victorious campaigns of the late 1940's; and the Korean War.

Studies in Panchayati Raj. By B. Maheshwari. Delhi, India: Metropolitan Book Company, 1963. 196 pp. Rs. 10.

A collection of essays on the Panchayati Raj (village democracy) by a political scientist at the University of Rajasthan. He describes the background and objectives of this system, the activities and procedures of a typical village council in Rajasthan, problems of communication, finance and administration, the role of political parties, and the need for improved leadership at the village level.

Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics. By Masao Maruyama. London: Oxford University Press, 1963. 344 pp. \$6.75.

Nine essays on the modern Japanese political scene by an eminent Japanese political scientist whose writings are widely read in Japan and exert considerable influence on the postwar generation. The subject matter of his essays includes the psychology of ultra-nationalism, the ideology and dynamics of Japanese fascism, the thought and behavior of Japan's wartime leaders, a critique of de-Stalinization, and politics as a science in Japan.

U Nu of Burma. By Richard Butwell. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963. 301 pp. \$7.50.

A biography of the most important member of the political elite which governed Burma from 1948 to 1962. Based largely on personal interviews with U Nu and other Burmese leaders, this study depicts not only U Nu's rise to prominence in the 1930's, his activities during the Japanese occupation and his record as Premier, but also his religious and political philosophy. Moreover, it serves as an introduction to Burmese political institutions and processes.

Contributors to this Issue

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John F. Melby, Lecturer in Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; former Foreign Service Officer with service in the Soviet Union, China and Southeast Asia.

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